It’s now clear that the “exploding pagers” were just the first phase: first, cut off Hezbollah’s internal communications, and then strike the organization’s leadership. The world holds its breath, wondering: what’s next?
Tensions in the region are already running high amid Israel’s operation in Gaza, where the “collateral damage” has clearly surpassed what global public opinion can “swallow.” Against this backdrop, a strike on Beirut certainly won’t bring peace in the next few hours. Undoubtedly, Israel had and still has the right to respond to the shelling of its cities and towns from Lebanese territory, something Hezbollah has been actively doing, but how far does the response that includes striking Beirut fit within acceptable limits?
Iran has declared a five-day mourning period for Sheikh Nasrallah. The official representative of the Islamic Republic’s Foreign Ministry, Nasser Kanani, has already stated: “Iran continues its efforts following the conversation between the first vice-president [Mohammad Reza Aref] and [Lebanese Prime Minister Najib] Mikati. We are in contact with the Lebanese authorities and monitoring the situation. Iran will not leave any of the Zionist regime’s aggressive actions unanswered, and the regime will not go unpunished for its crimes.”
But what does this mean in practice? So far, Tehran has made it clear that it will not send soldiers to assist Hezbollah. Nothing has been mentioned about missile strikes, drones, etc. However, the world had already been waiting for weeks for Iran’s response to the elimination of one of Hamas’ leaders, Ismail Haniyeh, but instead, it witnessed Israel’s strike on Sheikh Nasrallah’s bunker. Moreover, Israel continues to “take out” the leadership of Palestinian groups — now the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is under threat in every sense. Simultaneously, key targets of the Yemeni Houthis are also being hit. This raises uncomfortable questions: where will Israel stop? Will it limit itself to strikes on Iran’s proxies, or is Iran itself the next target? And in that case, what to expect — strikes on nuclear facilities, military bases, or government institutions? It’s no coincidence that within hours, reports emerged of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei being relocated to “a more secure location” — the strike on Hezbollah’s headquarters in Tehran was clearly seen as a “warning.” The “spiral of escalation” is spinning at an unprecedented pace. Even if no strike on Iran follows, it is not yet a reason to sigh with relief.
Will Tehran continue to watch as Israel decimates its most valuable and capable proxies without intervening? This is not only humiliating but also dangerous, especially in the Middle East. And even within Iran itself, peaceful gestures have often been perceived as weakness. Azerbaijan knows this very well. Will Iran eventually enter into a direct conflict with Israel? So far, Tehran has waged wars through its proxies, but how will things develop now? What position will “third countries” take? The sympathies of the “Muslim street” are largely on the side of the Palestinians, but in the oil monarchies, Iran is feared far more than Israel. During the last Iranian raid on Israel, many Muslim countries allowed missiles to be intercepted in their airspace. In principle, many Muslim capitals wouldn’t strongly oppose it if the “troublesome Zionists” were to solve the Iranian problem. Iran suddenly finds itself in a very vulnerable position, and most disturbingly, the situation’s development hardly depends on Tehran itself or its current president, Masoud Pezeshkian.
It’s hardly necessary to remind anyone that, in such a context, Tehran most of all needs good and predictable relations with its neighboring states. And it raises an interesting question: in the current situation, with Israel bombing Hezbollah’s headquarters in Beirut and key Houthi infrastructure in Yemen, does the Zangezur Corridor still remain Iran’s primary “red line”?
It’s worth reconsidering the arguments. First, “red lines” should be drawn on one’s own territory, not someone else’s. Second, the Zangezur Corridor is a rail and highway that will pass through Armenian territory and has nothing to do with Iran. Third, this is not anyone’s whim but signed commitments that need to be fulfilled. Finally, Iran’s nervous reaction to the Zangezur Corridor certainly doesn’t contribute to strengthening good-neighborly relations with Azerbaijan.
Iranian leadership certainly has much to ponder, but time for reflection may already be running out.
