Is the West alone in its expectations and demands toward Azerbaijan?
Before answering this question, it is important to clarify the phrase “collective West,” which I have put in quotation marks to specify what I mean by it. When I speak about Azerbaijan’s confrontation with the “collective West,” I am aware that this expression is widely used in Russian informational space and often serves propagandistic purposes. It emphasizes the supposed monolithism of Western countries in their opposition to Russia and its values. However, by using this phrase, I do not subscribe to conspiracy theories (even though some may contain a kernel of truth), but merely underline the fact that in relations with Azerbaijan, there have been hardly any noticeable differences in the approaches of the U.S. and united Europe, especially in recent years.
Nevertheless, it is essential to understand that smooth and cloudless relations between states are rare, and Azerbaijan is no exception. Today, Azerbaijan finds itself in a unique situation where either too much is expected of it, or these expectations serve as a convenient pretext for criticism. This pressure does not come solely from the collective West. Even in brotherly Turkey, there is a portion of society that expresses dissatisfaction with Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, particularly regarding its economic ties with Israel, energy supplies, and military deals.
When it comes to Israel, one cannot overlook the criticism from the so-called Islamic world toward Azerbaijan, especially due to its balanced position in relation to Israel and the Middle East conflict. While many Arab countries take a pragmatic approach to relations with Israel, Azerbaijan is often criticized for its lack of a strong anti-Israel rhetoric and the absence of Islamic solidarity.
Iran occupies a special place among those dissatisfied, as it questions Azerbaijan’s very right to exist, raising nationalist issues and laying claim to historical territories, regardless of Azerbaijan’s interactions with Israel. This rhetoric finds support not only among conservative circles but also among opposition forces in Iran, including supporters of the Shah’s regime both within and outside the country. There is a certain doctrinal Persian consensus regarding Azerbaijan, where the country is seen as a part of Iran and thus has no right to independent existence.
Even friendly Ukraine does not remain neutral. After each meeting between Aliyev and Putin, whether it is Putin’s visit to Baku or Aliyev’s trip to Moscow, some Ukrainian media outlets and bloggers criticize Azerbaijan. Aliyev is accused of authoritarianism, yielding to Russia, and allegedly fearing Putin. No other former CIS country faces such anger over its ties with Russia.
The situation with Russia itself is also quite ambiguous. Despite seemingly cordial relations between Moscow and Baku, within the Russian political spectrum, including among those in power, there are disagreements over Azerbaijan’s “overly independent” policies. Russia’s liberal circles, opposed to Putin, are also distinctly anti-Azerbaijan. In liberal circles, the idea of a “historical mission” towards Armenia is popular, with its proponents believing that Armenia must be unconditionally supported. This romantic concept traces back to the legacy of figures like Osip Mandelstam and Joseph Brodsky, iconic figures for Russian liberals, whose sentiments have shaped the perception of Armenians as objects of special care and sympathy. Anti-Azerbaijan sentiments in Russia are driven by concerns over Turkey’s (read: NATO’s) influence in the South Caucasus region and historical ties with Armenia, as well as the special obligations Russia believes it must fulfill toward the country. Thus, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia can be described as a “friendship with hidden enmities”: cooperation is maintained at the official level, but underlying antagonisms and conflicting interests make these relations far more complex than they appear at first glance.
It is important to note, however, that all of the aforementioned attacks and examples of pressure rarely originate from official government structures, even in the case of Iran, where state officials, no matter their personal views of Azerbaijan, are bound to adhere to protocol. In most cases, the sources of criticism toward Azerbaijan worldwide are public opinion leaders, journalists, bloggers, provocative politicians, and representatives of non-governmental organizations. In the case of the West, however, the situation is different—here, the pressure on Azerbaijan often takes on a systemic character and comes not only from bloggers and journalists but directly from governments, making this confrontation significantly more serious.
How collective is the West?
Azerbaijan’s relations with the collective West have never been without conflict. Parliaments of various European countries, both individually and through structures like the European Parliament and PACE, have regularly adopted resolutions condemning Azerbaijan’s actions, even going as far as refusing to extend the mandate of Azerbaijan’s delegation to PACE. The U.S. State Department has also frequently raised concerns about Azerbaijan in its reports, and NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have continued to criticize the country, particularly on issues related to press freedom, human rights, and democratic processes. Notably, the intensity of this pressure has always increased ahead of major international events. We saw this in the past, when waves of criticism surged before Eurovision, the European Games, and each Formula 1 event hosted in Azerbaijan. Now, ahead of the COP29 conference and in light of Azerbaijan’s restoration of full sovereignty over its territory through a one-day anti-terror ops, the pressure has reached its peak.
Within the European Union, it has been less the collective will of Brussels that has shaped policy toward Azerbaijan, and more the influence of France, which holds a dominant position behind the scenes of European politics. France, due to its close ties with the Armenian diaspora, has consistently supported Armenian interests, which hold special significance for the country. It is not so important whether France is deeply and irreversibly influenced by the Armenian lobby or is consciously using the Armenian factor for its political aims. The key point is that the relations between France and Azerbaijan, which have never been particularly warm, have now reached a stage where Azerbaijan responds not only with words but also with concrete actions to France’s ongoing anti-Azerbaijani policies. Azerbaijan has taken on the mission of defending the rights of peoples affected by French colonialism across the globe. This activity has sparked outrage from the French side and is taken very seriously.
And this is truly unfortunate, because if we exclude the Armenian factor, which France seems to have made a priority in its relations with Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis have generally had a positive image of this country, its culture, as well as a place for education and employment.
It is worth noting that these actions by Azerbaijan go beyond merely satisfying narrow interests or attempting to harm France. The fact that a relatively small country like Azerbaijan is taking on the defense of the rights of colonial peoples indicates that the country is moving to a new level and aspires to play a more significant role on the international stage. This, without a doubt, sends a worrying signal to a certain portion of the international community, and opposition from France—and not only France—in this context is both expected and logical.
Russia was written off too quickly
After Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War and the subsequent events, the U.S. and the EU, led by France, not only intensified their pressure in an attempt to solidify their influence in the South Caucasus, but have done so aggressively and directly, abandoning the traditional methods of “soft power.” This approach may indicate that the West views the Ukrainian front as a serious obstacle for Russia, limiting its ability to actively intervene in the affairs of the South Caucasus. In this context, the successes of the Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance, such as the presence of the Turkish general staff in Azerbaijan, the reorganization of the Azerbaijani army following the Turkish model, the purge of pro-Russian officers before, during, and after the war, the stationing of F-16 fighter jets on Azerbaijani soil during the 44-day war to deter Armenia’s potential allies, and the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh in 2024, may have given the West the false impression that Russia is easily conceding its position. In other words, rather than Russia agreeing to the Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance on mutually beneficial terms, it is seen as having been forced to retreat due to its own weakness and inability to effectively counter their actions. This understanding is viewed merely as a desperate attempt to justify itself and save face.
The belief that Russia has lost its leverage in the South Caucasus and is weakened has pushed the U.S. and the EU to take more active steps to secure their foothold in the region. This includes supplying weapons to Armenia, conducting military exercises, and deploying observers on the border with Azerbaijan. It is also openly acknowledged that Armenia is now being considered as a new strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, especially given that Georgia, once the West’s stronghold in the region, is gradually turning away from it—at least, this is how the events in Georgia are interpreted in the West.
Aliyev Accuses
As expected, this intensified confrontation led to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev issuing his most direct and harsh criticism of the U.S. for the first time. On October 4, during a meeting with residents of the liberated city of Jabrayil, Aliyev accused the U.S. of manipulating sanctions against Azerbaijan, referring to Section 907 of the United States Freedom Support Act, which had restricted direct U.S. aid to Azerbaijan since 1992. He noted, “America imposed sanctions on Azerbaijan in 1992 when our lands were under occupation. However, in 2001, the sanctions were suspended due to their interests in Afghanistan. As soon as they left Afghanistan, the sanctions were reimposed.”
A few days later, on the sidelines of the informal CIS summit in Moscow, Aliyev spoke out against sanctions policy in general, calling it “unacceptable.” He once again referenced Section 907, stating that sanctions against Azerbaijan are illegal and unjustified. In his view, sanctions today are applied selectively, highlighting the need for the international community to unite against this tool of pressure. Aliyev also revealed that 60 U.S. congressmen had proposed imposing sanctions on Azerbaijan for restoring its territorial integrity, expressing confidence that this proposal was backed by the U.S. State Department. He emphasized that Baku opposes the application of sanctions, both against Azerbaijan and against any other country or its citizens.
President Ilham Aliyev’s sharp remarks also targeted the European Union, particularly France. During a meeting with Belgium’s new ambassador Julien de Fraipont on October 14, Aliyev once again addressed the role of the EU in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. He criticized the EU’s policy for maintaining neutrality throughout nearly 30 years of the occupation of Azerbaijani lands, referring to the OSCE Minsk Group, which, he argued, was the body responsible for resolving the conflict, not the EU. However, in Aliyev’s view, now that the conflict is over, the EU is actively intervening in regional affairs, which Baku perceives as an attempt to delay the normalization process, especially considering that some EU representatives openly support Armenia.
Aliyev’s particular dissatisfaction was directed toward France’s destructive role in the conflict. He warned the European Union that following France’s example could prove to be a mistake. Azerbaijan also expressed discontent over the extension of the European monitoring mission’s mandate on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border without Baku’s consent. The president described the mission’s activities as “binocular diplomacy,” which he said violates the norms of political culture.
What does everyone want from Azerbaijan?
The root of the issue likely lies in Azerbaijan’s behavior, which, recognizing the shifting geopolitical landscape and the collapse of the old unipolar order where the U.S. played the leading role, has begun actively forging new relationships with international organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), while strengthening ties with the Global South. Azerbaijan is evaluating the current situation from a pragmatic and balanced perspective, building relations with key international players such as Russia and China, as well as with other countries open to constructive cooperation. Baku’s priorities remain its national interests and an independent foreign policy.
As a result, Azerbaijan’s behavior may seem provocative and unconventional, because according to the established logic, Azerbaijan is expected to “know its place.” It is assumed that moral superiority lies with the West, and it is the West that should dictate the terms, with others expected to follow. However, Azerbaijan’s pursuit of a multipolar world sharply contrasts with Washington’s approaches, leading to significant disagreements between Baku and the West.
It will take time for the centers of power and global hegemons to come to terms with Azerbaijan’s new role and ambitions, as it has no intention of being compliant, submitting to external dictates, relinquishing its status as a victor, or showing unnecessary leniency toward Armenia. For the collective West, this departure from the familiar order is understandably met with frustration and resentment. Nevertheless, on the international stage, Azerbaijan’s actions, based on international law, which it has skillfully and justly utilized over the past three decades, appear justified and aligned with its national interests. This makes the criticism directed at Azerbaijan less convincing.
Conclusion and Recommendations
It is unlikely that relations between Azerbaijan and the West will deteriorate to the point of recalling ambassadors, complete cessation of contact, or a break in diplomatic relations. History shows that such extremes have never been reached, and in the current situation, this also seems improbable. Sanctions are not expected either, as international consortia are actively operating in Azerbaijan, and their interests in the region are too significant to impose serious restrictions against the country. It is even more difficult to consider sanctions against Azerbaijan when Armenia, despite its westward aspirations, is actively involved in circumventing anti-Russian sanctions, a fact the West seems to tolerate. The West’s silence on this matter hints that if it benefits Armenia economically, it is deemed acceptable. Azerbaijan sees this double standard and undoubtedly takes it into account in its foreign policy.
Nevertheless, President Aliyev also acknowledges the positive aspects of relations with the EU. In a conversation with Belgium’s new ambassador, he emphasized that Brussels has been a successful platform for negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the support of Charles Michel. Aliyev also noted the importance of cooperation with the EU in areas such as energy, the green economy, transport, and trade. Despite disagreements over the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Azerbaijan sees potential for strengthening partnerships with European countries, especially in light of the upcoming COP29 climate conference to be held in Baku.
Fundamentally, Azerbaijanis do not have an ideological or philosophical conflict with the West. On the contrary, the Western way of life continues to be attractive to the vast majority of the Azerbaijani population. This is reflected in many areas — from standards in education, science, and medicine to the overall way of life. Secular by nature, Azerbaijanis have long adapted to Western realities and successfully integrate into Western societies without cultural shock or worldview conflicts. Azerbaijan is a country with a European way of life but with its own unique charm and, of course, problems that concern us deeply. However, these problems can be resolved domestically, over time, without the need for external interference or mentoring pressure from other countries. Such attempts usually complicate the situation rather than bring any benefit. It is important to appreciate and support Azerbaijan’s aspiration toward a Western way of life, without sacrificing it for the short-sighted whims of diasporas and lobbyists. However, it must be acknowledged that expecting the same wisdom and nuanced approach as Switzerland from every country is unrealistic.
The West, particularly the U.S. and France, despite the pressure from the Armenian lobby and diaspora, will sooner or later need to convey to the Armenian side that wasting limited resources on futile campaigns is a pointless effort. Campaigns involving foreign influencers and well-known politicians do not change the realities on the ground. Neither before the war nor after Azerbaijan’s victory in 2020 did such efforts yield tangible results. Armenia continues to expend its meager resources on dubious projects, despite it being clear that this strategy only leads to short-lived media bursts without impacting diplomatic or military processes.
Azerbaijan insists on resolving relations, including the Zangezur Corridor project, strictly on a bilateral basis, without the involvement of external mediators, particularly those not from the region. While Armenia relies on the support of the U.S. and France, seeing them as its main “protectors,” the West will have to acknowledge that the Karabakh issue is already settled. This is a fact that all sides must accept to reduce tensions. Continuing to give false hope to Armenian society is counterproductive. Moreover, within Armenia itself, there is a growing understanding that with the final resolution of the Karabakh issue and the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, new opportunities are emerging for the country. This is a chance to emerge from isolation and establish economic ties, which will undoubtedly benefit ordinary people.
Yerevan has already announced a referendum in 2027 to amend the Constitution. It is expected that Nikol Pashinyan will decide to remove the provisions concerning territorial claims against Azerbaijan, as this is a non-negotiable demand from Baku for the signing of a peace agreement. Without this, progress will be extremely difficult. However, the process of amending the Constitution may be delayed, as Yerevan is not yet ready for such decisive steps. The Armenian authorities’ decision to take a pause is linked to the need to prepare public opinion for these changes, given the strong revanchist sentiments supported by the opposition. Excluding Karabakh from Armenia’s Constitution is an unpopular measure that will require time and careful preparation of the society. Azerbaijan understands this and is willing to wait.
Western countries, given their real influence in the region, are unlikely to offer Armenia serious security guarantees. All they can provide is moral support and economic benefits in the form of investments and grants. However, long-term prospects for Armenia’s integration with the EU and NATO may remain at the discussion stage, as is the case with Georgia. Nonetheless, signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, which resolves territorial disputes, could ease Armenia’s path toward Euro-Atlantic integration.
Alekper Aliyev
