Before 2020, in the context of the Karabakh conflict, both Armenian and many foreign experts generally held the view that Azerbaijan was incapable of reclaiming Karabakh through military means. This was presented as an unquestionable axiom. However, the events of the Second Karabakh War, along with subsequent developments, demonstrated the opposite: Azerbaijan’s well-executed and strategically sound tactics delivered a decisive blow to an adversary blinded by arrogance and myths fostered by its own propaganda.
Five Misguided Myths
How did those so confident in their righteousness become prisoners of their own illusions? Their misconceptions were a combination of five myths, which we will now examine.
First Myth: Propaganda claimed that Armenians would defend ‘their home’ with double the motivation, while Azerbaijanis supposedly lacked an emotional connection to Karabakh, viewing it merely as ‘territory,’ whereas for Armenians it was their ‘homeland.’ However, this notion was far from reality: Azerbaijanis, determined to reclaim their historical lands, demonstrated both resolve and a willingness to make sacrifices, even after enduring 30 years of occupation.
Second Myth: It was believed that in Azerbaijan, allegedly under a dictatorship, the population would not fight for the “regime.” Yet, in reality, both the Azerbaijani army and the nation exhibited high levels of unity, discipline, and morale, with no instances of desertion throughout the conflict.
Third Myth: Among Armenians and certain foreign experts, there was a widespread belief that the Armenian army surpassed Azerbaijani forces in terms of fighting spirit. A myth was cultivated around the notion of a unique “Armenian spirit,” one that no enemy’s tactics or technology could overcome. Furthermore, this myth was deeply entwined with the stereotype of the ‘physically and intellectually inferior’ Azerbaijani, who, according to Armenian propaganda, could supposedly never defeat the ‘smart and brave Armenian lion, the god of war.’ Unfortunately, these racist stereotypes were used to foster a false sense of superiority, ultimately leading not only to military defeat but also to a profound psychological collapse. The Armenians’ frustration was particularly evident in their candid admissions of shock when they first encountered “tall, handsome, and cultured Azerbaijanis,” who were nothing like the image perpetuated by years of propaganda.
Fourth Myth: There was a belief that in the modern world, wars were off-limits for countries that were not global players, and that international forces, to which Azerbaijan was supposedly “bound” by oil contracts and pipelines, would not allow the conflict to escalate. The argument was that Azerbaijan was compelled to adhere to the will of large international corporations and institutions, which, in turn, were influenced by the global Armenian lobby.
Perhaps the crowning irony in this pipeline narrative was the brilliant move by the late President Heydar Aliyev, who signed the “Contract of the Century” with the world’s oil giants. Aliyev skillfully capitalized on a ready-made misconception, one that the Armenian side was eager to embrace. Failing to take advantage of such a blatant miscalculation by the opponent would have been unforgivable for an experienced leader. While developing its oil and gas infrastructure, Azerbaijan simultaneously played into Armenia’s misconception that a country hosting critical pipelines would never risk military action in the region. Armenians believed the pipelines would always be a vulnerable target and that Azerbaijan would be too afraid of jeopardizing its energy projects.
Fifth Myth: The final stronghold in this chain of misconceptions was the belief that Russia and/or Iran would never allow Azerbaijan to wage war against their ally, Armenia. It was assumed that these two regional powers, viewing themselves as historical arbiters of the South Caucasus, would actively support the status quo, using the conflict to maintain their influence in the region. However, the reality revealed that the geopolitical situation had drastically changed: Russia was preoccupied with its own internal and external challenges, while Iran, despite its traditional ties to Armenia and historically antagonistic attitude toward Azerbaijan, was unable to prevent the conflict’s military progression. Thus, the belief in the immutability of their positions turned out to be nothing more than an illusion.
Russia, a Spiritual Twin of Armenia in the Craft of Mythmaking
It is worth taking a closer look at Russia’s role as one of the most involved regional players in the Karabakh conflict. Russia not only participated in its escalation at the end of the 1980s, but its involvement and influence in the region date back to the early 20th century and even further.
Before its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, under the slogan “we’ll take Kyiv in three days,” Russia had already made similar critical mistakes during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. In both cases, the misjudgment of the actual situation led, and continues to lead, to humiliating outcomes for Russia. Both in Karabakh and Ukraine, these miscalculations were the result of disinformation reaching Putin. Key figures responsible for analytical reports to the Russian leadership, such as Sergei Naryshkin, head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, were either trapped in their own illusions or relied on inaccurate data. These misjudgments, both in Azerbaijan and later in Ukraine, proved to be fatal for Russian strategy, which continues to spiral in a cycle of self-deception and false expectations.
Russian leadership assumed that if military action began, Azerbaijan would not be able to sustain it for long and that its army would be forced to seek a ceasefire after just a few days of fighting. For this reason, Russia initially adopted a wait-and-see approach, believing that Azerbaijan’s offensive would soon falter. However, reality unfolded quite differently: not only was the Azerbaijani army far better prepared, but it also quickly purged its ranks of generals and officers tied to Russia’s fifth column.
By underestimating Azerbaijan’s level of preparation, its military infrastructure modernization, and the significance of acquiring advanced weaponry from various countries, Russia found itself trapped by its own flawed analysis. When it became clear that Azerbaijan was making significant gains, Naryshkin had to scramble to find excuses for his erroneous forecasts. In response, Russian propaganda began spreading the myth of Syrian mercenaries allegedly fighting on Azerbaijan’s side. This narrative was promoted as an explanation (!) for the rapid success of Azerbaijani forces.
This myth was not only embraced by the Armenian side but also by its international supporters. The narrative echoed the infamous “stab in the back” (Dolchstosslegende) myth from Germany after World War I, when military defeat was blamed not on battlefield failures but on supposed internal betrayal. In the case of Karabakh, this myth was adapted to justify Armenia’s defeat, with accusations leveled against the “”Nikol the traitor” (“Նիկոլ դավաճան” – “Nikol davajan”),” as well as claims that Azerbaijan’s victory was achieved through “unfair” means, such as allegedly using mercenaries. Ironically, this narrative essentially showed a willingness to admit defeat at the hands of anyone, even “bearded men from the steppes,” but not to a well-equipped and highly professional Azerbaijani army.
The ill-fated myth of the “underdeveloped Azerbaijani” prevented them from acknowledging that it was indeed Azerbaijan that had defeated them, and this realization remains a source of deep pain for them to this day.
Sobering Conclusions
The biases and myths upon which Armenian perceptions and the predictions of their supporters were based proved to be fatal. By relying on false assumptions and an exaggerated sense of invincibility, the Armenian side missed the opportunity to assess the situation realistically. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, skillfully used these misconceptions as a strategic asset. The ability to manipulate the enemy’s expectations and delusions, fostering an illusion of weakness only to deliver a crushing blow at the right moment, was one of the key factors behind Azerbaijan’s success.
There is no doubt that illusions led Armenia to disaster. However, even more alarming is the fact that these illusions continue to hold sway over minds today. In an age where access to information is limitless, it is paradoxical to witness how people are increasingly prone to self-deception. Modern technologies and the abundance of data, instead of clarifying reality, have only exacerbated this phenomenon. Armenian society, ignoring clear facts, continues to cling to false beliefs and myths.
One would think that the collapse of forecasts, the crushing defeat in the 44-day war, and subsequent events would have served as a wake-up call. But that hasn’t happened. Even in 2016, after the defeat in the Four-Day War, the Armenian side continued to claim victory. Ignoring reality, they prepared for an even more devastating collapse, which arrived four years later. During the 44 days of the Second Karabakh War, they denied their defeats, giving rise to the phenomenon of Artsrunism* and resulting in the shock of the November 10 capitulation, the effects of which are still felt today.
*Artsrunism — a phenomenon named after Artsrun Hovhannisyan, a representative of the Armenian Ministry of Defense, who during the war provided Armenian society with daily misinformation about the supposedly victorious actions of the Armenian army. After Armenia’s capitulation, he was accused of lying, but he defended himself by saying he was merely telling the public what it wanted to hear. Hovhannisyan admitted that he couldn’t convey the truth because people were not ready to accept it. This phenomenon has since become a symbol of self-deception and mass delusion in Armenia.
Thus, the Armenian elite and a significant part of society continue to live in a world of illusions, where myths of “lion hearts,” their own exceptionalism, and the hope of arms purchases from India and support from Iran obscure common sense. These comforting illusions can only temporarily numb the bitterness of defeat, but if there is no acknowledgment and sober assessment of reality, the inevitable clash with the truth will lead to new disappointments and even more devastating losses.
Let us not forget that today’s anti-Russian sentiment in Armenian society is rooted entirely in a deep grievance over Russia’s failure to come to their rescue. It’s important to make this distinction. Had Russia intervened and played a role in Karabakh similar to its involvement in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, Armenian affection for Russia today would have known no bounds. Anti-Russian sentiment in Armenia would be inconceivable. However, as history has shown, alliances built on illusions cannot withstand the test of reality, and reliance on external powers results in the collapse of one’s own hopes.
Post-Victory Strategy: Securing and Strengthening Successes
After its victory in the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has demonstrated not only its ability to effectively employ military power but also a maturity in managing the consequences of its triumph. The country continues to move confidently along the path of consolidating its achievements, focusing on strengthening its regional role and ensuring long-term stability.
One of the key elements of the post-victory strategy has been the large-scale restoration of the liberated territories. From the first days of regaining control and fully restoring its sovereignty, Azerbaijan embarked on an active effort to revive the devastated settlements and build modern infrastructure. In Karabakh, new roads, bridges, power plants, and homes are being constructed, water supply and communication lines are being restored, all of which not only bring the region back to full life but also open up prospects for economic growth and investment. A special focus is placed on the return of displaced persons, with conditions being created for their safe and comfortable resettlement on their ancestral lands. These steps ensure that Azerbaijan’s plans for integrating Karabakh into its national structure are both sustainable and systemic.
An equally significant component of the post-victory strategy is active diplomatic engagement. Azerbaijani diplomacy, skillfully navigating the complexities of the geopolitical landscape, effectively promotes the country’s interests, building a network of economic and political relationships. Azerbaijan is forging new strategic alliances while strengthening existing ones. Its alliance with Turkey, close ties with Israel, fraternal relations with Central Asian countries, and a balanced policy in relations with the West, Russia, and Iran—all contribute to Azerbaijan’s growing stature as a strong regional player. These efforts not only solidify Azerbaijan’s battlefield successes but also minimize the risks of any potential revanchist responses from Armenia or its possible allies.
Ultimately, Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh was not merely the result of military tactics or advanced technology. It was the triumph of strategic thinking, which allowed Azerbaijan to exploit its opponent’s weaknesses—rooted in myths, arrogance, and miscalculations. The Armenian side, refusing to acknowledge reality, condemned itself to failure by being unable to adapt to changing circumstances. In contrast, Azerbaijan skillfully took advantage of this self-deception, not only to reclaim its lands but also to establish itself as a key player in the Caucasus.
