Matthew Bryza: “This is a very positive development for Baku”

In the coming years, Yerevan’s foreign policy will likely be shaped by Pashinyan’s desire to free the country from strategic dependence on Russia and accelerate the peace process with Baku. Former U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza said this in an interview with Minval Politika.

— Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has won the parliamentary elections. How do you assess the significance of this result for Armenia’s further domestic political development and its foreign policy priorities?

— The victory of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his political force in the parliamentary elections is a major historic event both for the development of modern Armenia and for its relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, as well as for peace and long-term prosperity across the entire region.

At its core, these elections were about Armenia’s strategic choice: whether the country would continue its centuries-old dependence on Russia, based on fear of Turkic peoples — above all Türkiye and Azerbaijan — or whether it would choose the path of peace, cooperation and prosperity through engagement with Europe and the United States. At the same time, Armenia seeks not to enter into confrontation with Russia, but also not to remain its client state.

That is what these elections were about. The fact that Pashinyan and his political force received around 58–59 percent of the vote is highly significant. However, this is not enough to secure a two-thirds constitutional majority, which is required to amend Armenia’s Constitution. These are the amendments sought by Azerbaijan in order to remove any ambiguous wording regarding Karabakh that could be interpreted as preserving territorial claims by Armenia.

At least 66 percent of seats in parliament are needed to pass such an amendment. Therefore, Pashinyan’s current result falls slightly short of the required threshold. Nevertheless, I believe this issue will become the subject of further discussions between Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Ilham Aliyev.

The main point, however, is that the Armenian people chose the path of peace proposed by Pashinyan. This is the path of reconciliation with Azerbaijan and the restoration of relations with Türkiye for the sake of Armenia’s peaceful and prosperous future in partnership with Europe. In my view, this is a serious strategic shift and a very positive development not only for Armenia, but also for Azerbaijan.

— In recent years, Armenia has been consistently deepening its engagement with the European Union. How could the election results affect the further development of relations between Armenia and the EU? What role could the Donald Trump administration play in the region?

— Armenia’s rapprochement with the European Union and the United States has been going on for several years. This course became especially clear after the signing of the trilateral statement of November 10, 2020, between Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which ended the military phase of the Second Karabakh War.

Since then, Pashinyan has made it clear that Yerevan is choosing the path of peace with Baku and closer engagement with Europe. If Azerbaijan and Armenia sign the peace treaty that was initialed in the Oval Office of the White House in the presence of President Trump on August 8 last year, we may witness a significant inflow of investment into the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” which will connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenian territory.

I also hope to see significant investment in Nakhchivan itself and in the development of transport infrastructure that will connect Armenia through Nakhchivan with Türkiye. This includes roads, railway connections, digital and fiber-optic communications, as well as energy infrastructure — whether power transmission lines or even gas pipelines.

An important impetus to the peace process was given precisely on August 8, when President Trump hosted President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan at the White House. Since then, the Trump administration has been increasingly involved in advancing the peace process and supporting American investment in transport infrastructure running from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nakhchivan to Türkiye.

One of the key elements of the Trump administration’s foreign policy is the use of American corporate investment as an instrument of U.S. diplomacy. A second important element is the desire to ensure reliable supplies of critical minerals and resilient supply chains. Therefore, I see significant potential for the development of critical mineral processing in Azerbaijan, possibly in the Alat Free Economic Zone, with raw materials supplied from Central Asia across the Caspian Sea. After processing, these resources could be transported through Azerbaijan, Armenia and Türkiye to global markets.

— Do you expect any changes in Yerevan’s approach to normalizing relations with Baku? How close are the sides to signing a peace agreement?

— Pashinyan’s election victory opens up opportunities for all the investments mentioned above and for a new format of strategic U.S. engagement with the region. I believe that after his victory, Pashinyan will be even more motivated to accelerate the peace process with Azerbaijan. He is also likely to be more active in persuading Armenian society to support constitutional amendments sought by Azerbaijan.

Since he does not have a two-thirds majority in parliament, this issue will have to be put to a nationwide referendum. This will be a difficult and politically sensitive process. However, with support from the European Union, the United States and, possibly, Azerbaijan itself, such changes could become a reality. If constitutional reform proves impossible, Pashinyan and Aliyev will have to look for other ways to complete the peace process and formally finalize the peace treaty.

The sides are very close to signing it. We know that the text of the agreement was agreed back in March 2025. We also know that the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia initialed the document on August 8 at the White House. Therefore, the issue now is mainly about completing the signing process, which is closely linked to the question of amending Armenia’s Constitution.

— How do you assess EU assistance to Armenia, Russia’s policy and Yerevan’s further foreign policy course?

— It is obvious that Russia is not pleased with the election results. Moscow did everything possible to ensure Pashinyan’s defeat, but those efforts failed. In particular, large-scale disinformation campaigns were conducted, spreading false claims that Pashinyan allegedly had cancer and only a few months to live, that he had AIDS, and other similar allegations.

Nevertheless, the opposition failed to win, and some opposition forces may not even pass the four-percent threshold required to enter parliament. Moscow has already introduced economic restrictions against Armenia, refusing to import Armenian roses and other agricultural products under the pretext of sanitary requirements. In my view, these explanations do not correspond to reality. Russia may also try to provoke political instability inside Armenia, although it is impossible to predict specific steps at this stage.

In the coming years, Armenia’s foreign policy will likely be shaped by Pashinyan’s desire to free the country from strategic dependence on Russia. This does not mean a desire for confrontation with Moscow. Rather, it is about ensuring that Russia can no longer prevent Armenia from pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy that includes closer relations with Europe and the United States, as well as — perhaps most importantly — achieving lasting peace with Azerbaijan.