Thirty years ago, in New York, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev had a long one on one meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. They discussed mutual support – Azerbaijan needed Israeli technologies to protect itself from military threats, and Israel needed oil. Since then, the relationship has blossomed. The Shia Muslim-majority Azerbaijan has become one of Israel’s closest allies.
“Azerbaijan is closer to Israel than any other country except for the United States,” says Joseph Epstein, Director of Research at the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET). “But unlike Washington, Baku has never pressured or threatened Jerusalem over its conflict with the Palestinians or anything else.”
Israeli Azerbaijani collaboration goes far beyond cooperating against Iran. Both countries have work closely in the energy, defense, science and agriculture sectors. Azerbaijan supplies Israel with 50% of its oil needs. Israel in turn supplies Azerbaijan with almost 70% of its weapons imports.
“Azerbaijan has stuck with Israel even as many of its Western partners turn against it over the war in Gaza,” says Epstein. “While countries like France, Germany and the United Kingdom go back and forth on weapon embargos against the Jewish State, Azerbaijan has only increased its energy exports to Israel since October 7th and the ensuing multi-front war.”
These relations have not escaped the attention of experts such as Professor Ze’ev Khanin and Captain (res.) Alex Grinberg, who recently analyzed Azerbaijan’s long and stable friendship with Israel for the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. According to Khanin and Grinberg, incoming President Donald Trump should consider Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel as a sign of its usefulness for American interests. The analysis highlighted Azerbaijan’s anti-Iranian stance, position as a key nation in the Middle Corridor and crucial alternate supply of energy to Europe as the continent weans itself off Russian gas.
“The same benefits that Azerbaijan brings to Israel could easily be brought on a much larger scale to the United States,” says Epstein. “But harnessing it requires a pivot in policy from the administration.”
Indeed, previous U.S. administrations have often prioritized the Armenian issue over good relations with Azerbaijan, in part due to internal pressure from a very politically active Armenian diaspora. However, with the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia seemingly coming to an end, this could change, especially considering Trump’s proclivity of breaking from the foreign policy establishment.
“Both the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments want to end this chapter and focus on regional integration and better relations with the West, first and foremost with the United States,” says Grinberg. “The quickest road to that is by ending the conflict.”
But such a pivot in policy could antagonize Azerbaijan’s northern and southern neighbors – Russia and Iran. Since its independence, Baku has balanced its relations with two empires that both consider it as part of its sphere of influence. But the small Caucasian nation has no qualms about the nature of both countries.
“Azerbaijan sees Russia and Iran for what they are – aggressive and irredentist empires that would swallow it up if they could,” says Grinberg. “That is why it has so much to gain from good relations with the West.”
The benefits would be mutual. The Middle Corridor provides a key transit corridor from Asia to Europe circumventing both Russia and Iran. Such corridors are vital to global commerce as conflicts such as the war in Ukraine and attacks by Houthis shut down major trade arteries. And as Russia continuously threatens the European mainland, Azerbaijan could offer not only its own oil and gas but untapped reservoirs from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well.
Avi Monakov
