The Renaissance of US Interest in the South Caucasus

As Armenia moves toward its June 7 parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government is seeking to use Western support as a powerful electoral tool.

On May 26, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio made a short visit to Yerevan, where he met Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and signed a joint charter. The two sides also signed a framework agreement linked to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a US-led transport initiative which aims to become an integral part of the Middle Corridor and a central element of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, which began in earnest in 2025 and was facilitated by the trilateral agreement in Washington in August.

The agreements signed during Rubio’s visit contained little policy substance. But they did signal Washington’s support for Pashinyan and indirectly his effort to diversify Armenia’s foreign policy by building closer ties with Western countries. A day later, the US President Donald Trump publicly endorsed Pashinyan. (This has cut little ice with Armenian diaspora organizations in the US, foremost among them the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), whose representatives have derided TRIPP as a “neo-colonial US-backed corporate consortium”, and branded Rubio’s trip as straight-up foreign interference in Armenia’s elections.)

US engagement with Armenia runs directly into Russian opposition. The Kremlin has made considerable efforts to increase the pressure on Yerevan and weaken Pashinyan’s position. While in Kazakhstan, the Russian president argued that Armenia could face a similar fate as Ukraine in its attempts to join the EU — a statement brimming with menace. The Kremlin also coopted other members of its Eurasian Economic Union to threaten Armenia’s suspension and demand a national referendum on the issue.

The Kremlin is anxious to end Armenia’s westward drift, and therefore supports Pashinyan’s political rivals, who favor strong ties with Russia. It has begun a series of not-very-subtle messages. In one of the Kremlin’s latest moves made on June 1, Russian authorities imposed restrictions on imports of several Armenian fish and fruits. This followed the similar bans on flowers, brandy, and mineral water.

The timing of the restrictions has reinforced the message — familiar among Russia’s neighbors — that Moscow will use economic pressure and other coercion to influence elections. Further pressure is expected, given that Moscow has already signaled that it would reconsider moderate gas prices (Russian gas supplies to Armenia are about 70% cheaper than for the rest of Europe).

For Armenians, therefore, the vote requires a judgment on Armenia’s geopolitical orientation. Pashinyan’s government is asking voters to endorse a path that promises diversification of ties, indirectly meaning closer ties with Washington and European countries, and expanded regional infrastructure and data links. His opponents, on the other hand, argue that such a course risks provoking Moscow and exposing Armenia to Azerbaijan and Turkey, with which it was at loggerheads for decades.

The overt American support for Armenia and its incumbent government in the run-up to the elections should also be seen in the context of its evolving interest in the South Caucasus. Washington’s engagement with all three countries in the region varies, but it is much greater than under many previous administrations.

Washington dearly needs partners in the region. Traditionally close ties with Georgia have been reversed, though recently major efforts have been made from both sides to renew the dialogue, which could lead to a framework agreement on bilateral cooperation. Parallel to this, close ties are pursued with energy-rich Azerbaijan, with signs that military, security, and even civilian nuclear cooperation will be initiated. Taken as a whole, this amounts to an unexpected renaissance of US interest in the South Caucasus.

And that’s what makes the Armenian elections a key moment. For Washington, the TRIPP initiative is not only about actual infrastructure and connectivity development, but rather about a broader Armenia-Azerbaijan reconciliation process.

Moreover, should the peace process persist, Armenia’s turn toward the European Union and the United States could be further entrenched, thus diluting Russia’s more traditional influence. Should Pashinyan’s party, Civil Contract, win decisively, then the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan will be furthered. Alternatively, however unlikely, should Pashinyan lose, it is highly possible that the opposition, which is openly professing views of closer alignment with Russia, will push for annulment of agreements around the TRIPP.

A durable Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement would thus weaken Russia’s power as a conflict mediator. For decades, unresolved disputes in the South Caucasus helped Moscow preserve leverage over Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. If Yerevan and Baku move toward normalization, and if transport routes open under US-sponsored arrangements, the geopolitical architecture of the region changes. The US-backed transit logic around routes linking Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan exclave and onward to Turkey is therefore not merely commercial. It is part of a broader attempt to integrate the South Caucasus into east-west connectivity networks that bypass Russia and reduce Iran’s leverage in the region.

Ultimately, Armenia’s elections will determine whether the Western opening in the country’s foreign policy becomes a long-term approach or remains a fragile project tied to one political leader. For the United States, the best outcome is not simply a victory by the Civil Contract, but enough votes to create the parliamentary majority to pursue peace with Azerbaijan and build closer ties with the Western countries. At the moment, Pashinyan’s party is polling at around 32%, not enough for a majority.)

The June 7 election will thus show whether Armenian voters are prepared to give Pashinyan another mandate to continue a delicate strategic pivot, or whether frustration over Azerbaijan’s 2023 victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russian pressure, will create space for an alternative pursuing a traditional, Moscow-oriented foreign policy.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.