The opposite was expected from the United States by many scholars and veteran diplomats, including Henry Kissinger. The United States will have to reach an understanding with China on a new global order to ensure stability, or the world will face a dangerous period like the one which preceded World War One, he said in 2021, two years before he passed away. Against the backdrop of the latest visit of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to China, which is reported to be the 40th meeting between the leaders of the two countries over the past 10 years, there is enough ground to argue that Washington failed to “reach an understanding with Beijing on a new global order”.
Building upon their “no-limit partnership”, today China and Russia are rapidly rounding up their differences and moving towards a closer mode in their relations, if not towards an alliance. They have at least two archenemies of the West, Iran and North Korea, on their side. The military and economic support of these allies have been critical in Russia’s so far slow but steady move inward in Ukraine. The stronger Russia becomes in its war with Ukraine and its Western allies, the more confident and assertive its leaders become vis-à-vis the other post-Soviet states.
Today Russia’s leaders contemplate the establishment of a new global structure which would include the countries friendly to Russia. “We will form a new global architecture, including efficient and safe transport and logistics corridors, a financial system independent of political interference. The efforts of the world majority will unite around them”, Aleksey Overchuk, deputy prime minister of Russia told the Russian parliament on May 13, following the establishment of the new government after the presidential elections. He did not elaborate on the details of this “new global architecture” but it is clear that Russia and its partners are set to combine the forces of the anti-Western powers within a more coordinated international bloc. This power shift in international relations creates a more confrontational environment which, as Kissinger warned, resembles a pre-war situation.
The South Caucasus finds itself at the center of this confrontation. The latest developments in Georgia around the “foreign agent” law and anti-government protests in Armenia in response to the start of the delimitation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border are often analyzed as part of this power struggle. The region mostly maintains its post-Soviet character of being a microcosm of global geopolitics.
Previously, the politics of the South Caucasus could be characterized as “geopolitical heterogeneity”. This referred to the fact that the three local countries adopted three opposing orientations in foreign policy: Azerbaijan – neutrality, Georgia – aspiring to join the EU and NATO, and Armenia – Russia’s ally within the CSTO and EAEU. The bifurcation of the international politics between two blocs (the West and non-West) and the occurrence of this process in a rather confrontational mode make the great powers consolidate their power within their supposed sphere of influence. Today we observe Russia’s growing assertiveness vis-à-vis the countries of the South Caucasus in the wake of its strengthening position in Ukraine.
Moscow has succeeded to win the friendship of Azerbaijan by peacefully withdrawing its peacekeeping forces from the Karabakh region. In parallel, some major powers in the West took the wrong side of the history by supporting separatist forces in Karabakh. The anti-Azerbaijani resolutions at the parliaments of some EU member states, including at the European Parliament, the re-introduction of the sanctions against Azerbaijan under the 907 Section by the United States, the suspension of Azerbaijan’s voting rights at the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, etc. have negatively affected the relations between Azerbaijan and the West. It is incomprehensible but all these anti-Azerbaijani actions were taken in response to Azerbaijan’s efforts to liberate its occupied territories and put an end to the separatist movement. Azerbaijan, however, seeks to protect its independence foreign policy and plans to safeguard it within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), rather than within other regional blocs.
A departure from the Western-leaning orientation is observed in the case of Georgia as well. The confrontation between the Georgian government and the Western states has reached to unprecedented levels. Although Tbilisi’s efforts to gain control over the inflow of grants to the country through the adoption of the “foreign agent” law seem quite normal at first sight, particularly as even the United States has similar regulations, there is a fear that this law will stifle the role of the pro-Western actors in Georgia and move the country away from its Euro-Atlantic path. The upcoming parliamentary elections in Georgia (October 2024) will therefore chart out the future of the country’s foreign policy as well as the geopolitics of the region. If the ruling Georgian Dream party succeeds to remain in power beyond the elections, the South Caucasus will have a significantly different geopolitical balance in the future.
It will have an unavoidable impact on Armenia’s foreign policy as well. There is a widely shared view in the region that the aspirations of Armenia to join the EU or put an end to the Russian influence over the country are unlikely to be possible. Armenia’s multisectoral dependency on Russia, is observed in the growth of bilateral trade turnover to 7 billion USD in 2023 from 2.8 billion USD in 2021 – thanks to the circumvention of the Western sanctions according to many observers. In the meantime, there has been fourteenfold (14) increase in Armenia’s trade with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The Armenian government seems to be happy about these figures and seeks to expand economic ties with the EAEU members. These facts, along with the regional power balance and Russia’s still strong influence in the region, dispute the claims about Armenia’s possible departure from the Russian orbit. This will be further affected if Georgia “returns” to the region by abandoning the Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Thus, amidst the evolving dynamics in the international relations and bifurcation of the world between two camps, as it was during the Cold War, the geopolitics of the South Caucasus is also shifting. The region may face a more confident and assertive Russia if the ongoing war in Ukraine tilts more in Moscow’s favor. As often said by regional experts, the results of the Ukraine war will determine the fate of the South Caucasus, amongst others.
Dr Vasif Huseynov, is a Senior Advisor at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and Adjunct Lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan.
