Tusk’s Poland turns against Azerbaijan

The return of Donald Tusk and his liberal team to power has become a turning point in Poland’s policy toward Azerbaijan. In a short period of time, Warsaw has moved from pragmatic cooperation with Baku to an increasingly confrontational and ideologically driven approach.

What was once a relationship based on mutual interests, energy cooperation and regional pragmatism is now being replaced by a systematic campaign aimed at weakening Azerbaijan’s image, questioning its energy role and creating a political counterweight to the Azerbaijani-Turkish partnership in the South Caucasus.

Under the previous conservative leadership, relations between Azerbaijan and Poland had developed at a strategic level. Energy cooperation, political dialogue and high-level visits reflected a shared interest in diversification, stability and connectivity. The current liberal government in Warsaw has rapidly undermined that foundation.

Today, Poland is increasingly acting as one of the most active promoters of anti-Azerbaijani narratives within the European space.

One of the clearest signs of this shift is the creation of special regional offices by Polish public television, including VT Sakartvelo News and VT Hayastan News. Officially, these platforms are presented as tools to counter Russian disinformation. In reality, however, they reflect a broader geopolitical ambition: to expand Poland’s influence in the South Caucasus, strengthen Armenia’s role as a pro-Western foothold and limit Azerbaijan’s regional weight.

This approach is not limited to media policy. A particularly provocative episode took place in 2024, when former Polish President Andrzej Duda visited the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and staged what was widely perceived in Baku as a demonstrative “binocular show” directed toward Azerbaijani positions. The move caused a sharp reaction from Azerbaijan and dealt a serious blow to bilateral trust.

Such actions are difficult to reconcile with the spirit of strategic partnership. They reveal a deeper political shift in Warsaw’s attitude toward the region.

Polish liberal media, particularly Gazeta Wyborcza, regularly publish materials accusing Azerbaijan of “repression”, “human rights violations” and “authoritarianism”. Yet behind this selective concern for rights and freedoms, one can clearly see a familiar propaganda technique: shifting attention away from Poland’s own internal problems.

And Poland has no shortage of such problems.

One of the most serious is the rise of antisemitic sentiment. According to a CBOS survey conducted in February 2026, the share of Poles expressing dislike toward Jews rose to 40%, the highest level in years, while positive attitudes fell to their lowest point since 2006. In 2025, public scandals involving Holocaust denial and antisemitic rhetoric also intensified, particularly around politician Grzegorz Braun and his supporters.

Despite this, many Polish outlets prefer to focus their criticism on Azerbaijan rather than address uncomfortable realities at home.

A similar contradiction can be seen in Poland’s treatment of Ukrainian refugees. Officially, Warsaw presents support for Ukrainians as one of the symbols of its humanitarian policy. In practice, however, many Ukrainian refugees in Poland continue to face discrimination, xenophobia and labour exploitation.

In January-July 2025, Polish police recorded 543 hate crimes, a 41% increase compared with the same period of the previous year. Threats against Ukrainians more than doubled over two years, while insults and attacks motivated by nationality also increased sharply. Support for receiving Ukrainian refugees fell to a record low of 50%, according to a CBOS poll from March 2025.

Reports by international organisations have also documented cases of unpaid labour, forced labour, deception in employment, bullying in schools and street-level aggression. These are real issues that Warsaw appears eager to hide behind external moralising.

The goal of Poland’s current regional line is becoming increasingly clear: to encourage anti-Turkish and anti-Azerbaijani sentiment, weaken confidence in Azerbaijan’s energy projects and reshape the political balance in the South Caucasus.

Particularly telling are the warm and demonstrative ties between Donald Tusk and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Public gestures of friendship, frequent meetings and agreements on military-technical cooperation show that Poland is now openly providing Armenia with political and defence support while promoting its European integration.

In the Armenian-Azerbaijani context, Warsaw has taken an openly one-sided position. This confirms that Armenia is being viewed not simply as a partner, but as a platform for expanding Polish and broader Western influence in the Caucasus.

A clear example of this course was the May 2026 agreement to expand defence cooperation between Poland and Armenia. The defence ministries of the two countries agreed on a detailed military cooperation plan, while Poland’s defence leadership publicly stated support for Armenia’s “pro-Western and pro-European aspirations”. The planned opening of an Armenian military attaché office in Warsaw is another practical step in this direction.

Modern Poland’s ambitions are increasingly being presented under the language of liberal values, but in practice they look like an attempt to gain influence through confrontation and selective pressure.

By turning itself into a platform for anti-Azerbaijani narratives in Europe, Warsaw is damaging relations that once had serious potential. It is also undermining regional stability at a sensitive moment for the South Caucasus.

Unlike Warsaw, Baku does not change its strategic partnerships according to political fashion. Azerbaijan continues to support Europe’s energy security, deepen its alliance with Türkiye and promote regional connectivity.

Poland, meanwhile, is moving deeper into the role of an instrument in someone else’s geopolitical game, while struggling with its own domestic scandals, double standards and rising xenophobia.

Time will show how far Poland’s current liberal leadership is prepared to go in its anti-Azerbaijani campaign. But one thing is already clear: trust built over many years has been seriously damaged.

The responsibility for this lies with Donald Tusk’s government.