In his recent article “Central Asia on the threshold of a new era,” Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev states, “We are not building walls, we are building bridges.” These days, as Central Asia transforms into a new hub of attraction, it is not difficult to grasp the meaning behind Mirziyoyev’s words. He himself emphasizes in the article, “until only a few years ago, disputes over borders, water and energy among Central Asian states” were among the most prominent issues in the international relations literature.
Just as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the EU’s earliest form, turned a coal and steel dispute into a binding force on April 18, 1951, the countries of Central Asia have also built unity upon the very issues over which they once disagreed. From the Khujand Declaration of March 2025, where Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resolved their border disputes, to the transformation of the energy disagreements among Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan into a joint strategic venture with the 2022 launch of the Kambarata Hydroelectric Power Plant project, all these unifying steps have begun to bear fruit today. One of the most striking examples is the dizzying intensity of diplomatic traffic along the corridors leading toward Central Asia.
2025: Year of summits
The EU-Central Asia Summit held on April 4, the first such meeting in the history of the EU, offered significant insight into the new direction of diplomatic engagement. At the summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, European Council President Antonio Costa’s remark, “Our partnership is a journey, not a destination,” served as an answer for those curious about where this process is heading. Hosting cooperation negotiations on dozens of issues ranging from security to the economy, and from climate to human rights, the summit was a clear indication of Central Asia’s growing importance. One of the summit’s most concrete outcomes was the EU’s emphasis that the 10 billion euros ($11.5 billion) secured from the previous year’s Global Gateway Investors Forum would be crucial for establishing transport corridors, logistics, networks and value chains. The EU also agreed to support a coordination platform for critical infrastructure projects along the Middle Corridor, including the Caspian Sea transport corridor.
Meanwhile, at the China-Central Asia Leaders’ Summit held on June 17 in Kazakhstan’s Astana, Chinese President Xi Jinping described what he called the “China-Central Asia spirit,” offering a distinctly Chinese interpretation of the region’s rising prominence. Much like the EU, China also loosened its purse strings for Central Asia, with Xi pledging 1.5 billion yuan (approximately $210 million) in financial assistance to the region.
Russia, another major actor closely involved with Central Asia, also convened with the region’s states on Oct. 9 in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, mirroring the EU and China in diplomatic engagement. However, unlike the EU and China’s new financial commitments, Russian President Vladimir Putin merely listed the financial support Russia had provided to Central Asian countries to date and acknowledged that their cooperation still had not reached the desired level.
The final piece of the Central Asia summit puzzle of 2025 was undoubtedly the one held at the White House in the U.S. on Nov. 6. Unlike the previous three summits hosted by the EU, China and Russia, this gathering, hosted by Washington, also served as a significant indicator of the U.S.’ global standing. The most sensitive and common theme across all the above-mentioned summits, organized respectively by the EU, China, Russia and finally the U.S., with the Central Asian states, was, without question, trade corridors. It is widely recognized that the actor laying the foundational stones of Central Asia’s rising strategic appeal today is Türkiye. Ankara, which stood firmly by Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War with its military and diplomatic support, played a decisive role in resolving a 30-year-long conflict. The most concrete outcome of the path opened by Türkiye is, without doubt, the Zangezur Corridor. These days, both Central Asia and Azerbaijan, the host of the Zangezur Corridor, have yet another major item on their agenda.
‘A vivid symbol’: CA-AZ summit
Mirziyoyev reinforced his use of the expression “vivid symbol” by noting that, for the first time in many years, an atmosphere of mutual understanding had emerged in the region. The seventh consultative meeting of the heads of state, held on Nov. 15 in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, signified something more than its predecessors. Notably, Azerbaijan, though geographically outside the region, participated in the summit as a nation united by shared identity and political will. One of the meeting’s most striking decisions was the unanimous approval of Azerbaijan’s full membership in the consultative format.
During the summit, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev praised the support of Central Asian countries for “the reconstruction of Azerbaijan’s liberated territories.” This statement also carried an implicit reference to Türkiye, which has played a central role in this process. In this respect, Aliyev’s remarks echoed the rhetoric of the 12th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), held about a month earlier in Gabala, Azerbaijan, under the theme “Regional Peace and Security.” The comment thus serves as a reflection of Türkiye’s contribution to peace and stability in the region.
Ultimately, whether within the framework of the OTS or the Central Asia-Azerbaijan format, the strengthening of cooperation among Turkic nations represents the emergence of a new power bloc on the international stage. It is, fundamentally, a diplomatic success for the states involved. As Henry Ford famously said, “Coming together is a beginning. Keeping together is progress. Working together is success.”
Ahmet Turan, Ph.D. holder, Head of the International Relations Office at İnönü University
