Of this, France accounted for €1.9 billion, with its imports of Russian gas increasing by a third over the past eight months. Hungary came in second, purchasing €1.6 billion worth of Russian gas. Unlike Paris, however, Budapest has been steadily reducing its reliance on Russian energy.
These statistics are particularly striking in light of another growing trend: increased imports of Russian uranium for French nuclear power plants. Let us recall that Paris recently lost access to nuclear raw materials from Niger.
At this juncture, clear distinctions must be made. Azerbaijan supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine. At the same time, our country opposes unilateral sanctions, especially those rooted in “double standards.” However, in politics, one must be accountable for one’s words and declarations—and ideally, those declarations should align with actions.
Here’s the irony: the top purchaser of Russian gas is none other than France, a country known for its ostentatious anti-Russian rhetoric. Paris frequently accuses other nations, from Georgia to Hungary, of adopting an overly soft stance toward the “Kremlin regime.” French President Emmanuel Macron has even made bold proposals, such as sending troops to Ukraine. Yet, frustratingly for him, these grand proclamations are rarely followed by concrete actions. On the contrary, after puffing itself up with fiery rhetoric, Paris soon starts lamenting a lack of “resources” to aid Ukraine. Strangely enough, resources to support Armenia are always readily available, and Paris is unwilling to wait for Armenia to formally exit the CSTO before stepping in.
Now, however, France has emerged as the leader in Russian gas imports, surpassing even Germany, which has been a key customer of Moscow’s gas since Soviet times, and Hungary, a country often criticized in European circles (not least by Paris) for its close ties to Russia.
Let us set aside the question of who is right in this debate—the “doves” or the “hawks.” The issue is that the Gallic rooster, trying so hard to present itself as a “hawk,” exhibits a glaring mismatch between its declarations and actions—especially when it comes to gas purchases.
Let’s be realistic. Hungary is located in the heart of the continent, with very limited options for maneuvering in gas procurement. Gas contracts are typically long-term, and infrastructure is crucial for delivery. This means finding “uncontracted” gas on the global market and figuring out how to deliver it to landlocked Hungary, which lacks direct access to the sea. This necessitates pipelines, interconnectors, and other costly infrastructure.
France, on the other hand, enjoys far greater flexibility, largely due to its geography. With direct access to the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, France can procure liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States, Qatar, or other suppliers. Furthermore, France has all the geographical advantages to source gas from the southern Mediterranean, particularly from its former colony, Algeria. Gas could also be imported from Egypt, with Libya potentially joining the list in the future. Despite these options, Paris continues to buy gas from Russia, providing valuable insight into the true price of its anti-Russian rhetoric. Beneath the facade of anti-Russian grandstanding, France’s actions betray a continuation of the “Daladier diplomacy” of appeasement.
France’s soaring imports of Russian gas amid its fervent anti-Russian rhetoric expose a glaring contradiction between its words and actions. Unlike Hungary, whose geographic constraints limit its choices, France has numerous alternatives it could pursue, yet it chooses not to. This discrepancy raises serious questions about the sincerity and effectiveness of Paris’s public stance, offering a stark reminder of the double standards and underlying pragmatism that often govern international politics.
Nurani
