Today, the 12th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) opens in Gabala. The official theme is “Regional Peace and Security,” yet in practice, the participants are discussing a wide range of development goals for the OTS over the next three to five years.
The OTS members are united not only by shared economic interests but also by a common historical experience: the core countries of the organization share the legacy of the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, the aspiration to integrate into the European cultural and civilizational space, and at the same time, the desire to create an integration framework of Turkic states stretching between China and the European Union.
Since the 2020s, the dynamics of the post-Soviet space itself have forced national leaders to revise a number of old perceptions and approaches, while at the same time giving regional countries a chance to find new momentum. Since the idea of Turkic integration was first formulated at the 9th Nakhchivan Summit in October 2009 through the “Turkic Council,” the key member states — Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan — have significantly strengthened their political influence and expanded their economic capabilities, with Azerbaijan, in effect, becoming one of the leaders of the Turkic process.
At the current stage, all major trans-Caspian international initiatives have been consolidated under the “brand” of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) — including the Middle Corridor transport route, the Trans-Caspian Energy Cable project, the development of shipbuilding, and the modernization of ports along the Middle Corridor. In addition, the prospects for transporting gas from Turkmenistan via the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline are under consideration. It is worth recalling that Turkmenistan holds observer status within the OTS.
Among the large-scale political and economic objectives, particular attention should be given to bilateral investments among OTS member states — primarily along the Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan–Turkey lines. A leading role here is played by SOCAR, the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan. SOCAR’s investments in petrochemistry, major infrastructure, and transport projects in Turkey form the foundation of relations between Baku and Ankara.
SOCAR has also joined forces with Uzbekistan’s “Uzbekneftegaz” in joint projects: in July 2025, the two companies signed a production-sharing agreement for a group of fields on the Ustyurt Plateau, involving investments of around USD 2 billion.
Another addition to joint investments is the GreenMet Investments Fund (Kazakhstan) project for the construction of a hot-briquetted iron (HBI) plant in Azerbaijan, with a capacity of about 2 million tons per year and a total investment volume of roughly USD 700 million.
The institutional framework of the Turkic Investment Fund (TIF) — established in 2023 with an initial capital of USD 500 million — is taking shape. Subsequently, Hungary, which holds observer status in the OTS, contributed another USD 100 million, bringing the Fund’s total capital to approximately USD 600 million.
Serious challenges have also emerged in the spheres of trade and integration. The creation of a full-fledged free trade area (FTA) still remains a future goal. While there are agreements on tariff-free trade for certain goods, several objective obstacles hinder the establishment of a full FTA. Among these are the participation of some OTS members in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which impose tariff obligations. Meanwhile, Turkey — having its own customs union with the European Union — must take into account its commitments to Brussels when forming any FTA with organizations that overlap with the EU.
Another problem is the relatively low level of intra-OTS trade: in 2024, total trade among member states amounted to about USD 58 billion, or roughly 7 percent of their combined external trade. For comparison, when the EAEU was in a more active phase, its internal trade volume reached about 13.5 percent in 2015 and almost 19.8 percent by 2025.
Nevertheless, intra-Turkic trade is growing rapidly. Between January and July 2025, trade turnover between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan reached USD 517 million, nearly matching the previous year’s figure of USD 533 million. The main growth driver was Kazakhstan’s grain exports, which increased amid declining imports from Russia. If this trend continues, annual trade between Baku and Astana may reach USD 1 billion within the next two years.
A similar milestone — USD 1 billion — is projected by 2030 for trade between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. In January–May 2025, their mutual trade exceeded USD 200 million, up 40 percent year-on-year. In addition, the Azerbaijani-Uzbek Investment Company is financing at least 15 joint projects worth over USD 360 million. These include the development of a textile cluster in Azerbaijan and the construction of a second Chevrolet automobile and parts plant in the Hajigabul Industrial Park, in cooperation with “Uzavtosanoat” and “Azermash.”
Thus, the idea of Turkic integration — which emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s as a framework for intercultural dialogue — has now grown into a serious regional format. This is hardly surprising, as the practical development of this process is being carried out by the Turkic states themselves — without a dominant external influence and with a growing capacity to independently manage their own integration processes.
Ilgar Huseynov
Translated from haqqin.az
