As is known, since 2015, Russia has been a key player in the Arab republic, requiring Tel Aviv to coordinate militarily with Moscow to avoid clashes. In recent years, close coordination between Israel and Russia in Syria even led to a certain rapprochement between the two countries. The cooperation between Russian and Israeli military forces in Syria was so significant that high-ranking Iranian officers frequently raised concerns, openly stating that such a situation threatened Iran’s interests in the country.
At the beginning of January, the Telegram channel Free Iran, citing senior commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Bahruz Esbati, reported that Moscow allegedly disabled all radar systems, enabling Israel to strike the Iranian “Shahid Sadiq” intelligence headquarters.
Although this information was never officially confirmed or further developed, it is reasonable to assume that some level of coordination between Russian and Israeli forces in Syria did exist. In December 2024, Al Arabiya, citing its own sources, reported that Israel had gained control of two sites in Syria’s Daraa province, near the buffer zone at the Golan Heights, as well as an observation post. Prior to this, the IDF had opened a front in Syria and entered the buffer zone.
In any case, all of this is now in the past. Today, Syrian territory — and more importantly, its airspace — is protected by Turkey. According to Israeli military experts, Ankara’s deployment of long-range air defense systems in Syria, for example at the Tiyas airbase in Homs province, could pose a threat to Israeli airspace.
Interestingly, according to Conflits, not only Israel but also Iran shares concerns about the growing Turkish influence in the region. The United States will likely aim to create crisis management mechanisms between Tel Aviv and Ankara to prevent conflicts, but is unlikely to become directly involved in Syrian affairs.
This is evidenced by the fact that Washington has already begun withdrawing hundreds of its troops from northeastern Syria, according to sources cited by the New York Times. It is reported that three out of eight bases are being closed, and the size of the American contingent is being reduced from 2,000 to 1,400 troops.
Given these circumstances, Israel and Turkey have already started establishing contact mechanisms to avoid direct clashes in Syria. At the same time, Ankara has declared that it has no intention of withdrawing its military presence from the country. It is known that the first such contacts between Israel and Turkey took place in Baku, highlighting Azerbaijan’s growing role as a mediator in Turkish-Israeli relations.
Baku, which maintains close strategic relations with both Ankara and Tel Aviv, has no interest in exacerbating tensions between these two countries. Nor is the Syrian transitional government, currently focused on reconstruction after years of devastating civil war, interested in a new conflict.
The coincidence of interests between Baku and Damascus could bring Azerbaijan and Syria closer together. A meeting between President Ilham Aliyev and Syria’s transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the Antalya Forum could serve as a starting point for developing dialogue between the two countries, including on security issues.
Recently, it was reported that the Syrian leader invited Azerbaijan’s SOCAR to participate in the development of oil and gas fields in Syria. Security guarantees are a basic condition for implementing such promising projects.
Thus, the emerging new regional security architecture requires all participants to adapt. Baku could occupy a special place within it. We are only at the beginning of this process, and its effectiveness can only be tested by time.
Ilgar Velizade
