In recent days, virtually every significant move by Armenia’s leadership—both domestic and foreign—has been viewed through the lens of mounting pre-election dynamics. Preparations for next summer’s parliamentary elections have become the central factor shaping the government’s decisions. Against this backdrop, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan’s visit to Brussels on 2–3 December, during which the sixth Armenia–EU Partnership Council meeting was held, gained particular importance. The main objective of the trip appears to have been to secure political guarantees and demonstrate unwavering EU support for the current government’s direction.
Indeed, the joint statements made by Mirzoyan, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, and Commissioner Marta Kos at the press conference confirmed this assessment. The tone of the European officials clearly showed their backing of Nikol Pashinyan’s government ahead of the crucial electoral cycle, while also emphasizing key political priorities. Brussels aims to anchor Armenia within its political sphere not so much through legally binding commitments as through political patronage, institutional assistance, and expanded sectoral cooperation.
A central point of convergence became the shared approach to countering hybrid threats from Russia. Armenian officials, including Prime Minister Pashinyan and Parliamentary Speaker Alen Simonyan, have repeatedly spoken about extensive attempts by Moscow to influence Armenian domestic politics and destabilize the situation through media and political networks. This narrative has become both an instrument of Pashinyan’s internal political mobilization and a justification for distancing Armenia from Russia’s influence.
For the EU, this rhetoric aligns neatly with its own concept of “hybrid resilience” and its framing of Russia as a source of threat. This creates a deeper political affinity and allows Brussels to expect Armenia to continue limiting Russian influence and advancing its course toward Europe.
However, this tightening partnership is unfolding amid a domestic crisis in Armenia, growing opposition pressure, and the government’s attempts to secure external guarantees. EU statements on safeguarding the elections and the expansion of technical assistance—from expert missions to cybersecurity mechanisms—undoubtedly reinforce Pashinyan’s internal political standing.
At the same time, the EU’s decision to maintain its monitoring mission along the de facto Armenian–Azerbaijani border does not fully correspond to its stated goal of supporting regional peace. Despite having limited practical tools, the mission serves an important political-informational function by keeping Brussels engaged. Yet its continuation also irritates Baku, which sees the presence of external actors in the post-conflict environment as unnecessary and believes it provides unilateral legitimacy to Armenian interpretations.
Azerbaijan has repeatedly stressed that a peace treaty must enshrine the principle of no external actors on the border—so as not to replace direct dialogue. Still, the EU and Armenia disregard these signals, reinforcing the perception of Brussels as leaning toward Yerevan. The absence of an updated contractual framework between the EU and Baku only deepens this asymmetry.
Naturally, the evolving Armenia–EU architecture affects the regional balance. Brussels seeks to strengthen its presence in the South Caucasus through deeper ties with Armenia, including allocating €15 million for various peace-related initiatives. In the absence of comparable programs with Baku, this may shift the center of gravity of EU policy toward Yerevan and increase the risk of the EU being viewed as siding with one party to the former conflict. For Azerbaijan, this means the need to intensify diplomatic engagement not only with Brussels as an institution but also with individual EU member states to offset the effects of this emerging imbalance.
In sum, the new EU–Armenia strategic agenda serves to bolster Pashinyan’s position, expand EU influence, and gradually integrate Armenia into Europe’s political space. However, Baku believes that this rapprochement must not come at the expense of regional equilibrium or create new obstacles to the peace process in which the EU claims to play an impartial role.
Ilgar Velizade
