A little over six months remain until Armenia’s parliamentary elections, and after a period of relative calm, the country’s revanchist forces are once again becoming active.
Last week, a protest organized by the Kocharyan-aligned faction was held outside Armenia’s Prosecutor General’s Office, demanding the release of arrested opposition figures and clergy.
Yesterday, Arman Tatoyan—the former Armenian Ombudsman and head of the political initiative Wings of Unity—announced his intention to run in the upcoming elections. His stated priorities leave little room for interpretation: he said he does not plan to amend the constitution, intends to allocate 30–40% of the defense budget to develop the military-industrial complex, and opposes any dialogue between Azerbaijani and Armenian civil societies.
The growing activity of revanchist groups raises questions for Armenia directly linked to both internal stability and regional security—particularly the peace process with Azerbaijan.
To understand how these dynamics may affect next June’s parliamentary elections, 1news.az spoke with Farhad Mammadov, head of the South Caucasus Research Center.
How do you assess the pre-election atmosphere in Armenia? How strong are Pashinyan’s real political competitors and what are their chances?
At the moment, we can only assess the situation as it stands inside Armenia. Two opposition blocs are currently represented in parliament: Robert Kocharyan’s bloc with the ARF Dashnaktsutyun, and Serzh Sargsyan’s party together with former National Security Service chief Artur Vanetsyan.
As of today, it can be said that Kocharyan’s bloc and the Dashnaks have a realistic chance of crossing the electoral threshold and entering parliament.
The problems lie with Sargsyan’s party and Vanetsyan: many experts and polls show their chances and ratings are extremely low.
To defeat Pashinyan, the opposition must either unite into a single front and secure a massive vote share—which looks unrealistic—or replicate the “Gyumri scenario”: push three opposition forces into parliament, each of which loses to Pashinyan individually but ends up in second, third, and fourth place, enabling them to form a minority coalition and control parliament.
For this, new groups are needed. Among such emerging forces is Samvel Karapetyan’s movement, not yet converted into a political party but clearly preparing for it. There is also former ombudsman Arman Tatoyan, and billionaire Gagik Tsarukyan. These are the main opposition players seeking to become the second- and third-largest factions potentially able to enter parliament.
A merger is theoretically possible, but there is no unity among them. For example, Tatoyan openly urges former presidents Kocharyan and Sargsyan not to run, arguing their negative ratings outweigh the positive ones and insisting the “three pillars” should be led by new figures—including himself.
What matters for Azerbaijan? Azerbaijan’s key concern is how the political parties participating in the elections view Azerbaijan and the peace agenda outlined in the Joint Declaration signed by the Azerbaijani President and the Armenian Prime Minister in the presence of Donald Trump.
Currently, only Pashinyan’s party and former prime minister Aram Sargsyan’s Republic party (he is the brother of ex-PM Vazgen Sargsyan) support the Joint Declaration. Aram Sargsyan still has influence: for example, his bloc managed to gain some representation in the Yerevan Council of Elders, though in Vagharshapat they fell short by 30–40 votes.
Thus, we can say that within the opposition there is an active struggle for the “columns” that will participate in the elections. Meanwhile, after winning in Vagharshapat, the authorities feel fairly confident.
Do you think a possible defeat of Pashinyan and a change of power could derail the peace agenda? What risks to the peace process and regional security might arise?
If Armenia’s current opposition comes to power, everything will stop. The entire peace process—at the interstate level and at the level of civil society—will be so thoroughly destroyed that not even ruins will remain.
Azerbaijan will not resume dialogue with these groups that aspire to take power. However, we will still have the documents at hand—particularly the Joint Declaration.
Much will depend on how a new Armenian government treats that Declaration. But we must acknowledge that given the positions the main opposition forces are currently demonstrating, there will be almost nothing to negotiate.
This will have to be clearly shown to the countries that witnessed the Declaration’s signing—first and foremost the United States. Armenia’s relationship with Washington will also shift under a new government.
In the first months, all of this will need to be understood so that Azerbaijan can build its approach toward the new authorities.
In other words, Armenia could once again become a proxy state, as it effectively was for 25 years in our region. And if it continues this course under new leadership, Azerbaijan will calibrate its position accordingly.
What, in your view, could minimize the risk of the peace process collapsing? What steps can Armenia take right now to advance it?
First and foremost, a decision on the TRIPP operating regime. This would create an entirely new environment for the peace process over the next six months and could have a positive impact more broadly—both in interstate relations and between societies.
At this stage, it is fair to say the peace agenda has taken root. Both governments adhere to its main principles and advance it where possible under the current circumstances.
Each side, to a certain extent, finds the present arrangement acceptable. A regional configuration is taking shape; everyone understands its contours and pursues a coordinated policy.
For Azerbaijan, it is crucial that Armenia be a predictable neighbor. And at present, the peace agenda provides this element of predictability for both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
