Following the signing on August 8 in Washington of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan — brokered by the United States and providing for the creation of a transport corridor through Zangezur, or the so-called “Trump Route” — the regional configuration of the South Caucasus began to change rapidly.
It is important to stress, however, that the very appearance of this document and the possibility of discussing such ambitious projects became reality only thanks to Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war and Baku’s carefully calibrated political and diplomatic moves, which in recent years have fundamentally reshaped the region’s strategic architecture. Without these shifts, neither Yerevan, nor Washington, nor other external actors would have been able to advance such initiatives, and the positions of Iran and Russia would have remained rigid.
Iran, which initially took an extremely hard line, viewing the project as a direct threat to its geo-economic interests and an attempt to push it off the region’s transit map, has been forced to adjust its stance. Azerbaijan’s victory and the entrenchment of new realities in Washington made a return to the old status quo impossible.
Already on August 9, Igor Khovaev, special envoy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, arrived in Tehran, where he met with Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi. In official statements, Araghchi stressed Iran’s unwavering commitment to a peaceful settlement and the importance of ensuring that new projects respect the Islamic Republic’s “red lines.” According to him, the Armenian side managed to convince Tehran that the section of the future route would remain under Armenia’s sovereignty, while the road itself would be built by an American company registered in Armenia and operating under its laws. In effect, Iran agreed to accept the new rules of the game, shifting its emphasis from confrontation to an attempt to integrate into the process.
Russia is showing a similar dynamic. Initial caution, stemming from concerns over the weakening of its own position, has given way to a careful but nonetheless clear recognition of reality. Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk has already stated that Moscow is prepared to support Armenia in implementing the “Trump Route” if the authorities in Yerevan consider the project beneficial. Moreover, he emphasized that the signing of the document in Washington could provide Armenia with “greater security guarantees.” This statement was particularly notable given that Russia itself had long claimed the role of Armenia’s primary security guarantor. Effectively, Moscow indirectly acknowledged the limits of its influence and the need to reckon with the new realities created by Azerbaijan’s victory. Made on the eve of the U.S.–Russia presidential meeting in Alaska, the statement could also be seen as a diplomatic nod to Washington.
An important instrument of adaptation for both Moscow and Tehran is the regional 3+3 format, which, notably, was also proposed by President Ilham Aliyev. Once viewed as an alternative to Western mediation, it is now increasingly seen as a way to embed the U.S. initiative into a broader regional framework, thereby minimizing losses. For Iran, participation in 3+3 is a chance to maintain its status as a significant player in security and transit architecture despite shifts in traditional routes. For Russia, it is a way to remain politically involved, even as U.S. influence in the region grows.
Thus, the Washington accords represent not only a new stage in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations but also a catalyst for the transformation of approaches taken by such key regional powers as Iran and Russia. Yet the foundation for this transformation was laid earlier: it was Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war and its deft diplomatic strategy that made Baku the main architect of the new regional reality. Other players are left with no choice but to adapt to the conditions created by Azerbaijan and to search for formats that allow them to retain at least part of their previous influence.
Ultimately, what only a few years ago seemed impossible — U.S. participation in shaping agreements, Iran’s and Russia’s recognition of the new situation, and Yerevan’s readiness to compromise — became possible solely due to Azerbaijan’s decisive shift in the balance of power. This victory, consolidated through diplomacy, has become the point of no return defining the future of the South Caucasus.
Ilgar Velizade
