The investigation is still ongoing, and the official decoding of the “black boxes” is promised for next week. However, it is already known that the commercial plane, which was landing at the civilian airport in Grozny, was shot down by a Russian air defense system—specifically, the Pantsir-S1. Before that, its communication and navigation systems were jammed using electronic warfare systems.
And now, a month later, it must be stated: the behavior of both official and unofficial, Kremlin-aligned Russian entities following this catastrophe has led to serious political consequences. Bilateral relations between Baku and Moscow are undergoing a serious test today. More precisely, it is Russia’s attitude toward Azerbaijan that is being tested.
Azerbaijan, in full compliance with international law, expects the Russian side to acknowledge responsibility, issue apologies, conduct a transparent investigation, punish those responsible, and pay compensation. But in reality… In reality, an astronomical number of absurd theories have been thrown into the information space, such as “fog,” “collision with birds,” “an oxygen tank explosion,” and so on. Now, faced with irrefutable evidence, they claim it was “a special operation planned six months in advance by Ukrainian and NATO intelligence agencies.” Not a word about the responsibility of the Russian air defense system. Instead, a dirty information war has been unleashed against Azerbaijan on all fronts. Russian propagandists have essentially been given the command to “attack” Azerbaijan by all conceivable and inconceivable methods, with blatant speculations and distortions of facts leading the charge.
The main focus has been on “reviving” the incident with the Russian helicopter shot down in November 2020, and now, apparently, the deaths of peacekeepers during counter-terrorism raids.
On the evening of November 9, at 6:30 PM, on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, in the Nakhchivan sector, a Russian military helicopter was shot down. At that moment, a tripartite statement by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia and the prime minister of Armenia was still being prepared. The ceasefire was to take effect only at midnight, and it had not even been announced yet. The Russian peacekeeping contingent had not been deployed—nor had the peacekeeping mission even been declared.
Yes, combat operations were ongoing in Karabakh, not in the Nakhchivan sector of the border, but this was still Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, at least once—on October 15, 2020—an Armenian tactical missile had been launched toward the Ordubad district of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. And most importantly, the helicopter, which was flying at night with its transponders turned off, at low altitude—a standard maneuver for evading air defense radars, by the way—was escorting an Armenian military convoy! According to all the rules, it was a legitimate military target.
Nevertheless, let us remind once again: Baku did not escalate the situation or try to evade responsibility. President Ilham Aliyev called Russian President Vladimir Putin to apologize. Azerbaijan fully compensated for the helicopter and provided compensation to the families of the victims.
Now, the second episode is being “revived”—the deaths of peacekeepers during counter-terrorism raids. And it is being done according to the classic scheme: first, “sensational photographs” were thrown into Armenian Telegram channels, and then they were picked up by Russian ones. All of this is once again accompanied by a barrage of accusations against Azerbaijan.
But what is the reality? Let us remind everyone: before starting its counter-terrorism raids, Azerbaijan had warned the Russian peacekeeping command in advance and strongly recommended that the peacekeepers stay at their bases and not venture out. One would think that professional military personnel would understand the importance of following such recommendations. However, there were a few overly reckless individuals who ignored this warning. Several peacekeepers moved to combat positions in their vehicle, without displaying the mandatory Russian tricolor. It is not surprising that, in the heat of battle, Azerbaijani soldiers mistook them for the enemy and opened fire. And Azerbaijani forces are known for their accuracy. Again, the responsibility here lies on the principle of “they brought it upon themselves.” Nonetheless, Azerbaijan has done everything to avoid confrontation: apologies at the presidential level, the initiation of a criminal case, and so on.
And now, when an Azerbaijani civilian plane, strictly following its schedule, was first subjected to communication and navigation jamming and then struck by an anti-aircraft missile, Azerbaijan has every right to expect similar actions. That is, let us repeat, apologies, acknowledgment of responsibility, a transparent investigation, punishment of those responsible, and compensation. And if, instead, the Russian side begins an “information war” and a campaign of petty provocations aimed at discrediting our country—such actions do not go without consequences.
Here, one could stop. But there is also, if you will, a historical context. The month since the crash of the Azerbaijani civilian plane shot down by Russian air defense also coincided with another, the 35th, anniversary of Black January—a punitive operation of the Soviet army in a Soviet city. Ahead is another anniversary of the beginning of separatist protests in the now-nonexistent Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). And a clear understanding of where the roots of this tragedy lie. They go back to 1805, when Russia, to put it bluntly, began the occupation of the territory of present-day Azerbaijan, including the Karabakh Khanate. Formally, an agreement was signed with the Karabakh Khan. And it seemed that this agreement contained mutual guarantees, promises, and so on. But it turned out that Russia had no intention of fulfilling them. Very soon, Ibrahim Khalil Khan was killed along with his family by Russian officers. The Khan’s palace was burned. And soon, mass resettlement of ethnic Armenians to the lands of the Karabakh Khanate began. These were not unclaimed lands.
Today, Azerbaijan no longer has censorship imposed from Moscow. And it is well known how brutal the Russian assault on Ganja was, in which the last ruler of the city, Javad Khan, was killed. Openly accessible is the story of how Irevan was essentially plundered, where, by the way, there was no significant Armenian population at that time. Russia came to Azerbaijan as a conqueror and colonizer, so “velvet scenarios” were never an option here.
One could try to brush it off: it was a long time ago, the times were far from “vegetarian,” and other colonizers behaved no better. But in 1920, history repeated itself. Let us recall: in 1917, the Russian Empire ceased to exist. Independent states emerged from its ruins, including the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic—proclaimed on May 28, 1918. But less than two years later, it was not tsarist Russia, but Soviet Russia that took over the independent Azerbaijan of that time. A wave of mass killings and repressions swept across the country. Peasant uprisings were brutally suppressed in many regions of Azerbaijan. The country’s territory was simply torn apart—even contrary to the sparse Soviet laws, with Western Zangezur being given to Armenia. An Armenian autonomy was created in Karabakh, and for the first time in its history, the mountainous part of Karabakh was artificially separated from the plains of Karabakh, with which it had always been a single whole. Azerbaijan had to endure all the “charms” of collectivization, mass repressions of the 1930s, and so on. This did not stop the Kremlin from tactlessly exploiting the country’s resources, primarily its oil. That oil worked for everyone except Azerbaijan itself.
It was with the support of the Kremlin that a separatist rebellion broke out in Karabakh in 1988. Eyewitnesses to those events—and there are many—clearly remember: Moscow seemingly imposed a state of emergency in NKAO, but Armenian militant groups continued to operate. “Somehow” in 1989, professional terrorists from the Middle East, primarily from Lebanon, managed to infiltrate Armenia through the Soviet border. In 1988, a state of emergency was imposed in Baku, but not in Yerevan. Moscow did absolutely nothing to oppose the “ethnic cleansing” of Azerbaijanis in Armenia. Moreover, Armenia was allowed, with the silent approval of the Kremlin, to create its own armed structures.
In January 1990, however, the Soviet army carried out a punitive operation in Baku. And we clearly remember how everything happened. How the “Vympel” special group blew up the power block of the Baku tele-radio center to later blame this terrorist act on “Islamic fundamentalists.” How Mikhail Gorbachev lied about mythical “Islamic extremists.” What fake stories about Azerbaijan were spread by Moscow’s “central” newspapers and television. And how co-participants in Black January, such as Stepashin, were already held in high esteem in the new Russia. What kind of cult was created there around Yevgeny Primakov. And that’s far from everything.
For obvious reasons, this is not openly discussed in Yerevan, but the territorial conquests of the early 1990s, of which Armenians still boast today, were carried out, to put it bluntly, “with the power of Russian weapons.” Regular Russian units, with their standard armored vehicles, fought on Armenia’s side. The 66th regiment, which took part in the genocide of Azerbaijanis in Khojaly, is not the only example. Earlier, this same regiment distinguished itself in Malibeyli. Lachin was captured for Armenia by the Pskov Airborne Division.
And if we take it further, today Azerbaijan has every right to demand accountability from people like Stepashin, Bakatin, and others—co-participants in Black January in Baku. To demand the extradition of the command not only of the 366th regiment but also of the Pskov Airborne Division and other Russian units that fought on Armenia’s side. To this day, Azerbaijan has not received a clear answer to the question of how it was possible that “Iskander” ballistic missiles were fired at Shusha at the end of the war. There is also no investigation into the schemes by which weapons were transported to Armenia by cargo planes under the guise of humanitarian aid.
Yes, neither in 2020 nor in 2023 did Azerbaijan choose to escalate the situation. But it would be extremely short-sighted to think that our country lacks the political will or determination to take tougher political measures. There are “red lines” that cannot be crossed.
And Azerbaijan is undoubtedly drawing conclusions from the situation today, where Russia heavily criticizes Nikol Pashinyan for recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. If anything, this demonstrates Russia’s true position and its real intentions. It seems Moscow has not yet abandoned plans to expand the “Christian stronghold” in the South Caucasus.
What they fail to take into account is that the world map no longer features the Russian Empire or the USSR. And Russia, whose list of “unfriendly countries” is growing exponentially while its list of friendly ones is catastrophically shrinking, should consider the future of its relations with Azerbaijan. Relations that, if such steps continue, will no longer be the same. And that’s putting it mildly.
Nurani
Translated from minval.az