J.D. Vance toured Armenia and Azerbaijan on February 9-11, the first such high-level US visit to Armenia. The trip underlined two things: America’s indifference to Russia’s claimed areas of influence, and Kremlin weakness.
Vance’s visit underlines that while the Trump administration seeks better relations with Russia, the United States is undaunted about entry to an area the Kremlin likes to call its “near abroad”.
The vice president’s visit brought a frustrated response from the Russian state-controlled newspaper Kommersant. “There’s disappointment, frustration and a sense of helplessness,” the author wrote of Vance’s arrival in the South Caucasus. “Because it’s precisely in this region that Russia’s position has eroded noticeably in recent years. The main reason is obvious: excessive absorption in the Ukrainian conflict ties the hands in all other areas.”
US ambitions should not be overstated. It does not plan a military presence in the region. The aims are more economic than geopolitical, although as Russia well knows the one can lead to the other.
And the US aims to expand into traditional Russian areas. It is making inroads in spheres like peaceful nuclear cooperation. First and foremost, Armenia and the US signed the so-called 123 Agreement on nuclear cooperation, which would either replace the Soviet-era Metsamor nuclear plant or build modular reactors in addition to Metsamor, a technology in which the US is a global leader. Washington opened the way to a whopping $9bn investment in that area.
The Armenian government’s decision is a setback for Rosatom. The nuclear sphere has been a core component of Russia’s projection of power in the former Soviet space. The state company, Rosatom, has signed multiple deals with central Asian, Middle Eastern, and African countries. It has been a company with global reach and is pitching hard for the Armenia contract.
Yerevan may yet strike a balance between Moscow and Washington. Armenia is expected to sign a separate agreement with the Russian company for at least some part of its nuclear infrastructure, as discussed at an early February meeting between Russian and Armenian officials.
In another agreement with Washington, Armenia also pledged to buy $11m worth of US-made V-BAT type drones, and both sides agreed to expand their cooperation in AI and semiconductor innovation. The US vice-president said that Armenia will be able to acquire NVIDIA graphics processing units.
Next stop, Azerbaijan, where Vance signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership between the two countries. The bilateral talks revolved around oil and gas partnerships, electricity supplies via the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a US-leased road corridor aiming ultimately to link Turkey to the Caspian Sea. This follows intensive discussions between Baku and Washington on military issues, security, and trade.
Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)
The US is mindful that Armenia and Azerbaijan form a contiguous flank to Iran’s northern border. In a period of intense tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s alignment with Washington could serve as an additional pressure point on Tehran — Osint analysts counted more than 20 large US military transport aircraft flying into the two countries in the days up to February 9.
TRIPP is another challenge to Iran. It wants to keep the Aras corridor operational — this existing route skirts Armenia from the south and allows Azerbaijan proper to link up with its Nakhchivan exclave. Should TRIPP proceed as proposed, Iran will lose transit revenues but, more importantly, a powerful geopolitical tool when it comes to the relations with Azerbaijan, since it can interrupt transit should it choose. Vance’s visit is an additional sign that Washington is serious about the project, though there was less discussion on TRIPP than many expected.
It focused more on pushing Armenia and Azerbaijan closer to finally signing a comprehensive peace agreement, a logical step following the summit held in Washington in August. Here, too, the US side has evolved into a key participant in the peace process, sidelining Russia. Washington has emerged as a favored player given that both Armenia and Azerbaijan have serious grievances about Kremlin policy, and efforts at normalization are flagging.
Russia is struggling to find a response. Prior to Donald Trump’s second term, US engagement with the South Caucasus was more focused on democracy promotion, human rights, and, to a certain extent geopolitical importance of the region. Russia responded, seeking to thwart America’s initiatives via military moves, as with its 2008 invasion of Georgia.
Under Trump II, a more subtle approach is shaping up. This is largely based on transactional activities. With that come US investments into vital areas, and concomitant direct political dialogue.
Of course, to have a comprehensive South Caucasus strategy, the US will need to have Georgia on board too after a freeze in relations following the outcome of its 2024 election that the Biden administration heavily criticized. It’s notable that Vance talked to Georgian officials during the Winter Olympics opening ceremony in Milan; the ruling party claimed the brief discussions had been positive.
The central theme at the moment is clear, however. The US is on the way up in the South Caucasus, and Russia is struggling to find a response.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
