Over the course of two days, October 1–2, the Danish capital Copenhagen turned into the political hub of Europe: first came the EU summit, followed a day later by the European Political Community summit. Among the numerous meetings held on the sidelines of these events, special attention was drawn to the talks of President Ilham Aliyev. In particular, his separate meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stood out. Notably, a short report was published after the meeting, which was almost word-for-word identical in both the Azerbaijani and Armenian versions. This fact alone is symbolic: it shows a rare alignment of positions in defending a peace agenda during the post-conflict period.
Of particular importance was the emphasis by the Azerbaijani president and Armenian prime minister on the significance of transport communications for the region. They discussed the progress of infrastructure projects in Azerbaijan and the TRIPP project in Armenia, as well as exchanged views on the implementation of the Washington Declaration. However, a striking imbalance is evident: while the Azerbaijani side is actively building its part of the Zangezur transport corridor, thus contributing to a genuine unblocking of communications, Armenia has yet to begin practical work.
Moreover, on September 29, during his visit to Strasbourg, Nikol Pashinyan declared that Armenia should not be expected to implement agreements immediately. “Our idea is this: on the morning of August 9 we look—oh, is there an excavator? No excavator? Another fake again… That’s not how it works,” the prime minister remarked figuratively. According to him, the process “must be slow but continuous,” and any attempts to speed things up are doomed to fail. At present, he clarified, discussions are limited to railway design—deciding who will be responsible for construction and who will finance it.
This naturally raises the question: how long must one wait before Yerevan moves from words to action? Time carries both political and economic costs. Azerbaijan already plans to complete the Horadiz–Agbend section by early 2026, is actively modernizing railroads in Nakhchivan, and, together with Turkey, is implementing the strategic Nakhchivan–Igdir line, which will directly link the exclave to Turkey’s network and, effectively, to Europe. In other words, Baku is demonstrating consistency and readiness to bring the unblocking of communications to a real outcome.
Armenia, on the other hand, remains in the stage of discussions and preliminary design, as if deliberately postponing practical steps. It gives the impression that Yerevan is intentionally stalling, seeking to raise the stakes and bargain for more favorable terms—whether in financing, control, or political guarantees. Yet this tactic is fraught with risk: by the time Azerbaijan and its partners complete their infrastructure projects, Armenia may find itself sidelined from the region’s new transport architecture. The question then shifts: will Yerevan miss the chance to transform its territory from a dead end into a genuine transit hub?
Viewed in this light, the situation becomes even more pressing. Azerbaijan shows readiness for fast-tracked implementation of projects, shaping a new transport map of the region in which, by 2026, its infrastructure could become the key link in Trans-Caucasian logistics. Armenia, meanwhile, limiting itself to debates and declarations, projects the image of a country either trying to wait things out to extract maximum benefit, or simply avoiding swift decisions out of fear of their consequences. But time works against it: the further Baku, Ankara, and their partners advance, the less room for maneuver Yerevan will have. To international observers, this position increasingly looks less like caution and more like a lack of political will.
In the longer term, this entails the risk of losing a historic opportunity: instead of becoming a transit center and connecting hub, Armenia could cement itself in the role of a periphery. In that case, its slowness would no longer appear as cautious strategy, but as a strategic mistake—one whose consequences may prove difficult to correct.
It is enough to note that as a result of the protracted conflict with Azerbaijan, all strategic regional transport and energy projects have bypassed Armenian territory. The Zangezur Corridor is Armenia’s last chance to catch a departing train—and this may soon become true not only metaphorically, but literally.
Ilgar Velizade
