An unprecedented escalation—this is the most accurate way to describe the events currently unfolding at the still-undefined border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. For the third consecutive day, reports of ceasefire violations and shelling have been coming in almost continuously. Fortunately, so far, these border incidents have not resulted in casualties. But how long will this “so far” last? And most importantly—what guarantees that Armenia will not take the next step in its “game of escalation”?
Three days of continuous shelling cannot be a coincidence. Yes, nerves may get the better of someone on the border, leading to an accidental shot at a shadow or a warning shot into the air. However, deliberately targeting the positions of the Azerbaijani army and border forces from Armenian territory for three consecutive days can only be intentional.
One theory suggests that, as in February of last year, various terrorist groups—especially “Yerkrapah”—could be behind these provocations. However, upon closer examination, this theory does not hold up. The Armenian authorities are fully capable of controlling their side of the border.
The motives of official Yerevan are also quite obvious. It is hardly a coincidence that this “game of escalation” began immediately after Azerbaijan and Armenia announced the completion of their work on the text of a future peace agreement. The idea of revenge has not been abandoned in Yerevan. Moreover, for obvious reasons, Pashinyan does not want to sign a peace treaty under Azerbaijan’s terms. At the same time, Armenian officials understand that after their military defeats in 2020, 2023, and a series of border clashes, better conditions will not be offered. This leads to a clear and, unfortunately, well-known tactic for Azerbaijan: disrupting the peace process through military provocations.
But that is not all. Today’s statement from the “Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia” provides further insights. The “barbecue prime minister’s” team has quite explicitly outlined its political demands. Yerevan has stated that it has submitted written proposals to Azerbaijan regarding the resolution of rail freight transportation issues—from western Azerbaijan through Armenian territory to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and beyond, as well as from Armenia’s northwestern regions through Azerbaijan to the south and third countries. Additionally, Armenia proposed the creation of a bilateral mechanism for mutual arms control and is awaiting a positive response from Azerbaijan.
Minval has repeatedly exposed the essence of Yerevan’s “transportation fraud.” Instead of opening the Zangezur Corridor under the neutral control of Russian border guards, Armenia is offering Azerbaijan routes through its own territory under highly dubious security conditions. In return, Yerevan wants the right to transit through Azerbaijani territory, both between different regions of Armenia and to Iran.
However, the “bilateral mechanism for mutual arms control” is even more intriguing.
First and foremost, such a proposal implies a certain level of trust between the parties—a trust that does not exist. Speaking at the XII Global Forum, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev clearly stated:
“The level of trust in Armenia is close to zero. That is why we do not trust a single word they say. These are not people we can trust, including the current government.”
Yerevan had previously proposed the creation of a “mechanism for recording and investigating incidents” along the line of contact just before the 44-day Patriotic War. Baku rejected this proposal, as such a mechanism would have indefinitely “frozen” the line of contact, whereas Azerbaijan insisted on the liberation of its then-occupied lands rather than on fixing the status quo and guaranteeing the occupiers’ presence.
Today, the previously occupied territories have been liberated, and the focus has shifted to border delimitation and demarcation. Armenia is also being forced to cede land in this process. For instance, not only the transfer of four villages in Gazakh but also the first delimitation process under Russian mediation near the Iranian border, where Azerbaijan regained farmland, strategic heights, and part of the Yerevan–Meghri highway. Establishing a “bilateral mechanism” would essentially freeze the delimitation process, allowing Yerevan to maintain control over the disputed areas.
Thus, the current escalation appears to be a deliberate strategy by Armenia to disrupt the peace process and resist territorial concessions.
Armenia is now attempting to push forward not just the idea of “mutual investigation of incidents” but also mutual arms control. In simple terms, Yerevan is trying to impose restrictions on Azerbaijan’s military potential in border regions. Given that Armenia lags far behind Azerbaijan in military capabilities and its armed forces are significantly weaker than the Azerbaijani army, it is clear that such restrictions would primarily benefit Yerevan.
Not to mention that Armenia is eager to return to the old OSCE Minsk Group proposals, under which Azerbaijan would have been allowed to station only border guards and police with light firearms in the liberated regions—but not the army.
Additionally, official Yerevan’s attempts to shift responsibility for “incidents” by saying, “It’s not us, it’s ‘Yerkrapah,’ we don’t control them at all,” raise another serious concern. If today these groups are using only small arms, what guarantees that tomorrow they won’t be equipped with something more serious—possibly even ‘Iskander’ missiles? The question of who exactly launched the Iskander strike on Shusha in November 2020 still remains unanswered.
In short, Armenia has ambitious plans. But since there are no legal or legitimate ways for it to push them forward, and since it lacks the diplomatic leverage to pressure Baku, Yerevan is resorting to armed provocations as a form of blackmail.
Well, in that case, we are obliged to remind: the Azerbaijani army has strong nerves and does not fall for provocations. However, if Armenia crosses the “red line,” there will be a response—one that will be extremely painful for Yerevan. So, it would be wise not to play with fire.
Nurani
