Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, has once again taken on the role of a “peacemaker” and “constructive negotiator.” The Armenian head of government announced that Yerevan is “ready” to open as many as three border crossings along the border with Azerbaijan, allowing Azerbaijani cargo and passenger vehicles to enter Armenian territory and travel to Nakhchivan and Turkey. He claimed that the Armenian government could make this decision “within one or two weeks” and that the necessary infrastructure for entry into Nakhchivan could also be prepared “fairly quickly.”
He specified that cargo trucks “will be able to enter Armenian territory via the Lachin–Kornidzor route through the Kornidzor checkpoint, then continue to the Armenian-Turkish border and enter Turkey through the Margara checkpoint.” According to Nikol Vovaevich, the necessary physical infrastructure for such transit transport is “already ready,” with only an official decision needed, pending agreement from Baku and Ankara.
By the logic of the situation, one might recall that just the day before, Nikol Pashinyan visited the “Margara” checkpoint on the Turkish border—currently inactive—and spoke at length about opening the border with Turkey. Or even reference the Russian Foreign Ministry’s statements about the necessity of opening regional communications.
Leaving aside how realistic it is to expect Armenia’s border with Turkey to open before Yerevan explicitly renounces its historical and territorial claims against Turkey, another point stands out. Pashinyan made no mention whatsoever of opening the Zangezur Corridor—despite Armenia’s signed commitments to do so. According to the Trilateral Statement of November 10, 2020, Armenia is obligated to provide Azerbaijan with transport access between its mainland and Nakhchivan, with security ensured by Russian FSB border guards. This makes perfect sense. The old Soviet road to Nakhchivan runs along the Iranian border, which is still guarded by Russian “green berets.” A border zone regime, reminiscent of Soviet times, is still in place, and handing full control of the checkpoint over to Armenian border guards does not change much. Most importantly, given the existing realities, the security of the road must be ensured by a third party.
Yet, Pashinyan is in no hurry to open the Zangezur Corridor. Instead, Azerbaijan is once again being offered vague “alternative routes,” where Azerbaijani drivers would have to travel across the entire territory of Armenia without any clear security guarantees. Trusting Yerevan’s goodwill in this matter is, unfortunately, not an option—especially given the intense anti-Azerbaijani and anti-Turkish sentiments prevalent in Armenian society. Moreover, these proposed routes run along roads that are impassable for much of the year due to weather conditions.
It is not difficult to predict that such a “transport alternative,” proposed by Pashinyan, will not be acceptable to Azerbaijan, which insists on Armenia fulfilling all its obligations—obligations that Pashinyan himself signed, albeit in a secret location. It is highly unlikely that Yerevan fails to understand this. So then, why is Pashinyan even putting forward these “alternative proposals” in the first place?
The answer is simple. Nikol Vovaevich does not want to provide Azerbaijan with a transport corridor to Nakhchivan, let alone to Turkey. However, at the same time, he does not want to take responsibility for refusing to do so. Instead, he is orchestrating yet another act of what can only be described as political deception. That is, he is proposing an alternative solution while fully aware that it will not be accepted. But in doing so, he hopes that the blame for the failure to unblock regional communications will fall on Azerbaijan instead.
Pashinyan seems to believe that in response to this pseudo-constructive stance from Yerevan, the entire “civilized world” will pressure Azerbaijan into opening a route to Nakhchivan for Armenia. In other words, he wants to salvage his grand project, the so-called “Crossroads of Peace.”
However, in reality, such a primitive trick has no chance of success. Firstly, the global community, to put it mildly, has far more pressing concerns than indulging Yerevan’s transportation whims. And secondly, those who are truly familiar with the situation will hardly be deceived by this maneuver.
Moreover, considering that Azerbaijan already has an alternative road to Turkey via Georgia, as well as “transport agreements” with Iran, while Armenia has no alternative transit route through Azerbaijan, Pashinyan’s tactics ultimately harm his own country. Even if he fails to recognize it.
