These are outlined as follows:
Peace Treaty: Changes to the Constitution and legislation of Armenia.
Border Definition: The liberation of four villages and shifts to other border areas.
Unblocking Communications: Unhindered access to the Zangezur Corridor and international security control.
From statements and actions by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, it appears he is not opposed to making progress on the peace treaty and border definition. However, he is firmly against the unhindered operation of the Zangezur Corridor, a stance shared by both his government and Armenia’s international backers.
Since the beginning of the year, public discourse has included topics such as constitutional changes and the liberation of four villages to start the border definition process. Pashinyan left the issue of a constitutional referendum aside but decided to proceed with the liberation of the four villages, taking actions that are immediately feasible.
It seems Pashinyan has taken these steps to test his limits. The handover of the villages has sparked protests organized by the parliamentary opposition and the church. However, these protests are currently localized in the villages themselves, although there are attempts to spread them to other cities and the capital of Armenia. We are now observing how Pashinyan must use state apparatus resources to suppress these protests, with special forces from the loyal Ministry of Internal Affairs being deployed and the equally loyal Investigative Committee initiating criminal cases against soldiers joining the protests. Thus, this step and the subsequent suppression of protests do not undermine his legitimacy. Pashinyan is using the full extent of his power, which is normal.
However, to implement the subsequent fair conditions set by Azerbaijan, the Armenian Prime Minister will need to hold a referendum, the results of which are unpredictable and could question his legitimacy!
Thus, we conclude that Pashinyan will not likely proceed with a referendum in the near future—a process whose results could risk his power. His patrons in the West and South advise against it.
What could Pashinyan feasibly do next?
It seems that after completing the delimitation and demarcation process on the Gazakh direction, all Pashinyan might do is annul the decisions of the Armenian Supreme Council from 1992, adjust the documents of the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs… no withdrawal of lawsuits will occur, as the procedure has already started and requires mutual consent.
It feels like Pashinyan has reached the limit of his legitimacy in the decision-making process and will not risk his power.
The question remains – will Pashinyan’s limit of capabilities be enough for Baku?
It can be assumed that Blinken’s call was precisely about this issue. The West is not interested in any electoral process in Armenia that might harm Pashinyan and create a legitimacy issue for his power.
Farhad Mammadov
Translated from Telegram channel @mneniyefm
