Iran’s internal vulnerability is creating a window of opportunity for the United States to apply strategic pressure, while a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan could weaken the positions of Tehran and Moscow in the South Caucasus. This assessment was offered by Wes Martin, the first Senior Antiterrorism/Force Protection Officer for Coalition Forces in Iraq, in an article published by the US Department of Defense outlet Stars and Stripes.
According to the author, the recent surge of violence against protesters in Iran, which resulted in tens of thousands killed and wounded, once again demonstrates a pattern Washington cannot afford to ignore: pressure is most effective when an adversary is experiencing internal instability.
Martin notes that for decades Iran has sustained its influence by exporting violence through proxy structures and by controlling key geographic chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. At the same time, the South Caucasus long remained a secondary direction for Tehran.
In the author’s assessment, the prospect of a final settlement of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict is becoming an important factor in the broader geopolitical calculus surrounding Iran’s future.
Martin criticizes the approaches of the Barack Obama and Joe Biden administrations, which, in his view, treated the South Caucasus as a peripheral diplomatic arena of “frozen conflicts” and declining US influence. He argues that the situation shifted under President Donald Trump, who hosted the president of Azerbaijan and the prime minister of Armenia for the signing of a peace memorandum in August last year.
The author emphasizes that Azerbaijan, located at the intersection of East–West and North–South routes — including the Middle Corridor between Europe and Asia that bypasses Russia and Iran — has acquired key strategic importance. According to him, Baku supplies around 500,000 barrels of oil per day to the global market, provides Europe with non-Russian gas, and maintains close security cooperation with Israel.
“In a world of contested supply chains and sanctions evasion, geography once again matters,” Martin observes, adding that this is precisely why Moscow and Tehran seek to contain Azerbaijan’s rising strategic role.
In his view, Russia has for many years used Armenia as an instrument for preserving its regional influence, while Iran regarded Armenia as its only reliable northern outlet not aligned with Ankara, Jerusalem, or Washington. A peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku, Martin argues, would weaken these levers by opening transport routes to Nakhchivan, Türkiye, and onward to global markets.
Martin also draws attention to resistance to the peace process beyond the region itself — primarily in the United States, among segments of the Armenian diaspora. In particular, he criticizes the activities of the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), which, in his assessment, has increasingly shifted from defending Armenian interests to undermining US diplomacy.
The author further notes that the security, technological, and intelligence partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan has long irritated Tehran.
According to Martin, a successful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would stabilize the South Caucasus, reduce Russia’s military presence, weaken Iran’s ability to “weaponize geography,” and strengthen Azerbaijan as a US trade and investment partner.
Martin also calls on the United States to repeal Section 907, which restricts direct assistance to Azerbaijan and limits arms sales. In his view, this mechanism represents an outdated legacy of a different era and no longer corresponds to the current dynamics of the peace process.
