The past week has been eventful regarding Armenian topics. Although it concerns us, for the citizens of Armenia—whose Prime Minister is suddenly worried about President Lukashenko’s friendly attitude towards Azerbaijan—it forms an internal agenda. Meanwhile, Nikol Pashinyan accused the leadership of Karabakh separatists of surrendering territories they had previously captured from us to Azerbaijan, which also sparked a political scandal. Additionally, there have been regular shellings of Azerbaijani army positions in the Nakhchivan direction. What is happening in Armenia and how can we explain its recent internal political and military activities?
Minval.az asked political scientist Rasim Musabayov to comment on these issues. The editorial team of aze.media has translated the interview.
– How can we explain Pashinyan’s contradictory position? On one hand, he says that a peace treaty could be signed within a month, and on the other, he talks about the impossibility of changing the Constitution where territorial claims against Azerbaijan are reflected. What kind of game is this and where will it lead? Does this mean that Pashinyan has decided to torpedo the negotiation process and blame everything on Azerbaijan?
– We must understand that Pashinyan is currently in a rather difficult position. The text of the peace treaty is practically agreed upon. It has been sent back and forth between Yerevan and Baku nine times and has been discussed face-to-face by the foreign ministers of both countries with their teams. Pashinyan understands that there are constitutional issues that need to be resolved. He admitted this himself in February this year during his speech on the public radio channel in Armenia. The question is that he simply cannot meet our demand to remove the reference to the Declaration of Independence, which mentions the “unification of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia,” through a referendum under Azerbaijani pressure.
According to Armenian law, such a referendum requires the participation of at least half of the registered voters in Armenia. All his opponents will unite and fail the vote. And after this, the question of Pashinyan’s government’s resignation will arise. He believes that the caveat made in the text of the treaty that no one, citing internal legislation and internal restrictions, can prevent the entry into force of this treaty is sufficient. He believes that this should remove possible attempts to question the treaty.
There is also another nuance. When during the Soviet era the unification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh was announced, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR annulled this decision. But subsequently, the Armenians of the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh” themselves declared independence. And if later they then united with Armenia, it turns out they had independence from Armenia? No, this is absurd. Then independence from Azerbaijan? If so, they effectively agreed that the previous decision, rejected by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, did not come into force.
This problem first arose when Kocharyan was elected president of Armenia and his opponents stated that he could not run for this position because he had not lived in Armenia for the past ten years, as required by their Constitution. Then Kocharyan referred to the fact that “the necessary decision had already been made earlier and Nagorno-Karabakh had already united with Armenia.” But the Constitutional Court of Armenia confirmed Kocharyan’s correctness with its conclusion. So if necessary, the Constitutional Court can make the same conclusion that Kocharyan was wrongly allowed to run for president and that the reference in the Constitution to independence is legally null and void.
So when Pashinyan’s opponents will say that he has no right to recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including Karabakh, he will try to confirm with a parliamentary majority decision that Karabakh was not annexed to Armenia. Or he will try to get the corresponding conclusion of the Constitutional Court. But these are Pashinyan’s problems because for Azerbaijan, any ambiguity in this regard is unacceptable.
Even if we sign a peace treaty and normalize interstate relations, I don’t think we will ratify it as long as ambiguity and uncertainty remain.
– Pashinyan accused the former president of the former self-proclaimed separatist structure of Karabakh, Samvel Shahramanyan, of surrendering Karabakh to Azerbaijan. In response, former Security Council Secretary Samvel Babayan accused the Armenian leadership of the so-called Karabakh Defense Army being subordinate to official Yerevan and a structural unit of the Armenian Ministry of Defense. How can we understand these statements? Having lost the war, is Armenia now trying to find scapegoats in the Karabakh issue?
– In fact, we can say that Armenians are now engaging in self-exposure. We always said that units of the Armenian Armed Forces were present on the territory of Azerbaijan. Armenians and their Western patrons, as well as in Russia, always responded that there were no Armenian armed formations there, only local self-defense forces. But suddenly it turns out there were no self-defense forces, only the Armed Forces of Armenia. And now they openly admit it.
I believe this internal struggle will reveal a lot of interesting things to the whole world. It will also be very important for us since the “NKR” was only in words, but in reality, it was all about Armenia’s illegal occupation of Azerbaijani territory. I am sure this will strengthen Azerbaijan’s position in any negotiations and completely reject Armenia’s attempts to participate in determining the fate of Karabakh Armenians in negotiations with Azerbaijan. Our country will not recognize Armenia’s right to have a say in this matter because for 30 years they were engaged in the occupation of Azerbaijani territories, disguised as some kind of self-determination.
– What are Pashinyan’s attacks on Alexander Lukashenko related to? Is this something personal or an attempt to withdraw from the CSTO?
– Pashinyan’s attacks on Lukashenko are related to his mental state, as street pressure is, of course, making him very nervous. He himself once organized such pressure and understands that if it gets out of control, it will end badly for him. On the other hand, he is trying to find a reason to completely withdraw from participation in the CSTO. He is afraid to say something to Putin, so he directs his grievance towards Lukashenko. Like, “as long as Lukashenko is in the CSTO, I won’t come.” Well, don’t come. It’s not like everyone there is waiting for you. This is, of course, a nervous breakdown and, on the other hand, an attempt to find a reason to nullify participation and interaction with the CSTO.
– What are the increased shelling of the Nakhchivan territory by Armenia attempting to provoke Azerbaijan into?
– I want to remind you that an Azerbaijani serviceman recently died there and an investigation is underway. We do not have information about the circumstances or who fired the shot, but the serviceman died near the border. This may also be the result of actions from the Armenian side.
I do not think that Nikol Pashinyan and his government have lost their minds so much as to start creating military tension on the border. This will turn into another humiliation for them. But I quite admit that there are certain forces in the Armenian army interested in destabilizing the situation. They have many servicemen on the border who are former participants in military operations but are already older. They post about military topics on social networks. Among them, there may well be opponents of Pashinyan who may try to organize some kind of provocation. The goal is to demonstrate the supposed inability of Pashinyan’s government to establish peace with Azerbaijan and try to put pressure on him. But he has to deal with this himself. In one thing, I am sure: if provocations on the border continue, Azerbaijan’s response will be, as always, convincing and, if I may say so, enlightening.
Rauf Nasirov
