On December 17, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan disclosed the content of the remaining two articles of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty which have yet to be agreed upon (President.az, December 18, 2024). According to Aliyev, these articles call for the withdrawal of all lawsuits that the two countries have filed against each other in international courts and a commitment not to deploy the military forces of third countries along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. While there appears to be some mutual understanding on the first issue, the latter has proven far more contentious (Report.az, December 19, 2024).
As part of this condition, Azerbaijan expects Armenia to terminate the European Union’s monitoring mission in Armenia, which has been patrolling the border between the two countries for over two years (see EDM, January 16). Further complicating the negotiations, the European Union recently extended the monitoring mission for an additional two years, allocating over 44 million euros ($46 million) for its continuation until February 19, 2027 (Consilium.europa.eu, January 30). Although the deployment of third-party forces remains a major obstacle in the peace talks, the European Council has described the mission as “an essential component of the European Union’s efforts in supporting peace and stability in the region” (Consilium.europa.eu, January 30).
The European Union and the Armenian government credit the mission with preventing major escalations along the border since its deployment in October 2022. Farid Shafiyev, Chairman of the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations—a think tank close to the Azerbaijani government—argues, however, that this perspective overlooks the mission’s limitations. With only approximately 200 unarmed personnel, the mission lacks the capacity to patrol the entire border effectively (Author’s interview, February 4). Consequently, it would not have been able to prevent an Azerbaijani military operation had Baku intended to attack Armenia. On the contrary, its deployment has heightened tensions between Baku and Yerevan while also contributing to the broader geopolitical rivalries in the region.
Beyond the text of the peace treaty itself, two additional controversies complicate the broader context for signing the agreement. Disagreements persist regarding the dissolution of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group and Azerbaijan’s expectation that Armenia should remove territorial claims from its constitution before signing a peace treaty.
Regarding dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group, the Armenian government has shown some willingness to cooperate. “We agree to abolish the OSCE Minsk Group because the absence of conflict renders its conflict-serving format irrelevant. However, we want to be sure that the OSCE Minsk Group’s abolition means the same for Azerbaijan,” Pashinyan stated on January 31 (Interfax, January 31). This is a significant breakthrough, as Azerbaijan has officially declared that it considers the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resolved and holds no territorial claims against Armenia (Azertag, March 31, 2022, January 28).
Azerbaijan expects Armenia to remove territorial claims to the Karabakh region from its constitution to eliminate any possibility of rekindling the conflict in the future. This demand stems from concerns that Armenian nationalist and revanchist forces continue to discuss plans to reassert claims over Azerbaijan’s sovereign territories. For instance, Harut Sassounian, an Armenian author critical of Pashinyan’s policies, recently wrote, “It is wrong to declare that we [Armenians] do not have any territorial demands because that would forfeit Armenians’ right to someday regain their lost territories” (Horizonweekly.ca, January 29). Azerbaijan views the constitutional amendment as a safeguard against such territorial claims in the future. Due to various legal and political hurdles, however, amending the Armenian constitution remains a challenge (Commonspace.eu, December 14, 2024).
Another issue that has complicated the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process in recent months is related to the initiatives to re-open regional transportation and communication channels. On January 7, in an interview with local TV channels, Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan’s demand for a land passage between the western regions of mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan exclave through the Meghri region of southern Armenia (President.az, January 7). This route, referred to as the Zangezur corridor in reference to the historical name of the area, remains a key point of contention (see EDM, April 15, May 21, September 19, 2024).
“The Zangezur corridor must and will be opened,” Aliyev stressed (President.az, January 7). Rejecting alternative routes proposed by Armenia for connecting with Nakhchivan, he stated, “Why should we have to go to Nakhchivan, an integral part of Azerbaijan, through indirect routes? We should have a direct connection” (President.az, January 7). He also referenced the trilateral statement signed by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia on November 9–10, 2020, which obligated Armenia to provide an “unimpeded” land passage under the Border Guard Service of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) supervision. “Simply put, they must fulfill the provisions of the November 10 statement. Everything is clearly outlined there,” he asserted (President.az, November 10, 2020).
Meanwhile, Armenia refuses to open the corridor under the conditions outlined in the trilateral statement. Armenia has agreed to establish a railway connection through the Meghri region to break the deadlock, citing the high costs of constructing railways through northern Armenia (Armenpress.com, January 31). Pashinyan suggested prioritizing cargo shipments initially and considering passenger transportation once relations between the two countries stabilize (Armenpress.com, January 31). Pashinyan, however, has rejected demands for “unimpeded” passage, arguing that the trilateral statement contains no such provisions (Arminfo.info, January 31). Yerevan has proposed simplified transit procedures along this corridor, but this is unlikely to satisfy Azerbaijan (Armenpress.com, January 30). Baku insists that customs checks and fees should apply only when cargo and passengers travel to third countries, not when moving between different parts of Azerbaijan (see EDM, April 15, 2024).
Despite some progress on minor issues, the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process remains at an impasse, with fundamental disagreements on key treaty provisions persisting. The dispute over the Zangezur corridor and the presence of third-party forces along the border continue to obstruct negotiations. While Yerevan’s cautious willingness to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group and withdraw lawsuits from international courts signals a step forward, the existence of territorial claims in Armenia’s constitution remains an unresolved issue. Without an agreement on these matters, the path to a comprehensive peace treaty is likely to remain fraught with challenges and uncertainty.
