In today’s black-and-white world, this is an extremely difficult task that requires certain conditions: proper formulation of national interests, the ability to protect resources and national interests, the consolidation of society around national goals, and the impossibility of adjusting the country’s foreign policy through influence on internal policy.
Let’s try to understand this theory using examples from the last few months.
To understand how complex the conditions are under which Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is conducted, it is enough to look at the countermeasures of foreign actors opposing the implementation of Baku’s agenda after the 44-day war. Until September 2023, all these countermeasures took place both diplomatically and on the ground.
What is the situation now?
There is no longer a Russian Peacekeeping Contingent in Karabakh. This did not lead to a deterioration in relations between Baku and Moscow; on the contrary, it created a foundation for closer cooperation in the implementation of transport projects.
Official allies of Armenia (Russia, Belarus) and actual patrons (the U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan) visit Karabakh, and this has become a common occurrence.
After a long hiatus, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Iran met at the border at the opening ceremony of a joint project. Now, Iran can only prevent the opening of communications in Armenia. Even there, the protest movement in Syunik, supported by Iran, is turning into a meaningless action. After the deaths of Iran’s president and foreign minister, Tehran’s foreign activity will pause until a new head of state is elected.
The increasingly regular visits of high-ranking representatives of Azerbaijan and China demonstrate the parties’ readiness to elevate their relationship. Logically, this should be formalized in a face-to-face meeting between the leaders of Azerbaijan and China.
Relations with the West
This direction has seen the most turmoil. France, under Macron, has been the initiator of all anti-Azerbaijan actions in leading organizations. The list of these organizations is quite impressive: the UN Security Council, the EU, the European Parliament, the OSCE, Francophonie… Paris has made significant efforts to marginalize Azerbaijan and President Ilham Aliyev personally.
But what was the result of these efforts?
A couple of resolutions from the European Parliament, most EU countries ignoring Commissioner Borrell in their relations with Azerbaijan, and the withdrawal of the Azerbaijani delegation from PACE… That’s it!
Despite France’s efforts, Azerbaijan is increasing the number of EU countries with which it has strategic relations (10). The President of Azerbaijan has visited Germany twice this year, relations with the UK and Italy are developing at a regular pace, practical implementation of the cable project with the EU has begun, and gas supplies are increasing.
The upcoming EU-Central Asia summit is generally expected to include Azerbaijan’s participation.
Ups and downs in relations between Azerbaijan and the United States are common. However, the depth of the current downturn created the impression of a sharp conflict. Nevertheless, the visit of Hikmet Hajiyev, the Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan, to the United States and the level of the meetings held show that mutual relations will be at least “business as usual” before the presidential elections in that country and could be returned to a strategic level in the future. This will depend on how Washington perceives the messages from the Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan.
Finally, the hosting of COP 29 in our country means that in the coming years, the global climate agenda will be formed in Baku.
In conclusion, one more important point: all these areas of strategic balance do not exclude each other.
Translated from Center for South Caucasus Studies
