Various Iranian officials have been vocal with warnings and threats of an immediate and harsh response should the Iranian-Armenian border be closed.
This behavior from Iran seems rather odd, as its concerns should be directed toward Yerevan. In reality, however, Tehran has focused its anger on Moscow. Sticking to its age-old traditions of Persian diplomacy, Iran is sending veiled threats to Russia, aiming to intimidate. Though Iran often issues “final warnings,” they tend to be more like empty threats, as past incidents have shown. Now, Iran, keenly aware of Russia’s weakening influence in the region and its need for Iranian arms, is attempting to push its own agenda.
Iranian parliamentarians have expressed various views on Russia’s position regarding the Zangezur Corridor. One MP called it a “stab in the back” from Russia, stating that Tehran would “respond decisively” if marginalized or if its borders were threatened. Others are concerned about the creation of a connection between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Turkic nations of Central Asia, as well as NATO’s role in the region. Iranian political circles are increasingly arguing that to protect Iran’s national interests, the country must fully leverage its geopolitical and geoeconomic position and revise its foreign policy approach. Even if the Zangezur Corridor project does not materialize, they understand that Turkey and Azerbaijan will still be linked, leaving Iran’s concerns somewhat unclear. This realization renders Iran’s claims that the corridor would diminish its strategic role in regional transit and shift the balance of power in favor of Turkey and Azerbaijan rather senseless.
While issuing threats and drawing “red lines,” Iranian authorities remind Moscow that since the Ukraine war, “Iran has suffered greatly due to its cooperation with Russia,” though it appears Moscow is not giving much weight to Iran’s stance or its “red lines,” sacrificing them for greater advantages elsewhere.
Some Iranian diplomats, however, are less radical. For instance, former Iranian ambassador to Baku, Mohsen Pakayin, believes that Moscow’s and Baku’s positions on the Zangezur issue need clarification: “Considering that Azerbaijan and Russia are our friends, we should first carefully study the situation and engage in dialogue with Moscow and Baku to clarify uncertainties so that we don’t act negatively until the matter is fully understood.” This more measured approach offers hope for a more reasonable outcome, unlike the more extreme voices in Iran that have labeled the corridor as both “Zionist” and “Russian.”
As previously mentioned, Tehran should be directing its concerns toward Armenia. In any case, Iranian fearmongers must be reminded of the Trilateral Statement, which clearly stipulates the connection of Azerbaijan’s western regions to Nakhchivan and the security of the transport corridor under the control of Russia’s Federal Security Service. If Iran is so adamant that no third-party presence is acceptable in the region, why does it not question the presence of Russia’s 102nd military base and FSB border guards in Gyumri? And if Tehran is worried about NATO, it should stop pretending it doesn’t see the EU’s border mission stationed on Armenian soil. Additionally, Iran turns a blind eye to the fact that Armenia is being actively armed by the US and France. Given all this, Iran should reconsider making such reckless statements.
As for concerns over Iran’s territorial interests, they are baseless, as the project imposes no restrictions on Iran. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statements align fully with the 2020 trilateral agreement.
Could Iran’s criticism of Moscow be an attempt to exploit the conflict between Russia and the West to draw closer to Western powers? Is this the policy of Iran’s new president or its religious leadership? One thing is clear: Iran is eager to distance itself from Russia, especially given Moscow’s involvement in Ukraine. It’s possible that under Western pressure, Tehran will seek rapprochement with the West, something to consider in light of the election of reformist Pezeshkian and his focus on negotiations with the West to lift US sanctions.
Interestingly, the Zangezur Corridor issue, surrounded by Tehran’s discontent, has resurfaced ahead of the upcoming 3+3 meeting. Perhaps the participants of this forum will be able to clarify the contentious points and answer the pressing questions from all sides.
Alla Zeydullayeva
Translated from minval.az
