Until recently, the main activity came from Russian propagandists of Armenian origin and with a pro-Armenian image — from Margarita Simonyan to Vladimir Solovyov.
Now, the head of the Union of Armenians of Russia, Ara Abrahamyan, has given an extensive interview to TASS, in which he stated, among other things:
“Although I do not plan to participate in the upcoming elections, I will use all my capabilities to help unite healthy forces that, with consistency and love for the Motherland, can use the existing economic and human potential, including that of the diaspora, to revive Armenia.”
In other words, to unite the opposition against Nikol Pashinyan, whose government, according to Abrahamyan, “is taking from us something more, something priceless — our homeland, our history, our memory, our traditions and Christian faith, our ‘Artsakh’ (quotation marks by Minval Politika) with its ancient temples, our Syunik and Zangezur with their heroic past.”
It remains unclear what exactly Mr. Abrahamyan means by “heroic past” — the raids of Nzhdeh and Andranik? And even more so, which territories he is referring to. Western Zangezur, incorporated into Armenia in the 1920s, is called “Syunik” there. But which lands does Abrahamyan mean when he speaks of “Syunik and Zangezur” — Eastern Zangezur, liberated from Armenian occupation?
Another piece of news. Rossotrudnichestvo is launching a large-scale project to deliver humanitarian aid to “displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh.” Strictly speaking, the project will be carried out by the NGO Russian Humanitarian Mission under the auspices of Rossotrudnichestvo. The total volume of aid will exceed 140 tons and is intended for about 30,000 people. The head of the Armenia branch of the Russian Humanitarian Mission, Arseniy Pronin, proudly announced that the first stage will last throughout August and will begin in the Ararat region. The aid package includes food kits, personal hygiene products, and separate kits for families with small children.
Mr. Pronin said in an emotional tone:
“When forming the target audience, we paid special attention to helping large families, families without breadwinners, families with disabled members, and lonely elderly people.”
It was also announced that this year the NGO Eurasia joined the project. State Duma deputy and chair of the Eurasia Council, Alena Arshinova, noted that they are “building bridges of trust precisely through humanitarian projects.”
Let’s be realistic: Primakov Jr.’s agency likely doesn’t genuinely care about the social and humanitarian conditions of Karabakh Armenians.
First, this is another attempt to spin the myth of “ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Karabakh,” which is a blatant lie.
Second, the use of the term “displaced persons” for Karabakh Armenians is a direct attack on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. “Internally displaced persons,” by definition, are those who had to leave their homes but remained within the same country. So how did Karabakh Armenians in Armenia become “displaced persons” in Rossotrudnichestvo’s press releases? Do they consider Karabakh part of Armenia?
Is this another attempt to “poke” Azerbaijan, or a message to Armenian society that Russia is ready to help Armenia reoccupy Azerbaijani lands — if only Pashinyan is removed and a pro-Russian candidate brought to power?
The conclusion from all this is straightforward:
Moscow is making serious efforts to consolidate the Armenian opposition and lead it into an assault on Nikol Pashinyan.
Moreover, it is openly betting on revanchist circles — primarily the overthrown Karabakh clan. That is why Russian agencies like Rossotrudnichestvo are ready to revive the myth of “ethnic cleansing,” while TASS — whose professionalism has collapsed since Gusman’s departure, turning into Simonyan-style trash — not only provides a platform to figures like Abrahamyan but also allows provocative terminology like “Artsakh” to appear in its releases.
Despite a clear shortage of resources due to the war in Ukraine, Moscow is once again prepared to invest serious money in the Armenian project. Anything to retain its “outpost.” And it likely won’t be limited to symbolic “humanitarian aid.” Armenia is already well acquainted with the technologies of electoral bribery — shamelessly used by the pro-Russian Karabakh clan — and with hiring paid “crowds” for rallies, a practice backed by Kremlin oligarch-provocateur Ruben Vardanyan.
So Moscow has plenty of seasoned personnel in Armenia for carrying out such delicate missions.
But the point is, it may not stop at these methods. In today’s context, reports of the transfer of personnel and military equipment to the Russian base in Gyumri take on a new meaning. Military experts note the arrival of different types of equipment, including those intended for urban combat. In other words — street fighting. The question is: where does the Russian base plan to conduct these street battles? Are they still dreaming of a “new war for new territories” and planning to “drink tea in Baku”? Or… is the Russian base preparing to fight in the streets of Armenian cities?
This isn’t as unlikely as it may seem. Elections in Armenia are scheduled for 2026, but judging by the scale of propaganda and attempts to “destabilize the situation,” Moscow is not planning to wait. This is a clear indication that a forceful overthrow of Pashinyan is possible.
Strictly speaking, the opposition has people to rely on even without the Russian base. In Yerevan, it’s not common to speak of it aloud, but the era of “field commanders” continues, “volunteer detachments” are being formed, and armed — more accurately, terrorist — groups like Yerkrapah or VOMA operate. Moreover, there are plenty of professional terrorists in Armenia with Middle Eastern combat experience — one only needs to remember Jirair Sefilian, whose supporters seized a police base in Yerevan in 2016. Finally, no one has even tried to estimate how much weaponry remained in civilian hands after remnants of the defeated occupation junta arrived in Yerevan. It’s clear that Karabakh, under Russian peacekeeper control, was oversupplied with arms. Azerbaijani forces repeatedly found weapons caches in the liberated areas. And many signs suggest some of those weapons ended up in Armenia.
In the event of armed clashes in Yerevan, many will demand the Russian base intervene to “stop the bloodshed.”
Recall that similar demands were voiced during the first “Maidan” in Bishkek. That was when the idea of forming CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces arose — the same forces deployed in Kazakhstan in January 2022. It’s also worth recalling the 1990s — how Russia’s 201st Division, stationed in Tajikistan, intervened in the civil war and “redrew the map” essentially under Russian orders. And Armenia, let us remember, is one of the few places where such 1990s-style scenarios could still work.
For Azerbaijan, this is not an abstract issue.
Russia’s bet on revanchist circles at the very least threatens the signing of a peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku. At most, it increases the risk of armed provocations along still-undefined borders — and possibly even a new war.
However, Azerbaijan is ready for any scenario. The question is: how high will the cost be — not for individual Armenian politicians, but for Armenia as a whole?
The country may face a real risk of losing its statehood.
And that is no exaggeration.
Nurani
