Even before the restoration of its national independence in 1991, while still part of the USSR, Azerbaijan became the target of attacks and harassment from aggressively minded Armenia. Its predatory plans were supported by the central authorities headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, and later by the Russian elite, which also proclaimed its own independence. The “democratic cohort” led by Boris Yeltsin did not hide its sympathies for Armenian nationalists, who quietly carried out a policy of ethnic cleansing, acts of genocide, and other monstrous actions fully falling under the category of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The First Karabakh War, which ended in Yerevan’s favor, was the logical outcome of unlimited military aid from Moscow, which took the aggressor state under its wing with all the ensuing consequences. If one recalls the direct involvement of Russia’s 366th motorized rifle regiment stationed in Karabakh, Russian mercenaries, and airborne units drawn into combat operations against Azerbaijani forces, it becomes clear why Armenia prevailed in the war.
Russia handed victory to its ally, becoming a direct accomplice in the war in the Caucasus. After the fighting ended, Armenia continued under Moscow’s patronage, receiving unlimited military aid, dual-use technologies, and other strategic resources.
In dialogue with the Russian leadership, Azerbaijan constantly raised the issue of Russia’s biased stance on the South Caucasus conflict. Despite this, the northern neighbor continued to support Armenia, its self-created separatist regime in Karabakh, thereby undermining stability and peace along its southern borders.
One reason for the inaction of the OSCE Minsk Group, meant to secure a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict, was Moscow’s destructive position. As a co-chair of the mediation body, it did not want the conflict resolved. Russian diplomats in the Minsk Group consistently took a pro-Armenian line. The name of Vladimir Kazimirov became synonymous with a negative, anti-Azerbaijani image.
Moscow always sought to stoke the flames of war in the region, preventing Azerbaijan from liberating its occupied historic territories, restoring justice, and enforcing four UN Security Council resolutions that demanded the immediate withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijani lands. By that time, Russia had completely lost Azerbaijan’s trust as a mediator, having exhausted both its moral authority and capacity.
Armenia openly cultivated extreme radicalism toward Azerbaijanis and national minorities, introducing fascist-style governance norms—yet this did not prevent it from enjoying Russia’s boundless support. Encouraging Yerevan’s militaristic ambitions, Moscow kept building up the aggressor’s military might, supplying it with offensive weapons.
From the late 20th century onward, the course of strengthening Armenia’s military potential did not weaken, but only intensified. This meant Moscow fully encouraged Armenia’s aggressive policy for its own ends. Chief among them was conflict management in the South Caucasus, where Yerevan was assigned the role of a reliable tool of pressure on Baku.
Already in 1998, Yerevan received arms worth $1 billion from its ally. Alongside this, Armenia’s defense ministry was regularly granted favorable loans to implement new militarist plans. In practice, these nullified Azerbaijan’s peace efforts, and Baku could not persuade Moscow to change its stance on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and focus on peace initiatives.
No fundamental changes followed, until Azerbaijan’s political leadership decided to launch a counter-offensive to expel the occupier from its lands.
The military campaign that began in autumn 2020, later called the Second Karabakh War, achieved the goals set by Azerbaijan’s leadership, despite Russia’s continued active support of Armenia. Moscow supplied its satellite with weapons, ammunition, and new strike technologies, but this did not help the aggressor.
Faced with the equipment and offensive power of the Azerbaijani army, Armenia suffered a military-political collapse, which also signified the impotence of Russian policy and weaponry.
While formally maintaining neutrality, Moscow did everything to back Armenia in the information war. Not only private outlets, but also Russian state media propagated a negative image of Azerbaijan, justifying Yerevan’s predatory course. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani claims to defend independence and territorial integrity were denied space in Russian media.
In words, Moscow always claimed to fight fascism and misanthropy, but in practice turned a blind eye to Armenia’s monstrous glorification of Garegin Nzhdeh, a bloodthirsty fascist and tsekhakron ideologue. It is well known that he colluded with Hitler and planned to fight against the Red Army for the “liberation of Armenia.” Yet Russian propaganda still keeps silent about this, which speaks volumes.
Overall, the situation shows that Russian political circles cooperate with Armenian radicals. Both sides converged on a policy of new fascism, which has much in common with the course of Nazi Germany. The Russian establishment increasingly leans toward the concept of open aggression against its neighbors, striving for a violent redrawing of borders. All of this is done to satisfy Moscow’s hegemonistic ambitions.
But in the First Throne [Moscow] they should not forget that the right to defend one’s own interests belongs not only to large countries, but also to all other members of the international community. It is their lawful and inalienable right.
Magsud Salimov
Translated from minval.az