Shock and horror – these are perhaps the best words to describe the emotional reaction to the latest tragic news from Dagestan: militant attacks on an Orthodox church and a synagogue, the killing of a priest, a burned synagogue, street battles in Derbent and Makhachkala, and the death of more than a dozen police officers. It all seemed like an action movie, but it was happening for real. There was no way to stop the playback or switch to another channel. And one particularly poignant detail: the murdered priest, Nikolai Kotelnikov, was the spiritual leader of the Baku Diocese. It seemed like Baku, Derbent, and Makhachkala were just a stone’s throw apart, yet they are worlds apart. At this point, it doesn’t matter what anyone thinks about the battles in Gaza, Israel, Hamas, or anything else – some actions can never be justified. Terrorism and attacks on places of worship are among those actions.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev sent condolences to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, reiterating that Azerbaijan strongly condemns these bloody crimes and supports the fight against terrorism in all its forms.
The investigation into the terrorist attack is just beginning. Even in Russia, there is considerable skepticism about attempts to find a “Ukrainian trace” here. There is no doubt: the chaos in Makhachkala and Derbent was caused by homegrown radicals.
It is also clear that a “police” investigation alone will not suffice. There are already suggestions to bring order to MMA schools where the militants were trained, which is quite logical. Furthermore, various “fight clubs” are becoming centers for terrorist training not only in Dagestan. The Cherkizovsky market attack, carried out by Russian nationalists who were trained at the “SPAS military-sports club,” is a case in point. Ukraine has its memories too, where similar clubs in Donbas trained the infamous “titushky.”
But this is not the main issue. The terrorist attack in Dagestan once again highlighted a long-ignored truth: Muslim youth in Russia is being radicalized too quickly.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Dagestan already experienced a wave of radicalism. For a few years, it seemed the problem was solved, the situation was under control, and so on. However, by late October 2023, riots broke out in Makhachkala, with participants trying to find Jews arriving from Israel at the local airport. The image of one of the rioters looking into an airplane turbine for the “malicious Zionists” became a meme. Experts had already suggested taking measures then: the airport riot showed that radicals in Dagestan were once again gaining popularity and influence. Additionally, there were uncomfortable questions: how did the rioters manage to breach airport security and reach the runway? Dagestan is a troubled region, and security measures here should be stringent, especially at strategic sites like the airport.
Then there was a period of silence. Even the terrorist attack at “Crocus” could be dismissed as an outlier, since it was carried out by militants from Tajikistan’s “Vilayat Khorasan.” But during Gurban Bayram, radical Islamists took hostages at a detention center in Rostov-on-Don. And now, Derbent and Makhachkala.
Theoretically, these are Russia’s internal affairs. But in practice, such radicalization poses a direct and clear threat to Azerbaijan, even with closed land borders. The jihadist underground in Russia’s North Caucasus has repeatedly tried to establish branches in Azerbaijan – remember the arrests of Wahhabis in our country’s northwestern regions. Moreover, this activity was actively supported by Armenian intelligence services – it wasn’t limited to militants from “Savala” being trained at Armenian facilities. Armenian intelligence extensively collaborated with jihadists, hoping to destabilize Azerbaijan.
To what extent these old connections are being utilized now, given Pashinyan’s administration’s resentment towards Russia, is a question that should be raised, especially by Russian security forces. But what is more crucial for our country is this: while Azerbaijan doesn’t underestimate the danger of radical movements, the primary threat is expected from the south, whether from Iran, Syria, or Afghanistan. However, this doesn’t mean we can afford to underestimate the threat from the north. Remember, even the attempted assassination of Ganja’s executive head Elmar Veliyev was carried out by Yunis Safarov, a Russian citizen. He received military training in Iran, but his ideological indoctrination likely took place in Moscow. The activities of radical preachers and recruiters within Muslim immigrant communities are another “uncomfortable topic,” and it doesn’t concern Russia alone – consider the September 11, 2001, attacks in the USA, where many perpetrators were radicalized in Europe, including Germany.
Today, the same scenario is unfolding in Russia. This cannot be ignored by Azerbaijan. Firstly, border instability always poses a serious threat. Secondly, the question of how many “Yunis Safarovs” might come to Azerbaijan from the vast expanses of Russia is not something we can “think about tomorrow.” This is particularly pressing because “tomorrow” tends to arrive today.
Nurani
Translated from minval.az
