Constant shelling by Armenian forces of Azerbaijani Army positions, as well as the mysterious death of a soldier in the same area, have exacerbated tensions. However, the most puzzling aspect is that, amidst these hostilities, official Yerevan continues to speak of the possibility of a peace agreement between the parties being signed soon. How can these seemingly contradictory events be explained? What are the true intentions of the Armenian leadership?
Minval.az asked former Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov to comment on these questions.
– Let’s start with the Armenian issue concerning the complete withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh. Should we view this as the beginning of a new era in the history of Karabakh, the history of Azerbaijan, or just a planned event that was bound to happen sooner or later? How should this event be perceived?
– In the context of the conflict with Armenia, there are many different reactions to various events. In the propaganda sphere, these reactions are even more pronounced. Therefore, we see a lot of criticism directed at the peacekeepers in Azerbaijan. Yes, their activities did not always align with Azerbaijan’s interests, but if we are objective, the outcome of their activities aligns with the goals and objectives Azerbaijan had set for itself. Firstly, it’s important to remember the exodus of Armenians, whom I call ‘visitors,’ as 70% of the people who left Karabakh at the last moment were receiving salaries from the local budget, which was funded by the Armenian state budget. The Armenians tried to portray this exodus as genocide, but the presence of peacekeepers neutralized this attempt. I think this was the main significance of their presence in Karabakh. Since the Armenians criticize the peacekeepers, to some extent, we should speak positively about them. Moreover, components of the monitoring mission were created with the participation of high-ranking military officials from Russia and Turkey. Therefore, we should generally assess the results of their activities positively. However, we must acknowledge that the positive outcomes were due to the fact that Azerbaijan, its state structures, public, and media kept the actions of the peacekeepers under close scrutiny, influencing them appropriately and thus neutralizing any negative aspects that could have arisen.
– Are the increased shellings in Nakhchivan an attempt by Armenia to provoke Azerbaijan? Especially since Pashinyan has stated that a peace agreement could be signed within a month…
– When asked this question, I always ask, which peace agreement are we talking about? A framework agreement that includes some theses and does not resolve certain issues? Or perhaps we are talking about a final and comprehensive document that will be signed after all negotiations on various tracks are concluded? By tracks, I mean specific issues related to border demarcation and delimitation, restoration of communications, elimination of legal obstacles to peaceful neighborly relations – this pertains to the Armenian Constitution, etc. So, what document are we talking about?
– Of course, it would be desirable for the parties to sign that very comprehensive document.
– But is work being done on it? The president mentioned that work is underway on a rather short framework document that, at best, will not solve all problems but will outline the political framework for future negotiations.
– As far as I remember, the head of state mentioned five principles that should be included in the peace agreement…
– Exactly. Everyone should understand that there is a framework document, and there is a comprehensive one. After border delimitation, work on the final version of the peace agreement could take several years. Resolving all other issues, including compensation payments, amendments to the Constitution, etc., cannot be accomplished in a month.
– That’s an interesting point. So, the framework document will include a clause that within a certain period, Armenia commits, for example, to amend its Constitution. Am I understanding correctly?
– Absolutely. Or, for example, it could include the following: the parties commit to continue working on border demarcation and delimitation, and upon reaching an agreement on this, they commit to respecting each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. But how can one respect territorial integrity that still needs to be defined? Therefore, I want to emphasize that many people, not knowing the process’s technology, experience, in Lenin’s words, “confusion and hesitation.” When talking about a peace agreement, it is crucial to specify which document we are discussing: a framework or a final one. It is clear that by autumn, we should not expect border delimitation and demarcation of all interstate boundaries, nor the restoration of communications. We still need to define and agree on a transport corridor. Border delimitation and demarcation might even lead to Zangezur’s return to us. Who knows?
– But can a document in which the parties only express their intention to take certain actions in the future be called a peace agreement?
– According to the theory of how this is done, such a document is called a preliminary peace agreement, and after it comes the final one. I think when some of our and Armenian analysts, including the Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Alen Simonyan, talk about a peace agreement, they do not understand which document they are referring to. They think a final agreement might be signed. Although in the spring of 2021, the Azerbaijani side presented principles for a peace settlement. Two months later, the Armenian side stated that they wanted to work on a framework document that could be signed in the shortest possible time. They limited their ambitions, which is realistic in terms of the settlement process’s technology. Work is ongoing, and documents are being exchanged, but not in the final peace agreement version, but in the framework, or as it is also called in diplomacy, the preliminary version. We can only talk about it now. There are no other documents on the table. There are two other tracks – commissions on border delimitation and demarcation and negotiations on creating communications. This is the reality we have today. A comprehensive agreement, at best, might be possible in a few years because delimitation can take years.
– Does the absence of this agreement allow Armenia to shell Azerbaijani territories?
– No, these are completely different things. We still do not have peace. We still have a military situation and military relations between the countries. On some sections of the Armenian border, special forces, combining the functions of border guards and army corps, are deployed instead of border troops. They treat the border as a line of contact between the troops. So, we do not have borders with them, only a line of contact between the troops.
The Armenian side says they want the 1991 borders. They were explained that such borders do not exist because they abolished their borders in 1988. Now they are talking about the 1976 maps. Therefore, according to the Alma-Ata principles, we can only talk about the Soviet period, i.e., after the Bolsheviks occupied Transcaucasia. Azerbaijan proposes using maps from different periods and years for different border sections. So, de facto, we do not have borders; there is a line of contact where tensions flare up. And if we talk about the ceasefire violations from the Armenian side, we can say that Pashinyan and those opposed to him have significant influence over the security structures. They, in unison with the Sbazan, who freely walks around Yerevan, try to provoke Azerbaijan. This is how they see the situation. The shooting in Nakhchivan happened for this reason.
But why there? We need to understand that they have an internal contradiction in their position. Plus, there is a difference in the approaches of Azerbaijan and Armenia to statehood restoration. We declared ourselves successors of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, while they consider themselves successors of the Armenian SSR. Why? Because during the Armenian SSR, their territory was the largest. They strive to fix that territory within their current state. But if we consider the territory of the Ararat Republic, it was three times smaller. Hence the contradictions.
Azerbaijan says if you want to use the 1975 maps, then even by those maps, these four villages in the Gazakh district and the place where shootings occur in Karki belong to Azerbaijan. But the Armenians, even while declaring adherence to these principles, do not want to return territories that, according to their concept, should belong to Azerbaijan. Hence the dances they organize around returning these villages. And not only Azerbaijan but also Western countries are pressuring them in this direction, demanding that the Armenians determine their concept. They are told if they want Soviet Union breakup borders, then return the territories still under occupation. But since they do not want to do this, priests supposedly walk around Yerevan, and Karki is shelled.
– So, it is impossible to rule out not large-scale clashes but quite significant battles? What is the red line for Azerbaijan in this story? How far can they go in their provocations to force us to move troops?
– The red line for Azerbaijan is the security of its borders and everything related to understanding what is necessary to curb the aggressor. In this regard, we see that since September 2020, Azerbaijan has been adequately using its armed forces to repel the aggressor.
– Can Pashinyan’s criticism of Lukashenko be seen as one of the stages of Armenia’s exit from the CSTO? If so, will Armenia really leave the CSTO, and what could be the consequences?
– I have always had serious doubts about the reality of discord between Yerevan, Moscow, and consequently Minsk. As we see, the widely propagated desire of Armenia to move away from Russia in the Armenian, and even Russian, and of course, Western media resembles a game. Speaking of Russia’s military presence in Armenia, the CSTO and 20 border guards in Zvartnots are not the main players. Everyone seems to forget that Armenia has a bilateral military cooperation agreement with Russia. Criticism of the CSTO is voiced, but we know that several states are members of this organization, and all decisions, including considering Armenia’s request for assistance, are made by consensus. But everyone seems to forget about the bilateral alliance agreement between Armenia and Russia. Moreover, based on this, besides the well-known base in Gyumri, a joint group of forces is formed there. Plus, Armenia’s air defense is generally controlled from the Moscow region and is integrated into Russia’s overall air defense system. Near the place of these Russian border guards in Armenia, there is a Russian air group and even a full-fledged Russian air base. So, they have many components of military alliance, but everyone talks about the CSTO. This structure is a stillborn propaganda project, and 20 border guards in Zvartnots represented a shameful picture for Armenia when any foreign visitor to this country was met by Russian border officers. But no one talks about the border guards who remained on the border with Iran and Turkey, and these are several thousand servicemen. Therefore, the one-sided representation of Armenia’s so-called departure from Russia raises certain doubts for me. I would urge all our analysts not to fall for this propaganda provocation. If Armenia is really leaving, it should raise real issues, not ‘clutter the airwaves’ with propaganda clichés that have been thrown at us for more than a year.
– Let’s talk about foreign policy and specifically BRICS. There was information in the media that Azerbaijan, along with some countries, is considering joining BRICS, and since the list of such states is quite large, Russia is even developing a new membership category in the organization. Does Azerbaijan need BRICS?
– Economists should answer this question because, despite attempts to present BRICS as a political alliance, it is still more of an economic union. And the mutual openness of BRICS member markets might be somewhat interesting for Azerbaijan. If the European Union does not offer us better conditions for accessing its markets, we could use some BRICS mechanisms to export our goods. All this requires serious analysis, and the evaluations should be based not on political but economic arguments. If it is beneficial for us to export goods there, including agricultural products, then why not?
– The Peace Summit on Ukraine. Some countries refused to attend because Russia was not invited. Should Russia have been invited to Switzerland or not?
– There are two forms of state confrontation – military actions and political. If the Ukrainian leadership intends to continue military actions, then this summit is not perceived by the Ukrainian side as an attempt to create a platform for finding ways to politically resolve the situation. It means they are betting on a military victory over Russia. If they really have such an assessment of the situation, we can only understand Ukraine’s position. If they believe they can achieve a military defeat of Russia, it means they are confident in this. Therefore, searching for schemes to freeze the situation makes no sense. In essence, this summit can be seen as a platform where something can be agreed upon to stop the military actions. It is clear that each side has its own goals in this war. But if Ukraine bets on military actions, we must accept this as the position of the Ukrainian leadership.
– In your opinion, how many mistakes has Ukraine made in foreign policy since the start of the war? It is clear that there is a war, and mistakes are inevitable, but…
– We see that Ukraine’s position is supported by several countries. Some countries take a neutral stance. Restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity is primarily the task of the Ukrainian political elite and the people who elect them. I think we have no right to come with our advice and say how correctly they are acting. We have our own experience of war when we were weak and achieved some reconciliation without serious political consequences, and then strengthened and restored our territorial integrity. Ukraine believes it can achieve victory now. Perhaps, in this matter, they know something that is unknown to us.
Rauf Nasirov
