A sign of potential breakthrough came from a statement by U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio, made during a government meeting at the White House. Rubio expressed confidence that a peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan could be signed in the near future.
The context in which this statement was made is important for understanding the internal political logic of the official Washington. The discussion concerned the foreign policy achievements of the current administration, and Rubio’s words reflected not only diplomatic rhetoric but also a desire to showcase concrete successes of U.S. President Donald Trump on the international stage. Such demonstrative presentation of presidential achievements has become a hallmark of Trump’s second term, during which every high-ranking official opens their speeches by listing the president’s successes.
Among Rubio’s declared foreign policy achievements were the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, a peace agreement between Congo and Rwanda, and airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which, according to the Secretary of State, stopped the escalation of the Iran-Israel armed conflict. The prospect of a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan was also included in this list.
Mentioning this process at such a high level indicates the presence of real diplomatic efforts aimed at implementing the agreements initialed in March of this year. These efforts are apparently being conducted behind closed doors, as both sides prefer not to disclose details until the decisive moments.
In this context, the official confirmation of the meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, scheduled for tomorrow in Abu Dhabi, is particularly significant. The decision to announce the meeting just a day before it takes place suggests a highly sensitive negotiation process. According to available information, the signing of a peace agreement is possible—and by some accounts, even expected—during this meeting.
It is worth noting that Baku has consistently emphasized the need to amend Armenia’s Constitution as a precondition for peace. Nevertheless, the optimism voiced by the American side may indicate compromises already reached or being shaped on this issue. Otherwise, such confident statements from the White House would seem premature.
It should also be noted that since Donald Trump’s return to power, there has been a general decline in official Washington’s interest in the South Caucasus region. Unlike Joe Biden’s administration, which was actively involved in the peace process since 2022—organizing meetings of foreign ministers, holding numerous diplomatic contacts and phone calls—Trump’s administration has taken a more distant stance from the outset. It should also be recalled that Baku, having openly protested the unambiguous support Armenia received from the Biden administration, eventually rejected U.S. mediation.
Now, the White House prefers to act indirectly, primarily through Turkey. It is known that Marco Rubio maintains constant contact with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, discussing issues related to the South Caucasus. Direct contacts have been limited mainly to a meeting between former U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Azerbaijani Presidential Aide Hikmet Hajiyev, and a phone call between Rubio and the Armenian Prime Minister.
Nonetheless, according to diplomatic sources, Washington remains actively engaged through Ankara. It is expected that successful conclusion of the negotiations and signing of a peace agreement would bring a significant foreign policy win for the White House, especially given the lack of major breakthroughs on other international fronts.
In parallel, the United States shows genuine interest in the issue of opening a regional transportation route known as the Zangezur Corridor. According to statements by Carnegie Foundation analyst Olesya Vartanyan, Washington has presented the parties with a plan envisioning the corridor operating under the control of a private American company connected to President Trump’s inner circle. This plan is said to resemble a previously proposed EU initiative and involves delegating customs and border control to a U.S. operator—reflecting Washington’s intention to consolidate its influence in the South Caucasus logistical framework.
If a peace agreement is signed, rapid implementation of the Zangezur Corridor arrangements is expected, with direct involvement from Turkey. Work on relevant mechanisms is already underway.
Of particular interest in this situation is Russia’s absence from the negotiation process. Moscow, which traditionally claims the role of key mediator in the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, is now being sidelined from critical formats—naturally triggering concern in the Kremlin, as reflected in a series of official statements. Russia continues to insist that peace is only possible within the framework of the 2020–2022 trilateral agreements, signed with its direct mediation. These agreements, however, were more about freezing the conflict than resolving it—and ensured Moscow’s continued geopolitical influence in the region.
At this moment, Russia risks losing one of its most important levers of influence in the South Caucasus. Against this backdrop, there is a rise in anti-Azerbaijani rhetoric, the mobilization of pro-Russian forces in Armenia, and increasing tensions—including violent incidents involving the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia.
For example, Dmitry Masyuk, Director of the Fourth CIS Department of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently stated that Western countries are “forcing Baku and Yerevan into a rushed agreement,” while sustainable settlement is only possible through a format involving Moscow. Thus, Russia is striving to retain control over developments in the region, despite its clearly weakening position.
The question remains: can the U.S. and its partners provide the negotiating parties with sufficient guarantees to finalize the peace agreement and initiate the Zangezur Corridor?
The presence of such guarantees may prove to be the decisive factor for the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. In this context, the upcoming meeting in Abu Dhabi takes on critical importance—as it may become the turning point that defines the future of the entire South Caucasus.
Farhad Mammadov
Translated from haqqin.az
