At a meeting between Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Tashkent on August 23-24, the two countries’ leaders agreed detailed road maps for industrial, infrastructural, and interregional development.
The recently cemented Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan alliance not only paves the way for Baku’s deeper engagement with the Central Asian region but also sets a positive precedent for potential similar agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Its common cultural and linguistic kinship with Central Asia is paving the way for Azerbaijan’s deeper engagement with the states of the region.
Azerbaijan’s pivot towards Central Asia reflects the growing prominence of the energy-rich region following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukraine war in 2022. The region is also attracting renewed interest from beyond the region, such as from Turkey, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU).
In response to this changing geopolitical landscape and the diplomatic rifts between the West and Azerbaijan, Baku has demonstrated strategic foresight by boosting interaction with Central Asian countries, including China. This proactive approach aims to diversify its economic portfolio and minimise the risks of the Ukraine war and diplomatic confrontation with the West. The military victory in the second Karabakh War in 2020 has also enabled Azerbaijan to mobilise all its resources to reshape foreign policy priorities.
As a result, Azerbaijan managed to establish Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Turkey and Azerbaijan-Turkey-Uzbekistan formats of partnership with a broad agenda encompassing the economy, energy, defence, and logistic fields.
For example, in July 2023 and 2024, Azerbaijan participated in joint military drills with Kazakh and Uzbek armed forces involving commando units, air forces, and staff officers. Joint exercises with Azerbaijani Special Forces are seen as important for Uzbekistan, considering the existing security threats emanating from Afghanistan.
Azerbaijan is also a viable partner for the landlocked Uzbekistan to get access to Turkish and European markets by joining the flagship project Middle Corridor transit route. Despite geographical difficulties, Uzbekistan has sought to establish itself as a regional logistics hub, given its economic potential, human capital, and better integration than neighbours into international value chains and markets.
On September 5, Uzbekistan announced its plans to increase cargo flow by 15 times to Europe via Bulgaria within the Middle Corridor route. This ambitious plan holds the potential to significantly boost the region’s economic prospects and foster stronger ties with European markets.
Considering this factor, Azerbaijan intends to become a viable bridge between Central Asia and the West, which has recently made enormous efforts to gain access to the energy-rich region by bypassing Russia.
Moreover, a strategic alliance with the Central Asian region enables Azerbaijan to expand the scope of partnership beyond traditional fields like energy transit, agriculture, and defence, focusing on relatively new fields such as green energy.
In May 2024, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tashkent discussed the possibilities of laying a new green energy corridor through Azerbaijani territory, which will become a bridge through which “clean” electricity from solar and wind power plants in Central Asia will flow to homes and businesses in Europe.
Such a prospect is sought after by some member countries of the EU, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Greece, and Italy, despite the long-term war of words between Baku and Brussels. This explains these countries’ willingness to invest heavily in the Black Sea Submarine Cable project to supply Europe with green energy.
The potential benefits of close partnership with Central Asian states has emboldened Azerbaijan to engage with the region at many levels, including institutional. Baku has actively boosted its engagement in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) since 2020 and recently it unveiled ambitions to be integrated into the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). On July 18, Azerbaijani state media reported that Baku has applied to change its status from a dialogue partner to an observer country in the SCO.
Azerbaijan believes that its renewed approach toward the Central Asian region and new foreign policy priorities set in the post-2020 period increase its geopolitical weight, while granting it additional leverage against external influence.
Simultaneously, Baku maintains a nuanced approach, by deepening energy and logistics partnerships with Europe despite diplomatic confrontation, announcing a strategic partnership with China, and keeping an open dialogue with Russia. In that sense, Baku, Astana, and Tashkent follow a similar multi-vectored diplomacy to avoid falling under the influence of any one powerful geopolitical actor.
Fuad Shahbazov is a Chevening FCDO scholar at the University of Durham School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA).