On the one hand, Azerbaijan and Iran are neighboring countries with a vast number of “points of contact”, historical, economic, humanitarian and simply human ties. And with a vast potential for bilateral cooperation.
But to say that there are constant “sparks” on the Iranian track is to say nothing. The “diplomatic dimension” of 2023 between Baku and Tehran began with an unprecedented and dramatic event: on January 27, the Embassy of Azerbaijan in IRI was attacked. One employee of the embassy was killed and several others were injured. The operation of the embassy was suspended.
And then in the last days of 2023 both Baku and Tehran started talking about easing tensions and successful negotiations on resuming the work of the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Iran. According to Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, the attack on the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Iran caused tension in relations, which was subsequently mitigated through contacts.
Earlier, the case of the terrorist who attacked the embassies was discussed by the Prosecutors General of Azerbaijan and Iran, and the spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry Nasser Kanaani said that a roadmap had been drafted for the reopening of the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Iran, pointing out “good trends in relations between the two countries and in other areas.”
Of course, this “diplomatic optimism” is a classic case of “glass half empty or half full”. Yes, there are “good trends” between Baku and Tehran. Azerbaijan and Iran are discussing many joint projects, first of all in the field of logistics and trade. There is intensive work underway to build a transport corridor between the mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan along the Iranian bank of the Araz. But the activity of the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Tehran has not yet been resumed, even though mutual contacts have helped to reduce tensions, even though there is a “roadmap” and “good trends”.
There is also an aspect of the issue that diplomats very rarely mention at press conferences. Apparently, Tehran’s top officials still have no clear answer as to what to do with Azerbaijan and how to build relations with our country.
And frankly speaking, not everyone among the Iranian top brass is ready to build real state-to-state relations with Azerbaijan on the basis of mutual respect.
First of all, the persons from the entourage of the late Qasem Soleimani, who are willing to offer patronage to persons like Tohid Ibrahimbeyli, form groups like “Husayniyun”, organize terrorist attacks, etc., are still around. Yes, they have been quiet for now, but how long will this “for now” last?
On top of that, there are plenty of “great-power nationalists” in Iran, both among inveterate “mullahcrats” and in the camp of “pragmatists”, and even in the ranks of the Iranian anti-mullahcratic opposition, who still see Azerbaijan as an “Iranian province” that by some mistake is at the moment outside Tehran’s control. Moreover, it is all happening near Iranian Azerbaijan, where enough “explosive material” has accumulated.
While Azerbaijan was part of the Russian Empire and the USSR, and the words “Azerbaijan” and “independence” did not appear in the same sentence, Tehran was not particularly nervous. But an independent secular Azerbaijan close to the provinces of Iran, where the majority of the population is ethnic Azerbaijanis, is a stab in the heart for some people in Tehran.
Finally, while Azerbaijani territories were under Armenian occupation, Iran was sure that it could afford to look down on Azerbaijan. But now, after the victory and expulsion of the invaders, Azerbaijan has to be treated with respect, and some people in Tehran were not ready for this. All this is against the backdrop of the traditional Iranian political behind-the-scene tug of war, alternately won by supporters of building normal relations with Azerbaijan, or by persons who want to “teach Azerbaijan a lesson”, “put it in its place” and, in general, “to show it who runs the house”. As a result, one day Iran conducts exercises with an “offensive” cover story close to the borders of our country, the next it calls Azerbaijan “the light of its eyes”, negotiates the Zangezur corridor, then opens a consulate in Gafan and allows Armenia to open a consulate in Tabriz…
And there is no doubt that the further development of bilateral relations in general and the chances of reopening the embassy in Tehran in particular will largely depend on what forces will gain the upper hand in Tehran. Baku is ready for cooperation, but this cooperation should be based on generally accepted principles of state-to-state relations.
Nurani
Translated from Minval.az
