The negotiating documents on Karabakh released by the Armenian government have, as expected, drawn the attention of both Azerbaijani experts and the broader public. In theory, all of this belongs to history. But the history is much too recent, and the topic remains highly sensitive. What may cause some confusion among the Azerbaijani public is the fact that the published papers mention an idea of “territorial exchange” — Karabakh in return for Western Zangezur and Meghri.
Let us set aside historical digressions and refrain from recalling that this proposal was first voiced in the early 1990s by former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Paul Goble. Even more so, there is no need once again to explain that the negotiating options of that period — when 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory was under occupation — have long since lost any political or “diplomatic” relevance. Instead, let us emphasize something else: diplomacy is not always conducted in a straight line. It relies on probing, maneuvering, and many other tools. As our sources recount, Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s National Leader, an experienced statesman and a subtle diplomat, understood this better than most. Through various negotiating theses, Azerbaijan pursued clear objectives: to determine the limits of Armenia’s flexibility — or, rather, inflexibility — to probe Yerevan’s position, and so on.
Moreover, this method allowed Azerbaijan to achieve an important diplomatic goal: to push representatives of the Khankendi occupation junta out of the negotiation format and, critically, to put the issue of Nakhchivan’s blockade on the agenda. Even though a “territorial exchange” never materialized, the issue of Nakhchivan itself became part of the talks. This is precisely why, when the Trilateral Statement of 10 November 2020 unexpectedly included a clause on opening the Zangezur Corridor, it was a direct outcome of those earlier diplomatic maneuvers — the significance of which many failed to appreciate at the time.
All of this took place under extremely unfavorable conditions for Azerbaijan. Even a quick look at the newly published documents shows that none of the proposals were genuinely advantageous for Azerbaijan. Let us recall once more: the “legal file” of the Karabakh settlement was formed in the early 1990s. It included internationally recognized borders — which in Azerbaijan’s case encompass Karabakh — as well as UN Security Council resolutions demanding the immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territory. The proposals put forward by the OSCE Minsk Group and other mediators did not fit into this legal framework and did not correspond to Azerbaijan’s legitimate interests. Nonetheless, for obvious reasons, Azerbaijan could not simply exit the negotiating process. First, it was and remains a member of the international community. Second, such a step could have triggered highly negative consequences, including sanctions. And third, it was necessary to use every available opportunity — to advance national interests diplomatically and to prepare a military solution and the diplomatic consolidation of its outcomes. This meant employing the full range of diplomatic tools, from probing to maneuvering.
Yet this diplomatic probing — which ultimately worked in Azerbaijan’s favor — does not change the fundamental point: Azerbaijan has always been a steadfast supporter of international law, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of borders. The country worked to secure numerous resolutions in international organizations condemning Armenia’s aggression and reaffirming Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity — from the OSCE and the Council of Europe to the OIC and the Non-Aligned Movement.
These documents and this diplomatic doctrine, laid down during the presidency of National Leader Heydar Aliyev, created the groundwork for both preparing the military solution and consolidating Azerbaijan’s victory through diplomatic means. The roots of today’s success lie in that difficult period. And when assessing those events from the vantage point of the present day, it is essential to keep this in mind.
