The ongoing war between Israel and Iran remains the dominant topic on the international agenda. Both sides continue to exchange missile strikes, and according to many experts, Israel has begun using bunker-busting weapons. Iranian media report that a missile factory near Tehran and the Imam Hossein Military University, which trains IRGC officers, have been targeted. Meanwhile, Israeli sources claim to have also struck a centrifuge manufacturing plant near Tehran, vital for uranium enrichment.
However, the main political intrigue centers on the potential involvement of the United States in the conflict. The news here is mixed. The U.S. administration has reportedly stated that the next 24–48 hours would be decisive. Donald Trump issued an ultimatum to Tehran, demanding it abandon its missile and nuclear programs within 24 hours, threatening consequences. Nevertheless, no decision to strike Iran has been made—at least for now. The key question is how long this “not yet” will last.
This is not only about Washington’s desire to end Iran’s nuclear ambitions—even though U.S. intelligence lacks full confidence that Iran has been building nuclear weapons. As experts note, without American bunker-buster bombs, Israel will find it difficult to inflict critical damage on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, particularly the Fordow facility. Such strikes may be interpreted by Tehran as direct U.S. involvement.
It also remains unclear how credible the Iranian media’s claims are that the IRGC shot down not only an Israeli Hermes drone but also an F-35 fighter jet. These reports may well be wartime propaganda—similar claims in other countries have gone unproven. Still, the presence of an F-35 in Iranian airspace might be perceived as U.S. interference, even though the aircraft is operated by Israel and not under direct American command.
In any case, if the U.S. were to become directly involved, the first targets would likely be neighboring countries hosting American military bases. Iran’s Tasnim News Agency has already published a map marking U.S. bases within range of Iranian missiles. These potential targets include Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and even Turkey—despite Ankara not supporting Israel’s operation. This underlines the broader regional risks stemming from the Iran–Israel confrontation.
Azerbaijan, due to its geographic location, cannot fully insulate itself from the fallout of this conflict. However, the country’s stance of strict neutrality and non-interference has proven to be a wise course thus far. While there may be discreet efforts to influence Baku’s position, Azerbaijan has avoided aligning with either side—a decision that has considerable strategic value in the current environment.
What matters even more is that there are no foreign military bases on Azerbaijani soil—despite this idea having been discussed in the past. There are also no “grey zones” or uncontrolled areas where foreign military infrastructure could be placed without the government’s consent. As recent events have shown, the supposed benefits of foreign military presence are often illusory, while the risks—especially during high-stakes regional conflicts—are substantial.
In this light, Azerbaijan’s policy of neutrality is not just a diplomatic posture but a strategic decision that best aligns with the country’s long-term national interests.
Nurani
