On September 11, the transport ministers of Turkey, Syria, and Jordan agreed to implement a project to restore the Hejaz Railway. In particular, the parties approved the repair of a 30-kilometer section in Syria, with Turkey taking on the key role in financing and technical support. The project will establish direct rail connections between Turkish cities—primarily Istanbul—and Jordan’s port of Aqaba on the Red Sea, the country’s only “maritime gateway.”
The prospect of reviving the railway, which historically connected Damascus with Medina and played an important role in the Ottoman Empire, has again become central to Turkish policy. For Ankara, the project is not only an instrument for strengthening its influence in the Middle East, but also a chance for participating countries to enhance their transport and logistics potential. Once restored, the line could become part of modern infrastructure, linking Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and eventually Saudi Arabia.
From an economic standpoint, the initiative could expand trade ties and diversify routes. Turkey aims to consolidate its status as a transit hub between Europe and Asia, and integrating the Hejaz Railway into the network of land corridors complements the Middle Corridor and modernization of southern infrastructure. This would create new routes for passenger and freight transport, as well as for the delivery of energy resources and consumer goods.
The political significance is also considerable. For Turkey, restoring the line is a way to strengthen its presence in Syria and Jordan through economic projects, a tool of soft power, and a demonstration of its ability to carry out large-scale initiatives. Moreover, connecting Turkey with Aqaba and, eventually, pilgrimage cities is perceived as a matter of prestige and a means of enhancing cultural and religious influence.
However, the project faces difficulties: political instability in Syria, the high cost of infrastructure restoration, and the need to agree on tariff policy. It is therefore seen as a long-term initiative, where symbolism and politics still outweigh economic calculations.
In this context, another project plays a special role—the “Development Road,” linking Turkey’s Mardin with Iraq’s port of al-Faw. The construction of a highway and railway from al-Faw to the Turkish border will create a new multimodal route connecting the Indian Ocean with Europe, bypassing the Suez Canal. Economically, it reinforces Turkey’s role as a transit hub; politically, it strengthens its standing in the Arab world; and strategically, it complements both the Middle Corridor and the Hejaz Railway.
All these projects fit organically into the concept of the Zangezur transport corridor. Zangezur becomes the link connecting the Middle Corridor and the North–South route with Ankara’s Middle Eastern initiatives. The Hejaz Railway provides access to the Levant and the Red Sea, while the Development Road connects to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
Strategically, this architecture consolidates Turkey’s position as a key player in the competition of transport initiatives, while Azerbaijan emerges as an interconnector, ensuring transit from Central Asia and the Caspian region into Turkey and further both westward and southward. The Zangezur corridor ceases to be a local project of the South Caucasus and instead becomes the framework into which both historically revived lines like the Hejaz Railway and modern highways such as the Development Road are embedded. The result is a unified Eurasian–Middle Eastern network, with Turkey and Azerbaijan at its core.
Ilgar Velizade
