At the beginning of the week, the regional information space was shaken by news of an upcoming important meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Washington. The unfolding events suggest that Washington is not merely interested in hosting the signing of a peace agreement, but also aims to become a key player in a new South Caucasus security architecture—possibly even serving as a guarantor for the implementation of any agreements reached.
These assumptions have gained particular traction in light of proposals by the current U.S. administration regarding potential involvement of an American company in ensuring the security of the Armenian section of the Zangezur Corridor.
This latest development could not go unnoticed by Iran—especially by those political circles that, for unclear reasons, have traditionally viewed Azerbaijan as a “conduit of foreign influence,” despite far more compelling evidence pointing to Armenia historically playing that role. In any case, this perception has repeatedly served as a pretext for Tehran to exert pressure on Baku, which pursues an independent foreign policy not always aligned with the interests of Iran’s conservative political elites—elites that have long sought unconditional loyalty from Azerbaijan.
In this context, it was no coincidence that Iran’s Foreign Ministry suddenly expressed concern over the fate of Iranian prisoners held in Azerbaijani jails—conveniently on the same day that news of the Washington meeting surfaced. Later, Ali Akbar Velayati, a top adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, made thinly veiled threats toward both regional and external actors interested in the Zangezur Corridor project.
According to Velayati, the Zangezur Corridor is not merely a logistical initiative but a “front for a large-scale geopolitical operation controlled by the U.S., Israel, NATO, and certain pan-Turkic movements.” In his view, the real objective is to weaken the “Axis of Resistance,” sever Iran’s strategic ties with the Caucasus, and trap both Iran and Russia within a land-based containment ring in the region’s south.
Moreover, Velayati emphasized that Iran had already taken concrete steps to prevent the project’s implementation: armed forces were deployed to the border, and relevant military exercises were conducted. This reflects Tehran’s strategy of “active deterrence,” rather than passive response.
He stressed that any attempt to “repeat past mistakes”—by reviving or advancing the corridor project—would trigger a “harsh response” from Tehran, as “Iran’s national security remains a red line.” By aligning itself with Russia, Iran appears to be leveraging the current tensions between Moscow, Baku, and Yerevan to counter not only Washington but also Turkey, which is a direct stakeholder in this transport initiative.
Such aggressive posturing by Iranian hardliners stands in stark contrast to the position of Iran’s current president, Masoud Pezeshkian. During a recent visit to Zanjan, he made an unprecedented statement, openly admitting that the problems in Iran-Azerbaijan relations stem largely from the Iranian side. He noted: “Azerbaijan is a brotherly country… How is it that I cannot visit and build an alliance there, while Israel can? Clearly, the blame lies with us.”
For the first time, a senior Iranian official acknowledged diplomatic missteps—particularly against the backdrop of intensified Azerbaijan-Israel cooperation.
Pezeshkian’s remarks reflect a desire to chart a new foreign policy course, one grounded in de-escalation, regional solidarity, and prioritization of dialogue with neighboring states. His Azerbaijani heritage on both sides of his family added special resonance to his statement, garnering support in some political circles while provoking criticism in others. Against this backdrop, Velayati’s statements clearly delineate the spectrum of political forces in Iran seeking to obstruct this new direction by appealing to traditional security concerns and nationalist narratives.
Under these conditions, the Zangezur Corridor has become a litmus test—not only of foreign policy priorities but of deeper domestic political rifts within Iran. It reflects the struggle between conservative and reformist visions for the country’s future. For official Baku, the situation presents an opportunity: Azerbaijan is hopeful for a more constructive agenda in its relations with Iran and is interested in supporting President Pezeshkian’s efforts to institutionalize and strengthen bilateral cooperation.
Ilgar Velizade
