Last week, during a regular government question hour in parliament, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, commenting on the TRIPP project, stated that Yerevan and Azerbaijan intend to interconnect their energy systems, enabling mutual imports and exports of electricity. Among the practical benefits already emerging from participation in the project, he cited fuel supplies and a reduction in gasoline prices, as well as grain imports transiting through Azerbaijani territory. These remarks are indicative and go beyond short-term economic conditions, reflecting a deeper transformation in the Armenian leadership’s approach to energy and economic security.
For decades, Armenia’s energy system evolved under conditions of strong structural dependence on Russia. Formally, the country met its electricity needs through its own generation capacities—nuclear, thermal, and hydropower—but their stable operation was closely tied to Russian energy supplies and technological support. Gas-fired generation relied on imported Russian gas, while the entire domestic gas transmission infrastructure was controlled by Gazprom Armenia, effectively making Moscow not only a resource supplier but also a key regulator of the sector’s economic parameters. A similar dependence existed in nuclear energy, where fuel supplies, servicing, and modernization decisions were likewise linked to the Russian side. Taken together, this created a stable model in which energy became one of the main levers of external influence over Armenia.
A comparable logic prevailed in the fuel market. For many years, gasoline and diesel supplies to Armenia were effectively tied to the Russian direction, and the market itself was characterized by high concentration and limited competition. The dominance of Russian supplies and affiliated traders shaped a pricing model in which domestic fuel costs were largely determined by external conditions and political-economic arrangements rather than market competition. As in the electricity sector, reliance on a single primary source made the fuel market not only economically but also politically sensitive, increasing Armenia’s vulnerability to external pressure and constraining its ability to independently adjust energy and social policy.
It is precisely this model that the current steps by Yerevan aim to dismantle. The idea of interconnecting energy systems with Azerbaijan implies not merely technical synchronization of grids, but the creation of an alternative energy framework capable of reducing Russia’s monopolistic role in ensuring the stability of Armenia’s energy supply. The ability to import and export electricity introduces an additional balancing mechanism, expanding choice and lowering vulnerability to price, political, and logistical risks associated with one-sided dependence.
In doing so, the Armenian leadership effectively deprives of arguments those who for years claimed that any departure from Russia’s energy orbit would inevitably lead to economic and social shocks.
In a broader context, energy cooperation with Azerbaijan acquires a clear geopolitical dimension. By reducing dependence on Russian gas supplies, fuel imports, and technological chains, Yerevan gains greater room for foreign-policy maneuver and the ability to shape its position more confidently without constant deference to Moscow. Energy diversification thus becomes not merely a sectoral reform, but an instrument of foreign-policy sovereignty.
Paradoxically, it is Baku—until recently viewed in Armenian political discourse exclusively as a source of threats—that is emerging as one of the factors strengthening Armenia’s energy security and facilitating its gradual rapprochement with Europe. This opens the possibility for Armenia to continue its European trajectory without constant reliance on Moscow. In this logic, Baku effectively contributes to Armenia’s integration into a new regional reality, which in the long term may influence not only the economy, but also the country’s broader foreign-policy orientation.
Ilgar Velizade
