After Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war, the South Caucasus entered a fundamentally new political phase. The formation of a new balance of power became the starting point for a large-scale transformation of the region’s transport and logistics architecture. The restoration of territorial integrity, the elimination of Armenian armed separatism, and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers in 2023 created conditions under which Azerbaijan gained the ability to independently set the rules of the game in key regional projects and determine the routes of future transit.
Against the backdrop of the accelerated development of the East–West Corridor and concrete steps to advance the Zangezur route, the potential of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) — designed to link the Indian Ocean with Europe through Iran, the Caspian, Azerbaijan, and Russia — is also growing. Spanning about 7,200 kilometers, this route has already demonstrated its economic advantage: cargo delivery is 30–40% cheaper and 15–20 days faster than the traditional maritime path via the Suez Canal.
The latest meeting in Baku between the deputy prime ministers of Azerbaijan and Russia and Iran’s transport minister reaffirmed that the project is moving from conceptual discussions to practical implementation. The main focus of upcoming work is the construction of the Rasht–Astara railway section (162 km), which Azerbaijan agreed to finance by granting Iran a $500 million loan. Once completed, the North–South Corridor will offer continuous railway connectivity from the Bay of Bengal to the Baltic Sea.
For Azerbaijan, the project carries strategic importance. The INSTC strengthens the country’s role as a transit hub between Russia, Iran, and Europe, increases traffic through the Baku and Alat ports, expands Azerbaijan’s footprint in Eurasian logistics, and enables new linkages among the Caspian, the Middle East, and the Black Sea region. In 2023–2024, transit through Azerbaijan’s section of the North–South route grew by more than 35%, reaching record volumes.
India has shown particular interest in developing this corridor. For New Delhi, the INSTC represents a strategic opportunity to establish an alternative route to Europe and Russia that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, instability in the Red Sea, and restrictions related to Pakistan. India has already invested over $250 million in developing the port of Chabahar, intending to use it as a key access point to the corridor.
However, India’s political course increasingly contradicts the geopolitical realities. Indian arms deliveries to Armenia — including Pinaka MLRS, Swathi radars, and anti-tank missile systems — diplomatic attempts to pressure Azerbaijan, and rising Islamophobic rhetoric in India’s domestic discourse have seriously undermined trust between the two countries. In the post-conflict environment, where Azerbaijan has full control over key land routes in the region, these actions have effectively pushed India out of the processes in which it might once have played a role.
Meanwhile, the Azerbaijan–Turkey–Pakistan axis is rapidly gaining strength. Since 2020, this trilateral format has acquired a clearly defined strategic dimension, spanning military modernization, energy, and infrastructure cooperation. Baku and Ankara’s relations have evolved into an alliance formalized by the 2021 Shusha Declaration, while ties with Pakistan have reached an unprecedented level. Interestingly, while remaining Azerbaijan’s strategic ally, Pakistan has begun cautiously engaging with Armenia — a flexible, multi-vector approach that does not compromise its solidarity with Baku. As a result, India has become the only major player effectively excluded from the emerging post-war logistics system.
Thus, the new transport map of Eurasia is being built around three interconnected routes: East–West, North–South, and the Zangezur Corridor. In this system, Azerbaijan functions not merely as a transit country but as the key coordinator of regional logistics. India, by maintaining its current policy course, risks sidelining itself from one of the most promising branches of the North–South Corridor unless it reconsiders its stance and recalibrates its approach toward Baku.
Ilgar Velizade
