An article published in Politico raises one of the key issues of modern European energy policy: how the European Union, striving to reduce its dependency on Russian gas, is building energy cooperation with Azerbaijan and what risks may arise in this interaction.
The European Commission asserts that the Southern Gas Corridor, which supplies EU countries, is connected exclusively to Azerbaijani gas fields and is not linked to Russian gas. Tim McPhie, the Commission’s energy spokesperson, emphasized that “gas molecules cannot be traced” but stated that current information supports the independence of these supplies. However, analysts such as those from Chatham House argue that Russian gas may be “laundered” through Azerbaijan and Turkey to meet Europe’s high energy demand.
Following the signing of a 2022 agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan aimed at doubling gas imports from the South Caucasus by 2027, relations between Baku and Brussels have strengthened. Simultaneously, Russia and Azerbaijan have concluded several strategic agreements between Gazprom and SOCAR, raising doubts about the true independence of Azerbaijani exports from Russian influence. Is it possible that Azerbaijan exports its own gas to Europe while covering domestic demand with imports of Russian gas?
Energy cooperation with Azerbaijan has been met with criticism from the European Parliament, which in October 2024 passed a resolution condemning human rights violations in the country and calling for a reassessment of energy ties. Baku rejected these accusations, describing them as a “smear campaign” and interference in its internal affairs.
