There have been arrests and exposures of Iranian agents before. But there is every reason for this counterintelligence operation to be considered a turning point. And this is not just because the State Security Service tracked WhatsApp groups under the innocent names of “Müzakirələr” (“Discussions”), “Elanlar” (“Announcements”), etc.
Here we have the complete set of less than gentlemanly methods employed by the Iranian secret services: recruitment of Azerbaijani citizens who go to Iran for education or even medical treatment, attempts to use them to organize religious and political uprisings in Azerbaijan (we saw real examples in Nardaran and Ganja), and so on.
This time the Iranian agents were engaged in actual military espionage. Their handlers from Tehran and Qom were interested in the dates of military exercises in the Caspian Sea, the specifications of the Israeli and Turkish UAVs used by Azerbaijani border guards, and the coordinates of the military bases in Salyan, Lankaran and Fizuli… There is a reason why the criminal case was initiated on charges of national treason.
The guilt, of course, will be determined by the court. But if the case is proven (and there is little doubt that it will be), then there is no point in citing “religious beliefs” or even “I didn’t understand”. The coordinates of military bases a priori have little to do with theological disputes.
But the conclusions from this Iranian interest are quite serious. Apparently, Tehran has realized that the only way to bring their puppets into power in Azerbaijan is on Iranian bayonets. And they were preparing to organize something like the 11th Army here, Green-White-Red instead of Red, or the Soviet “Afghan version”, where the role of Babrak Karmal would probably be played by Tohid Ibrahimbayli.
It is no coincidence that after the current arrests, Iran got seriously nervous and summoned the Azerbaijani ambassador to the Iranian Foreign Ministry—for a second time in two weeks!—and handed him a note of protest concerning the “illegal activities” of Azerbaijani citizens in Iran. It is unclear what “illegal activities” this is in reference to. It is even less clear what evidence is presented to support the allegations. Finally, it is unclear whether we are talking simply about citizens, for whom the state is not accountable, or intelligence service employees, as in the case of the Iranian agents in Azerbaijan. Where those agents were gathering military information as a gift to Yerevan. Even the individuals involved in the case are aware that Iran shared the acquired information with Armenia. The question they ought to be asking themselves is whether it occurred to them a little too late. But there is no doubt that this spy network reveals the true face of the current Iranian authorities in general and their plans concerning Azerbaijan in particular. And this is not all. There has been information about intelligence cooperation between Armenia and Iran before. But now, after staging this kind of espionage session in favor of Armenia in the territory of Azerbaijan during the 44-day war, Iran has openly crossed red lines. It seems that Tehran has misinterpreted Azerbaijan’s peacefulness and willingness to build good-neighborly relations with Iran.
But if they respond to good neighborliness with espionage in favor of Armenia, Tehran must understand that Baku will not leave such actions without response either. Azerbaijan is not a country with which red lines can be crossed with impunity.
And God forbid that Iran should get a taste of the specifications of Azerbaijani UAVs in action.