The Telegram channel “Nezygar,” known for its “special attention” to Azerbaijan, has circulated yet another “sensation.” According to its claims, “Iran is delaying the construction of a full-fledged seamless western branch of the North-South International Transport Corridor. This concerns the 160-kilometer section between the Iranian cities of Astara (on the border with Azerbaijan) and Rasht.”
An explanation is immediately offered: “Experts attribute this unusual slowness for an authoritarian regime to foreign policy reasons. Recently, tensions between Tehran and Baku have been rising, driven by the active rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Turkey, with whom Iran has complicated relations in the Middle East. There have even been mutual accusations: Azerbaijani counterintelligence allegedly uncovered an Iranian spy network, while Iran accused Baku of interfering in its internal affairs, particularly in the provinces of West and East Azerbaijan.” They also recalled the “cooling of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, partly caused by the latter continuing to highlight the crash of a passenger plane on December 25 last year over Kazakhstan’s Aktau.”
After listing all these imaginable and unimaginable “sins” of Azerbaijan, “Nezygar” moves to the main point. It turns out that “an alternative route of the ITC has been laid along the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, providing Iran (and Russia) with an opportunity to bypass the Azerbaijani section amid stable relations with these transit countries.” Indeed, back in 2014, the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway was ceremonially opened — specifically, the Uzen–Gyzylgaya–Bereket–Etrek–Gorgan railway line. And from Kazakhstan, one can access Russia’s railway network. Moreover, there is also a “sea route” between Iran and Russia — across the Caspian Sea.
But let’s set aside the question of why, if these “alternative routes” exist, Russia and Iran negotiated with Azerbaijan to build the transport corridor — the very one whose construction is now being delayed. Let’s not dwell on the “logistical” truths either: that two roads are always better than one; that the technical equipment of the roads, the availability of infrastructure, and the length of the route also matter; and finally, that the “Azerbaijani” corridor offers Iran access not only to the Russian but also to the European railway network — through Georgia and Turkey — something that can no longer be accomplished through Central Asia and Russia under the conditions of the Ukraine war and sanctions.
In Central Asia itself, hopes are pinned on the Trans-Caspian ferry crossing as an alternative. Nor shall we focus too much on the small and large discrepancies with reality in Nezygar’s text — though there are plenty. For instance, Iranian authorities have never publicly accused Azerbaijan of “interfering in the internal affairs of the country, particularly in the provinces of West and East Azerbaijan.” Yes, the very existence of an independent Azerbaijan, against the backdrop of tens of millions of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran who are deprived of basic rights to national identity, cultural development, and even education in their native language, understandably makes many in Tehran nervous. However, Iranian authorities prefer not to publicly mention the “Iranian Azerbaijan factor,” knowing how dangerous this issue is for Tehran itself.
Moreover, Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey are also not a topic of public rhetoric. Azerbaijan has been, and continues to be, accused — publicly — of having “overly close” relations with Israel, at least according to some representatives of the Iranian “mullocracy.” Azerbaijani security services have repeatedly uncovered not only “Iranian spy networks” in Azerbaijan but also terrorist plots orchestrated by Iranian intelligence.
What is far more important is something else. In essence, this Telegram channel, which is fairly close to the Kremlin, rather transparently hints that Russia is behind the “delay” in the construction of the Iranian section of the Astara–Rasht railway. Russia is allegedly unhappy that Azerbaijan did not “forget” about its civilian aircraft that was shot down by Russian air defense. And as “punishment,” Moscow is proposing an alternative route along the eastern coast of the Caspian.
Now, this gives rise not only to questions about the degree of “coordination of actions” between Moscow and Tehran but also to a deeper question — is it even possible to build fruitful cooperation with a country like Russia, where air defense systems can mistakenly shoot down a civilian aircraft and where, instead of issuing an apology, the authorities then quietly stall already signed and agreed-upon cooperation projects in completely different areas?
And as the “cherry on top,” the Kremlin punishes not itself, but its partners. Because it seems that they not only shot themselves in the foot but also hopelessly crippled their Iranian partners in the process.
Nurani
