It is hard to believe that any new large-scale aid packages for Ukraine would fit into Donald Trump’s plans. He will likely want to avoid further involvement in a losing war and will probably pressure Zelensky and Europe to offer a deal to Russia. This was stated in an interview with Minval.az by Matthew Blackburn, an expert with the Research Group on Russia, Asia, and International Trade at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and a fellow at the Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University.
— Mr. Blackburn, why can’t the West step away from the war in Ukraine? When did the West realize the seriousness of the situation?
— The Biden administration (and most Western leaders) have backed themselves into a corner. For nearly three years, they repeated loud statements about supporting Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” They said that Russia must be defeated or “not allowed to win.” Since they lack the means to seriously support Ukraine or prevent Russia’s victory, it’s time for a reality check and a policy shift. But the outgoing Biden administration has refused to do this, instead escalating the situation by approving deep strikes, which has led to fears of World War III reaching unprecedented levels.
— Why do you think this is happening?
— This could be due to pride (unwillingness to admit a mistake), malice (to harm the incoming Trump administration), or even flawed strategic thinking (hoping that such measures would deter Russia from further success in Ukraine). The problem here is that Western leaders may not understand the gravity of the situation.
We often hear phrases like “we can cross Russian red lines without consequences” or “Putin will never use nuclear weapons.” These are the same people who believed Russia would collapse in 2022 or that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would push the Russian army out of the country in 2023. It seems they lack realism in their thinking. There’s a sense that some within the Western political elite criticize this approach and want to return to pragmatism and restraint but are waiting for Trump to take office before speaking out.
— What can Ukraine and the world expect after the U.S. presidential elections?
— Many talk about Trump’s unpredictability and the impossibility of making any forecasts. Ardent supporters of Ukraine are convinced (or simply hopeful) that Trump is preparing a major escalation to force Putin to the negotiating table. Some American conservatives are concerned that Trump will make the same choice as during his last term, namely appointing hawkish neoconservatives who will influence him to avoid making peace with Russia.
In my opinion, Trump will prioritize the economy. He wants to achieve rapid and noticeable progress in tackling the illegal immigration crisis and take measures to reduce domestic inflation. This will cost money. It’s hard to believe that any new large-scale aid packages for Ukraine will fit into these plans or be well-received by his supporters. Trump will likely want to avoid further involvement in a losing war and will probably pressure Zelensky and Europe to offer a deal to Russia.
If Putin receives a serious proposal, we will be entering a new phase, as the West has not made any significant diplomatic offers to Russia since 2022. Beyond Ukraine, we can expect Trump to continue his entrepreneurial approach to diplomacy, making deals where he can. On the other hand, his previous record of impulsive decisions could be dangerous given the volatile times we live in. I believe it all depends on how much he has learned from his previous term.
— How is Russia a threat to the U.S.?
— Russia threatens America’s grand strategy since 1989, aimed at preventing other “great powers” from becoming too strong in their regions. America, the regional hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, does not want Russia, China, Iran, or other countries to achieve anything similar. Russia has shifted from seeking a place in a U.S.-dominated order to acting as an adversary, claiming to expose and resist America’s neo-imperial project. Russia uses hard power to counter various U.S. foreign policy initiatives. One U.S. project that Russia torpedoed was in Syria. The current project is Ukraine.
Much of the “threat” from Russia could be reduced to a manageable level if Washington were willing to revise its global grand strategy, abandoning neocon ambitions to “maintain hegemony” in favor of some new, more pragmatic, realistic strategy of restraint and engagement with rising powers. A deal with Russia in Europe and Ukraine would not mean a dramatic loss of American power. A deal with Maoist China in the 1970s also didn’t prevent the U.S. from becoming a superpower. In fact, such a deal would acknowledge the security competition with Russia in Eurasia, which drains U.S. resources at a time when they need to shift focus to domestic issues and China.
However, a deal with Russia would enrage American neocons like John Bolton and Victoria Nuland, who still arrogantly believe that America is strong enough to confront and defeat all the states of the “autocratic axis of evil” simultaneously. Neocons advocate doubling down on interventions, proxy wars, and provocations, based on the idea that American military power can crush countries like Iran and Russia, sending a strong signal to China. This type of thinking isn’t limited to Nuland and Bolton; its variants circulate within the U.S. political establishment. Perhaps only a potential Trump successor, J.D. Vance, could begin a new era of restraint in U.S. foreign policy. Until then, much could happen over the next four years.
— What are your predictions regarding the continuation and outcomes of the war in Ukraine?
— The most dangerous possibility is that the continuation of the war brings us closer to Ukraine’s inevitable collapse, forcing NATO to intervene, which would provoke a hot war with Russia that could turn nuclear. There is now reason to be very skeptical of Western “discussions” about deploying a contingent to Ukraine. Simply put, NATO lacks ready forces or a feasible plan to provide air support without sparking a hot war with Russia.
And there is no public appetite for this in the West—democratically elected leaders would commit electoral suicide if they approved such intervention. Therefore, all recent talks of escalation and the need to “fight Russia” are likely a distraction from the real story: Ukraine’s defensive lines are near collapse, and its energy system is on the brink of failure. If no diplomatic solution between Russia and the West is found by January, 2025 will be the year of Ukraine’s defeat.
Will this mean a regime change and civil war among factions? Will it mean the collapse of fronts and retreat to the Dnipro? Or economic collapse, hyperinflation, and mass emigration leading to state failure? Russia is betting on one or more of these scenarios—assuming the current dynamics persist. Will the West be so immoral and passive as to let this happen, multiplying the suffering of the Ukrainian people to horrifying levels? Many in the Middle East would say they’ve done it before. I would argue that Ukraine’s European location works against this and that if Trump somehow washes his hands of the issue, European leaders will draw up a plan to end the war. But at the moment, apart from the leaders of Hungary and Slovakia, they aren’t saying so.
— Amid China’s growing influence in Africa and Asia, what risks and opportunities do you see for Europe in the current competition for economic and political influence?
— Europe, by all accounts, is in deep distress. It faces serious economic challenges outlined in the 2024 Draghi Report. These include low labor productivity, declining investment, a lack of innovation in key 21st-century industries, deteriorating competitiveness, and troubling demographic trends. Germany, once the EU’s economic powerhouse, is now in severe distress. To top it off, geopolitically, Europe’s position has significantly worsened since 2022. It is not only cut off from highly profitable trade with Russia but also far more dependent on America for security, as well as economically and psychologically. If the U.S. strikes China with tariffs, Europe is expected to follow suit, inflicting even more economic damage on itself. And if the war in Ukraine drags on and is not resolved diplomatically, Europe will also suffer from this instability and the threat of a constant hybrid war with Russia. This picture will require bold and decisive leadership to steer Europe out of these troubled waters.
Looking at the current lineup of leaders in Europe, I genuinely cannot see how this will happen. The EU is committed to the green agenda and significant increases in defense spending, which will require austerity policies and further declines in living standards and incomes for European citizens. Despite all the confident talk, the EU will succeed if it survives the next decade, as the social contract unravels and populist uprisings gain momentum.
— What consequences will Europe’s economic decline have for other countries?
— Obviously, this has massive implications for Azerbaijan and other countries located between the EU, Russia, and the Middle East. Europe’s decline opens up opportunities but also risks. As the EU cannot act as a serious player in the Caucasus, the focus shifts to the roles of China, Turkey, Iran, and Russia. All four countries share an interest in developing geo-economic integration in the Caucasus and the Caspian region. They also share a mutual interest in resolving conflicts and reducing security competition risks among themselves. This is a time for patience and restraint, not bold declarations or rash decisions. However, Europe seems to fail to grasp this.
— What are your predictions regarding the escalation of conflict in the Middle East, considering the growing tensions between Israel and its neighbors? How do you see the situation unfolding?
— The current situation, despite the recent ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, remains a tense standoff. Israel is also preparing for Trump’s presidency and is still waiting for a decisive moment to deal with Iran. Israel’s actions since October 2023 have inflicted significant damage on its image in the Middle East. The repercussions of its atrocities will leave an indelible mark on the region.
A realignment is underway, with Saudi Arabia and Turkey being key countries that could shape a new regional order. Saudi Arabia has already taken steps to improve relations with Iran, while Turkey continues to balance its position, even applying for BRICS membership. Some individuals associated with the Trump administration seem enthusiastic about a war with Iran. Currently, no state in the Middle East—except Netanyahu’s government—shows enthusiasm for such a conflict. Still, it’s hard to imagine the U.S. going to war with Iran without reaching a peace agreement in Ukraine. Would Russia coldly abandon its new ally in the fight against U.S. hegemony? I don’t think so.
Alarmingly, it seems the Netanyahu government needs a highly successful war to avoid losing power and facing mass accusations from the opposition. Drawing the U.S. into a fight with Iran is its best option, and the strength of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. is well-documented. Again, it all depends on Trump and how much his “America First” approach aligns with Zionist ambitions to crush Iran.
— How do you assess the negotiation process for signing a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia?
— To some extent, there is a window of opportunity to reach a deal where Western influence is relatively diminished. Europe is preoccupied with Ukraine’s fate; Russia is fully engaged in waging war and does not want distractions on its southern border. Turkey is at least somewhat distracted by the possibility of a major war in the Middle East but will support Baku on key issues. There is talk of a major summit between Russia and Turkey, which could be an important precursor to a deal.
The 3+3 format proposed by Russia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia + Iran, Turkey, and Russia) has been completely rejected by Armenia. Yerevan likely wants the EU or France to be more involved, but this may be unrealistic. Western ambitions in the Caucasus seem to have suffered a significant blow in Georgia, which resists closer alignment. Armenia is waiting with open arms but is in an extremely weak position, which the West will find hard to support. If Turkey and Russia manage to involve Iran in the process, it’s hard to see how Armenia, beset by numerous internal problems, could resist the incentives they are likely to offer for peace.
— How would you characterize France’s biased stance toward Azerbaijan?
— The obvious starting point is the role of the Armenian diaspora in France, which has initiated and sustained this position. But another element is France’s post-imperial syndrome. Having lost its empire, France under De Gaulle managed to nurture its pride by demonstrating independence from NATO and asserting zones of French influence, such as in sub-Saharan Africa. After rejoining NATO, France gradually became more closely aligned with neocon adventures led by the U.S., with Libya being a turning point. Still, France’s political establishment continues to aspire to act as an independent great power, though, by all accounts, it has abandoned this role.
Macron speaks of the need for Europe’s strategic autonomy, but in practice, he passively watches as France’s influence in Africa declines and Europe’s dependence on the U.S. grows. By abandoning its balancing position in the Caucasus to become a staunch supporter of Armenia, France is not merely influenced by the Armenian diaspora; it is driven by its own post-imperial complex. However, ongoing economic ties between France and Azerbaijan suggest there is a pathway to improved relations in the future, once Macron leaves office and the focus shifts to more pressing issues within the EU and in Ukraine.
Translated from minval.az
