Kocharyan, who is accused in Azerbaijan of numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the Khojaly genocide, made a public appearance with strong statements.
However, in his press conference, Robert Sedrakovich did not mention Khojaly. Instead, he criticized the Armenian government’s failure in handling relations with the CSTO, recalled how Armenia received “good weapons” from Russia (to put it bluntly, billions of dollars worth of free military aid), and warned that cozying up to France would be futile:
“Can you name a single foreign leader with whom Armenia’s Prime Minister has a friendly relationship? Macron may make grand statements, but France has no vital interests in this region. I say this as someone who played a significant role in strengthening Armenian-French relations and had excellent ties with Jacques Chirac. But Paris does not have strategic stakes here.”
The most intriguing part was Kocharyan’s plan to “return Armenians to Artsakh.” According to him, the solution lies in revisiting discussions with Azerbaijan under the framework of the November 9, 2020, trilateral agreement.
“The only way to ensure the return of the Karabakh Armenians is to return to the November 9 trilateral agreement,” Kocharyan claimed, arguing that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is uninterested in protecting the rights of the “Artsakh people”:
“It seems that the authorities do not want Karabakh Armenians to return because it would complicate their lives—certain questions would arise. For them, it’s easier this way: no people, no problems.”
This raises a fundamental question: what exactly does Robert Kocharyan intend to “discuss with Azerbaijan,” and why is he so confident that Baku would even entertain such discussions? Azerbaijan has already guaranteed the safety and civil rights of Karabakh’s Armenian population. However, when given the choice, they opted to leave for Armenia—not because they were forced, but because they chose to. So again, what does Kocharyan want to discuss, and why does he think the trilateral agreement is relevant here?
A Political Deception
Kocharyan’s rhetoric can be translated into one simple phrase: political fraud. In essence, his argument is: if Armenia restores its close ties with Russia, it will, first, receive more free weapons, and second, allow Russian troops to return to Karabakh, reinstating the occupation regime under Moscow’s protection.
This is particularly noteworthy given the current backdrop. The Armenian Parliament recently decided to seek EU membership. While this goal is highly unrealistic—not only due to the EU’s moratorium on expansion but also because Armenia remains in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)—this move is something Moscow will not forgive Pashinyan for. Sensing an opportunity, Kocharyan is attempting to “ride the wave” and position himself as a Kremlin-backed alternative leader.
Similarly, Kocharyan’s foreign policy stance is deeply tied to Russia, particularly concerning military revanchism and a renewed occupation of Karabakh. He still seems to think in terms of the 1990s, imagining a repeat of the tactics used by the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the Pskov Airborne Division.
The timing is also significant. Moscow is increasingly frustrated with Azerbaijan’s firm stance on investigating the downing of the Baku-Grozny flight—an incident where a civilian aircraft was shot down by Russian air defenses. Unlike others, Baku refuses to let this matter be forgotten.
As a result, Moscow has seemingly “reactivated” Kocharyan, a politician who never makes a move without Kremlin approval. Now, he is stepping onto the political stage, making grand statements: “Bring me to power, and I’ll restore order!” He is making promises to Armenian voters—everything from cheap public transport to reclaiming Karabakh—while threatening Pashinyan with a power struggle: “If you don’t comply, Kocharyan will come and make your life miserable.”
Azerbaijan Has Moved On
Perhaps some in Moscow see this as a clever political maneuver. But they have overlooked a critical fact: Kocharyan is not just past his political peak—he is completely obsolete in his own country.
Moreover, his credibility took a major hit during the 44-day war. Back then, he loudly announced a visit to Moscow for “important negotiations.” But when the time came, he suddenly “caught COVID-19” and the trip never happened. Experts at the time had little doubt that Moscow had simply ignored him, and the coronavirus excuse was a convenient diplomatic cover-up.
The End of the Karabakh Card
Moscow is bound to respond to Armenia’s EU aspirations, though what form this response will take remains uncertain. Despite Pashinyan’s political maneuvering, Armenia remains economically, infrastructurally, and militarily dependent on Russia. However, one thing is crystal clear: Karabakh is no longer a leverage point against Baku.
Azerbaijan decisively closed the Karabakh issue through military and political means, with the final chapter written on September 19–20, 2023. The days when Armenia could “negotiate” its way into bringing Russian paratroopers back to Lachin are long gone. The South Caucasus is no longer the same, and neither is Azerbaijan. The balance of power has shifted.
This is not the 1990s, no matter how much Kocharyan and his backers may wish it were. And clinging to outdated political illusions can come at a very high price.
Nurani
