Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, made another sensational statement—one that puts the entire peace dialogue at risk. On Facebook, the “barbecue-loving prime minister” declared: “Since 1994, that is, after the ceasefire, the negotiation process has been about the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The negotiation process had no other content. Discourses suggesting otherwise were introduced in the Republic of Armenia solely for addressing domestic political objectives.”
Then, carried away, he let slip: “In this context, I made a big mistake. In 2018, when I was familiarizing myself with the content of the negotiations, I didn’t admit the above to myself (my patriotism of a certain model didn’t allow it) and, therefore, I didn’t explain all this to the people.”
In other words, it turns out that after 2018, the “people’s barbecue prime minister,” to put it mildly, was stringing his voters along.
Theoretically, this should be resolved by the citizens of Armenia themselves. Especially since the statement was clearly made with a domestic political agenda: Nikol Pashinyan, it seems, intends to shift the responsibility for the Karabakh failure onto his predecessors. It’s no coincidence he called on Armenia’s former presidents for debates—though all three have already declined.
But the matter concerns negotiations on Karabakh, and this is no longer just an internal Armenian issue.
One might recall that before 2020, the negotiations included options involving the return of five of the seven districts surrounding the former NKAO (Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast) to Azerbaijan, along with several “perks” for the occupying regime in Khankendi. As Minval previously reported, in one of his interviews, Rashid Nurgaliyev, Deputy Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, outlined the proposals prepared by the Russian Foreign Ministry and presented to the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs in June 2019:
“…Returning five occupied districts to Azerbaijan in the first phase after the deployment of international peacekeeping forces. Meanwhile, it was proposed that Nagorno-Karabakh be granted rights to establish governing bodies and self-defense forces. The blockade by Azerbaijan would be lifted, and trade-economic relations restored. In the second phase, the remaining two districts would be transferred in conjunction with determining the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh via a referendum in accordance with international norms. Additionally, a corridor in Lachin District would be retained for transportation between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, subject to mutual agreement.”
But there’s something far more critical.
Knowing that the negotiations involved territorial returns to Azerbaijan (what else could have been discussed given the recognized borders and four UN Security Council resolutions?), Nikol Pashinyan continued to mislead his voters without sharing such a stunning revelation. More importantly, he pursued a policy of escalation.
Nikol Pashinyan proclaimed in Khankendi: “Karabakh is Armenia, period!” He relocated the “inauguration” of Arayik Harutyunyan to Shusha, where he also indulged in drunken dances. Under his leadership, construction began on a “parliament” building for the occupying regime in Shusha. He sent his own son to serve in the army on occupied Azerbaijani lands, later followed by his wife for military training there. Most significantly, he surrounded himself with known “hawks” like Davit Tonoyan and Vagharshak Harutyunyan. In the fall of 2019, Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan openly promised a “new war for new territories,” which Armenia launched on September 27, 2020.
The extent of lies fed to the Armenian audience and the actual plans of Yerevan are evident from revelations by the newspaper Voice of Armenia on October 28, 2021: “Last year, during these days, the authorities flooded the internal Armenian information space with various fabrications—claims about the destruction of the runway of ‘Gandzak Airport’ (Ganja, as noted by Minval), the war supposedly starting in Azerbaijan due to this, the liberation of the ‘Shaumyan District,’ and other fantasies. Our compatriots, receiving unofficial information from the front, were confused: whom to believe—the accounts of soldiers and volunteers or the state propaganda assuring that the enemy was in panic, ‘Gandzak’ was evacuated, we were winning, and our army would soon reach the historic ‘Gardmanak’ (the territory of the former Girdyman Khanate—Minval).”
The newspaper admitted: “The illusion of a false reality was shattered by Azerbaijan’s President, who announced the imminent capture of Shusha when we had not even come to terms with the loss of Hadrut. Back then, and even now, Aliyev was honest enough with his people and the Armenian public, not hiding his plans.”
If Pashinyan himself now admits to deceiving his people, how can he be a reliable partner in negotiations over such a complex issue as a peace agreement? What guarantees are there that tomorrow, citing his “model of patriotism,” Pashinyan won’t, as he has done before, simply backtrack on reached agreements?
The continued presence of a military group in Karabakh after the 44-day war—with 15,000 personnel, hundreds of tanks, and other armored vehicles, artillery, and rocket systems—is a telling example. And far from the only one.
This means we must be ready for any surprises from Armenia. Azerbaijan’s tough diplomacy, demanding an end to Armenia’s remilitarization, and a military budget of $5 billion may well be signs of such readiness. Simply put, our neighbors are in desperate need of pragmatism.
Nurani
Translated from minval.az
