The past week was marked by two, without exaggeration, historical events. The process of withdrawing Russian peacekeepers from the Karabakh region began, and Armenia agreed to return four occupied villages of the Gazakh district to Azerbaijan. This topic has attracted interest not only in Azerbaijan but also in a number of global media outlets. In this context, the upcoming visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Moscow on April 22 is also of significant interest. According to the Kremlin press service, during the visit, negotiations between Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin will take place.
“It is planned to consider key issues for further development of Russian-Azerbaijani relations of strategic partnership and alliance, as well as to conduct a detailed exchange of views on current regional issues. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline, Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev will meet with veterans of BAM and workers of the railway industry. It is known that the father of the Azerbaijani president, Heydar Aliyev, was directly involved in issues related to the construction of the mainline,” the Kremlin statement said.
Given the importance of the above issues, we turned to Azerbaijani political scientist, Milli Majlis deputy Rasim Musabayov for comments.
– In one of the interviews with our publication, you predicted that the four villages of the Gazakh district, which until recently were under Armenian occupation, would be returned either peacefully or by force. Armenia is returning these villages. This raises questions: are mass protests in Armenia possible and what is the likelihood that the demarcation and delimitation issue will finally move from a deadlock?
– There are protests. But Armenian provocateurs, who have realized their inability to organize mass demonstrations in Yerevan and other major cities due to the return of four border villages of the Gazakh district to Azerbaijan, are trying to incite unlawful actions among the residents of the villages of the Tavush region.
Authorities are actively opposing them. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has visited the region twice and met with the people. Additional police forces have been deployed there. Thus, the Armenian government has maintained control over the situation and will be able to implement the decisions taken. After all, there are no civilians in the returned settlements, and the military must obey the order to move to other positions. It is important to fulfill this by the agreed date of May 15, as the protocol signed by the deputy prime ministers of both states implies a certain regulation of actions, in accordance with the road map for the delimitation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and will give this process a positive start. I note that the US, EU, and neighboring countries have welcomed the readiness of the parties to move forward based on the Almaty Declaration.
– Parallel to this event, the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the Karabakh region has begun. Some experts from the political science community believe that the Kremlin could present some sort of bill to Azerbaijan for the premature withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. What kind of bill could this be?
– These are idle talks. The premature withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent should not be seen as a concession to Azerbaijan by the Kremlin. After the Armenians left Karabakh last fall and it became clear that even with security guarantees from the Azerbaijani authorities for those willing to legally return, and there were none, the peacekeeping mission of the Russian military contingent became unnecessary.
The military-strategic role of 2,000 Russian soldiers, armed with light weapons, surrounded by numerous Azerbaijani corps and brigades, is not significant. The costs of maintaining the Russian peacekeeping contingent are not small. Bearing them for “flag showing” when the armed forces of the Russian Federation are fighting bloody battles in Ukraine seemed irrational. Hence, after a phone conversation between Presidents Aliyev and Putin, a decision was made for the premature withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent.
– Amid these processes, the upcoming visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Moscow on April 22 occupies a special place. According to the Kremlin press service, ‘it is planned to consider key issues for further development of Russian-Azerbaijani relations of strategic partnership and alliance, as well as to conduct a detailed exchange of views on current regional issues.’ These are generic phrases typical of a diplomatic press release. In your opinion, what issues might be discussed, let’s say, behind the scenes of the meeting?
– President Ilham Aliyev’s visit is announced as a working one. No preliminary preparations for it were made. I suppose that no new documents will be signed, especially since the contractual and legal base of Azerbaijani-Russian relations is quite extensive and solid. Most likely, the visit should be seen as part of a regular political dialogue at a high level.
I recall that recently the head of the Russian government, Mikhail Mishustin, visited Baku for a two-day visit, and issues related to the economy, transport, and finance were deeply worked through. Perhaps there are topics for which a final decision will be made after the negotiations between the top officials.
– Apparently, after Armenia does not hide its desire to find shelter under the ‘Western umbrella,’ Moscow is increasingly inclined to close cooperation with Azerbaijan. Lately, various politicians have expressed the opinion that Azerbaijan can replace Armenia in the EAEС. How justified are such versions?
– Relations with Azerbaijan are valuable to Moscow, regardless of Armenia. I am not aware of any intention of our country to join the EAEС. In any case, no negotiations or preliminary work in this direction have been conducted.
Joining the EAEС precedes a significant adaptation period and many actions to align procedures and domestic legislation. So far, no actions have been observed in this direction.
By the way, Armenia intends to leave the CSTO, while Yerevan does not wish to break with the EAEС, and this is understandable. The volume of trade and economic ties of Armenia with the EAEС countries makes up more than 50 percent, while the share of the European Union is about 13 percent, and the US – a meager 3 percent. The benefits of Armenia from being in the EAEС are measured in billions of dollars, and greatly exceed the financial handouts from Brussels and Washington.
– As a continuation of the previous question: what is the likelihood that an invitation from Moscow for Baku to join the CSTO might arise? And if such an invitation comes, do we need it?
– President Putin is a realistic politician, adequately perceiving the national aspirations and geopolitical role of Azerbaijan. Therefore, I have no doubt that he will not even make us an offer to join the CSTO. However, the strengthening of Azerbaijani-Russian relations within the framework of the Declaration of Allied Interaction signed in February 2022 will be analyzed by the leaders of both countries. I do not exclude that issues of Azerbaijan’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS may be considered.
Translated from vesti.az
![A zoomed in view of the waterfront promenade running along the shores of the Caspian Sea, Baku, Azerbaijan. [Photo via Getty Images]](https://aze.media/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/GettyImages-1178395339-e1723534011484-150x150.webp)
