The resistance movement in Anatolia also faced some problems in the early stage. There were disagreements between the nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal and the supporters of the Society of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti). Mustafa Kemal was opposed by the Young Turks who wanted to regain their power. Aware of this situation, Mustafa Kemal organized the Sivas Congress in 1919 to prevent them from taking control of the national struggle movement. The split between the two groups was even more pronounced in the Transcaucasia. The Young Turks had a strong foothold in Azerbaijan and had made contact with the Bolsheviks even before Mustafa Kemal (Ağayev, 2016:124-125).
It was clear even at this time that Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the ADR would be on opposite sides. This was evident from Mustafa Kemal Pasha calling it a strategic mistake for the Ottomans to send an army to Azerbaijan in 1918: “Recent events have taught us to stick to one principle. During the war, the person at the head of our government used Ottoman troops to conquer the Caucasus, strengthen the Azerbaijani government and retake Egypt. As a result of this policy, we suffered very heavy losses in the territories that are our real homeland. A lot of fertile lands were taken away from us. Our capital and unique regions of the country such as Izmir, Antalya, Adana are under occupation. On the other hand, if we had not participated in the war or at least used our forces to defend our lands within our current borders instead of squandering them for mercenary purposes, our current situation would be somewhat different even if we had been defeated. We believe that we should refrain from going to the aid of the suffering Muslim people in Armenia and act unanimously with the Muslims of Azerbaijan, but rather pursue our goals within the borders of our homeland and nation. We believe that by using our material and moral forces for purposes beyond our borders, we will dilute the strength we need to defend our homeland.” (Baykara,1975:290).
As the national struggle began to take shape in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha and Rauf Bey saw at the congress in Erzurum rapprochement with the Bolsheviks as the basis of the movement’s foreign policy strategy. For this purpose, Kâzım Karabekir decided to send Ömer Lütfi Bey to Baku and Fuat Sabit to Moscow. Fuat Sabit was also to go to Baku first (Tekerek, 2019:266). On September 2, 1919, one of the representatives who returned to Erzurum, Ömer Lütfi Bey, informed Kâzım Karabekir Pasha: “Although Bolshevik troops have not yet entered the Caucasus, underground Bolshevik organizations exist in the region. The Azerbaijani Musavat government in Baku is in the hands of the British. This government is indifferent to us. They consider our movement a dead movement and do not want to help. They believe that the Bolshevik ideology will die soon.” (Karabekir, 2008:183).
Fuat Sabit, who visited Baku and met with Azerbaijani government officials, did not disagree: “Since the Azerbaijani government relies on the British, they act cautiously and with restraint. The Peace Conference is thinking of establishing a Federation in Transcaucasia. The Azerbaijani government also supports this. In view of this, I have come to realize that they will not help us. I have met with the Bolsheviks. Since Bolshevism has no social or economic basis for taking root in our country, and since the masses and traditions will oppose it, I asked how they could help us, without any calls for reforms. They assured me that they would help in every way possible, that there was no other way now but with money, and that the necessary amount would be provided immediately.” (Karabekir, 2008:395-396).
At that time, Halil Pasha was at the forefront as a key negotiator between members of the resistance movement in Anatolia and the ADR. Halil Pasha, who had escaped from the prison where he was being held by the British in Constantinople, traveled to Ankara, where he met Mustafa Kemal in Sivas on the advice of Ali Fuat Cebesoy, one of the leaders of the Anatolian movement. At the meeting in Sivas, Mustafa Kemal first considered appointing him commander of the Izmir Front. However, he later changed his mind. Cebesoy recalled this meeting: “We would like to use you in the East. For example, in relations with the Bolsheviks, obtaining weapons, ammunition and material aid from them. Before the armistice you were operating with our armies in the Caucasus. You got to know the Bolsheviks well at that time. Therefore, the help you will provide to Anatolia in this region will be more valuable than the help you would provide on other sides. If you undertake this mission, you will be able both to tell us about the situation in the East and to help us in an important way in case of success.” (Cebesoy, 2002:136-137). Halil Pasha did not hesitate to accept the position offered by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and arrived in Baku at the end of 1919. On September 23, 1919 Kâzım Karabekir sent Halil Pasha to Baku together with the Great Khan of Nakhichevan for negotiations. This time Kâzım Karabekir gave an ultimatum to ADR. The conditions were as follows.
– Even if you consider our movement as dead, this movement will keep independent Turkey alive.
– Sooner or later, we will crush the Armenians and dominate the Caucasus.
– If the Entente sends soldiers to Armenia and Azerbaijan, bridges and tunnels will be destroyed, military supplies will be seized.
– Since the Bolsheviks will enter the Caucasus, we must come to an understanding with them. The British will soon have nothing but words in the Caucasus. For this reason you must not prevent the Bolsheviks from coming to the banks of the Arpachay. (Karabekir, 2008:328).
However, the ADR leadership, counting on the support of Great Britain at the Paris Peace Conference, refused to support the members of the resistance movement. Kâzım Karabekir gave the following assessment to this decision in a telegram to the Majlis, emphasizing that the Musavat government is no different from the government of Istanbul: “The Musavat party dominates in Azerbaijan. This party is under British influence. Would they dare go to war with the Bolsheviks with such influence? Their officers and soldiers are very weak. What can this 20,000-strong army, which could not even put up resistance to the Armenian armed forces, do against an army that has defeated the combined forces of Denikin, Kolchak and the Entente? Will they come to an agreement with the Bolsheviks while there is still time to solve the issue politically? Our Farid Pasha government in Istanbul is the same as the Musavat government.” (Karabekir, 2008:503-504).
In early 1920, members of the Turkish resistance movement as well as Enver Pasha’s supporters in Baku concluded that it was necessary to overthrow the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Both Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Enver Pasha intended to legitimize their power in Turkey through the Bolsheviks. For this reason, Mustafa Kemal Pasha formed the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Fırkası, TKF). The Ittihadists, on the other hand, operated within the Karakol Society. The Turkish Communist Party in Baku was headed by Halil Pasha. Mirza Bala Mammadzadeh said of Khalil Pasha in the magazine New Caucasasia: “There were close ties between Viktor and Skachko, Khalil Pasha’s Bolshevik spies. Yusif Ziya Bey, originally from Azerbaijan, who went to Turkey and returned from there as a reserve officer, was also part of Halil Pasha’s organization.” (Soysüren, 2018:45). The Karakol Society was headed by Baha Sait Bey. Although he signed an agreement with the Bolsheviks in early 1920, members of the national resistance movement refused to recognize the agreement (Korkmazcan, 2017:109). In addition, a third communist group formed in Baku from Turks was led by Mustafa Suphi.[1] (İleri, 2005:90). Each of these groups was allied in the early period. These groups, operating under the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, established in February 1920, began preparations for a coup starting in March.
Halil Pasha, who visited the region during the Armenian uprising in Karabakh, noted in his memoirs: “The closeness between the Musavat government and the British began to attract my attention. During this period we were fighting the British in Anatolia. Russia was in the same position as we were. Russian Foreign Commissar Chicherin asked the Musavat government for permission to supply fuel oil. Immediately after I learned of this, I met with the government officials and asked them to release the fuel oil. However, the Musavat government did not heed my advice and further strengthened relations with the British. This closeness of the Musavat government to the British also caused serious protest among the people. As hostility towards the British grew, the people began to see the Russians as saviors. There was a serious tendency towards Communism among the people. Although the government fought against it, it could not be effective.” (Halil, 1974:319-320).
Kâzım Karabekir Pasha expressed approximately the same views in his memoirs: “Denikin’s army in the Caucasus suffered a decisive defeat. Dagestan is moving together with the Bolsheviks. The governments in power in Azerbaijan and Georgia belong to the bourgeoisie class. However, the majority of the population in this region is pro-Bolshevik. For this reason there is bound to be an internal revolution. I do not think that the nation and the army in Azerbaijan will take a stand against the Bolsheviks. The situation is developing rapidly. In the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, Turkish officers and intelligentsia are allying with the Bolsheviks as part of Mustafa Kemal’s plan.” (İleri, 2005: 89-90). Halil Pasha, in a letter after negotiations with ADR representatives, called Musavat “the plaything of the British.” The letter said: “Musavatists are willing to give Nakhchivan and its surroundings, Zangezur and Karabakh to the Armenians. Karabekir is to attack Elviye-i Selâse[2] from the south. Whether the operation takes place or not, the government in Azerbaijan will be eliminated and the red flag will be raised. If the movement of our army slows down, everything may flip upside down and the situation will turn completely against us.” (Akal, 2014: 51).
The March uprising of Armenians, as well as the government crisis, created serious problems for the ADR leadership. By this time, the Musavat government had already been overthrown by the local Bolshevik population in Gazakh uyezd, Garyagin (now Fizuli) and Zagatala districts. Aliheydar Garayev suggested inviting the Red Army into the country at a Majlis session held after the uprising of Armenians in Karabakh. Rasulzade described this moment as follows, “During this speech by Garayev, there were serious expressions of approval and appreciation on the face of the Turkish representative sitting in the guest box of the parliament.” (Resulzade, 1990:83). During this period, Turkish officers held important positions in the security of the ADR. The forces on the railroad, parliament security, and at sea were completely in the hands of Turkish officers (Rasulzade, 1991:42). Baha Sait led the volunteer Relief Regiment battalion established for the defense of Baku. (Soysüren, 2018:44). Communist Maharram Sultanov, one of the members of the Relief Regiment, wrote in his memoirs: “The Relief Regiment was a paramilitary unit formed for self-defense. The first detachment of the regiment was organized in the courtyard of the Tezepir Mosque, then such detachments were created in the courtyards of other mosques. The Turkish officer Muftizade Salahaddin, one of the commanders of our relief regiment, later, when I was studying at the Workers Faculty, was teaching us. He himself was actually a member of the Communist Party.” (Suleymanov, 1987:187-189). The position of this battalion on April 27 would be decisive.
Following reports that England would send weapons and troops to Azerbaijan, Turkish Communists, together with Azerbaijani Bolsheviks, began preparations for a coup. (Şamıyeva, 2018:25). On the previous day, the process of nationalizing the movement in Anatolia had been launched. On April 23, representatives gathered in Ankara began the establishment of Turkey’s national resistance movement in the form of a state. On the same day, the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) was announced. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was elected chairman of the new government. 3 days later, Mustafa Kemal Pasha publicly outlined his plans for the Caucasus region in a letter to the leadership of the RSFSR on behalf of the TBMM government:
– We undertake to unite our struggle and all military operations with the Russian Bolsheviks to fight the imperialist governments and liberate all the oppressed.
– If Soviet Russia intends to initiate military operations against Georgia or to bring Georgia into the Union by diplomatic means and to drive the British out of the Caucasus, the TBMM government takes it upon itself to initiate military operations against imperialist Armenia and to incorporate the Republic of Azerbaijan into the Bolshevik states.
– In order to expel the imperialist forces that have invaded our lands inhabited by our people and to continue our joint struggle against imperialism, we want Soviet Russia to provide us with 5 million Turkish liras worth of gold, arms and other ammunition, as well as military equipment and provisions necessary for our army to be used in the East, as demanded by the Soviet government. (İleri, 2005: 89-90).
The letter with the first proposal of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to the government of Moscow was appended by Kâzım Karabekir and delivered to the delegation traveling from Trabzon to Moscow (Korkmazcan, 2017:112). This letter signaled the beginning of the coup. In preparation for the coup, Suleyman Nuri and other Turkish communists supplied the Azerbaijani Bolsheviks in Baku with arms and ammunition brought from Astrakhan (Tekerek, 2019:275).
The movement was carried out in a coordinated manner with the 11th Red Army waiting in Dagestan. It was even announced that the command of the army that would enter Azerbaijan would be entrusted to Turkish officers. Halil Pasha recalled: “One day a member of the Turkish Communist Organization, Baha Sait, came to me and said that he wanted to talk to me personally. The Red Army in the North Caucasus, he said, would come here not as an enemy but as a friend. The command of the army will be handed over to you if you go there personally. This decision was made right at the top.” (Halil, 1974:320).
On the morning of April 27, Azerbaijani Bolshevik leader Hamid Sultanov and the Turkish Communists launched the operation. Captain Mustafa Şevki was reassigned as head of the operational and revolutionary department within the Caucasian Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. However, Captains İhsan and Bahaaddin were assigned to different regions to spread the revolution. Captain Rifat, inspector of the Derbent front, participated in the capture of the station on the night of the revolution and was appointed commander of the Baku Governorate. Artillery chief Nuraddin, machine gunner Fahri, officers İbrahim Ethem and Rashad Efendi served under the command of the committee. (Soysüren, 2018:45-46).
When the fleet under the command of Chingiz Ildyrym and the 7th Shirvan Regiment went over to the Communist side, Baku was surrounded. Turkish officer Hulusi Mammadzadeh played a major role in the Shirvan regiment’s move to the Communist side (Huseynov, 1967:544). The coup reached its goal, especially with the defection of the relief regiment led by Baha Sait to the Bolshevik side. Nagi Sheikhzamanli, Chairman of the ADR Organization for Combating Counterrevolution, recalled: “On the eve of the occupation, our government intended to urgently retreat from Baku to Ganja and wage war against the Red Army in Ganja. Material means were needed for this purpose. As a matter of urgency, 100 million manats were sent to the Ganja branch of the State Central Bank of Azerbaijan. The money was put in trunks, taken to the railway station and loaded into the cars. At the moment the train started moving, Khalid, a short Turkish officer from the Parliamentary Guards Regiment, arrived at the station with a detachment of fifty or sixty armed men to prevent the train from moving.” (Sheikhzamanli, 1997:100). Rasulzade in his book Siyavush of Our Century also mentioned that the relief regiment had prevented the government from fleeing. (Rasulzade, 1991:44).
In a telegram to Lenin, Ordzhonikidze described the role of the Turks in the coup as follows: “Turkish soldiers and officers in Baku played a very active role to the benefit of the revolution, and thanks to them it was possible to prevent the government from fleeing from Baku.” (Tekerek, 2019:275). After the siege of the parliament, the leader of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, Hamid Sultanov, entered the building and demanded that authority be handed over to the Bolsheviks within 2 hours. Immediately after an emergency government meeting, authority was handed over to the Communists. In parallel, the 11th Red Army, which was waiting on the border, entered Azerbaijan. Nagi Sheikhzamanli emphasized the role of Halil Pasha in the entry of the 11th Red Army into Azerbaijan: “When the Red Army was standing on the border, the ADR government gave an order to the governor of Guba to dismantle the railway tracks within a distance of one kilometer. The governor immediately carried out this order. Upon learning of this, Halil Pasha met with General Shikhlinski and hastily said: “General, the government has dismantled the railway tracks on the border. The Red Army will not be able to advance into Anatolia and as a result aid will be delayed. Please take immediate action.” Deceived by his words, the general ordered the rails to be put back in place.” (Sheikhzamanli, 1997:101).
The Red Army that entered Baku included Turkish soldiers[3] (Tekerek, 2019:275). The journal Liberation described the entry of the 11th Red Army into Baku as follows: “Russia, passing through Azerbaijan, was coming to the aid of the oppressed peoples of the East who had fallen under the heel of the British and French imperialists. To do this, first it was necessary to help the Anatolian Turks, who were fighting for their independence. Arabia, Iran, India and Africa were then next in line. The Turkish military carried out propaganda among the population in the cities, saying that ‘the Musavat government was preventing the Red Army from passing through Azerbaijan to help Mustafa Kemal Pasha‘. The Red Army entered Baku with Turkish flags.” (Soysüren, 2018:43). Among the Turkish officers who played a role in and made efforts for the process of the Bolsheviks coming to power in Azerbaijan were individuals such as Halil Pasha, Küçük Talât, Fuat Sabit, Bahaaddin, Rifat, Yakup, Feyzullah Sacit, and Ahmet Bedi Trinıç. The latter later worked in the Soviet secret services. (Soysüren, 2018:44-45).
1 day after the April coup an independent republic was established in Azerbaijan. The TBMM government became the second republic after the RSFSR to recognize the independence of the Azerbaijan SSR. After that, Halil Pasha and Fuat Sabit went to Moscow on April 30 for negotiations. However, an uprising carried out by remnants of the ADR army in Ganja 1 month later prevented this negotiation process. Mustafa Kemal Pasha in his speech to TBMM harshly criticized the Musavatists who organized the uprising in Ganja, as well as Nuru Pasha who participated in the uprising in Karabakh: “As a result of the events in Poland, the Bolshevik government had to send as many forces as possible to this front line. The troops sent to Poland included the 11th Red Army and other Soviet units that were in Azerbaijan. Because of this their military power against the Armenians and Georgians in the Caucasus was diminished. It was at this moment that a reactionary uprising organized by the Azerbaijani Musavat government, which loved to kowtow to the British, broke out in the Ganja area, as a result of provocations by the British. After this event, the 11th Army suppressed the uprising what forces it had gathered. Nuru Pasha also participated in this uprising. Azerbaijani units numbering from two to three thousand men were under the command of this man. The British also somehow seduced this man and used his power for their own purposes.” After the Ganja uprising, Mustafa Kemal Pasha opened the first embassy of the Ankara government precisely in Baku in order to establish diplomatic relations with the Azerbaijan SSR and also to form a strong alliance (Şimşir, 2006:24).
The first ambassador of the Ankara government to Azerbaijan was Memduh Şevket Esendal. After the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, the contradictions between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Pasha, former supporters of the Union and Progress. Enver Pasha’s arrival in Baku in September 1920 to participate in the First Congress of the Peoples of the East was met with alarm by the government in Ankara. However, the leadership of the RSFSR as well as that of the Azerbaijan SSR made a decision. Rejecting an alliance with Enver Pasha, the Soviet leadership chose an alliance with Mustafa Kemal. Thus, the members of the Union and Progress began their struggle against the Soviets in Central Asia. Mustafa Kemal and his companions won the fight against the imperialist forces in the struggle for the liberation of Turkey. And the historical role of Azerbaijan and Russia in this victory will be always remembered.
References
In Azerbaijani
Rəsulzadə, M.Ə. (1991). Əsrimizin Siyavuşu. Gənclik. Baku. [Rasulzade, M.A. Siyavush of Our Century]
Şeyxzamanlı, N.B. (1997). Azərbaycan istiqlal mücadiləsi xatirələri. Baku. [Sheikhzamanli, N.B., Memoirs of Azerbaijan’s Independence Struggle].
http://web2.anl.az:81/read/page.php?bibid=26211&pno=1
Süleymanov, M. (1987). Eşitdiklərim, Oxuduqlarım, Gördüklərim. Baku: Azerbaijan. [Suleymanov, M. What I Have Heard, Read, and Seen]
https://www.history.az/pdf.php?item_id=20111109055128717&ext=pdf
In Turkish
Ağayev, M. (2006). Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Türkiye ve Azerbaycan İlişkileri. Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü [Ağayev, M. Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations in the Years of National Struggle. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Istanbul University Institute of Social Sciences]
http://nek.istanbul.edu.tr:4444/ekos/TEZ/41222.pdf
Akal, E. (2014). İştirakiyuncular, Komünistler ve Paşa Hazretleri: Moskova, Ankara, Londra Üçgeninde: Moskova-Ankara-Londra Üçgeninde. İletişim Yayınları. [Akal, E. Iştirakiyunists, Communists and His Excellency Pasha in the Triangle of Moscow-Ankara-London]
Baykara, H. (1975). Azerbaycan istiklal mücadelesi tarihi. Azerbaycan Halk Yayınları. [Baykara, H. The History of Azerbaijan’s Struggle for Independence.]
Cebesoy, A.F. (2002). Moskova Hatıraları, Milli Mücadele ve Bolşevik Rusya. Hazırlayan: Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, Temel Yayınları, Istanbul. [Cebesoy, A.F. Moscow Memories, National Struggle and Bolshevik Russia. Edited by Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu]
DAĞISTAN, A. (1996). Millî Mücadele’de Mustafa Suphi Olayı. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, 12(34), 171-193. [Dağistan, A. Mustafa Suphi incident in the national struggle. Journal of Atatürk Research Center]
https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1680709
İleri, R.N. (2005). Atatürk ve komünizm: Kurtuluş Savaşı stratejisi. İleri Yayınları. [İleri, R.N. Atatürk and Communism: The Strategy of the War of Independence]
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Karabekir, K. (2008). İstiklal Harbimiz. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları. [Karabekir, K. Our War of Independence]
https://www.ebooks.az/download/I7wP5beO.pdf?token=lBkz7HE3Ju
KORKMAZCAN, N.S. Atatürk’ün Dış Politika Anlayışının TBMM’nin İlk Dış Politika Kararı Üzerinden Değerlendirilmesi. Aydın İnsan ve Toplum Dergisi, 2(4), 99-124. [Korkmazcan, N.S. Evaluation of Atatürk’s understanding of foreign policy based on the first foreign policy decision of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Aydın Human and Society Journal]
https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/651172
Paşa, H. (1972). Bitmeyen Savaş,(haz. Taylan Sorgun). Yaylacık Matbaası, Istanbul. [Pasha, H. The Never-Ending War, (ed. Taylan Sorgun).]
https://turuz.com/az/book/title/Bitmeyen+Savash-Xelil+Pasha-1972-331s
RESULZADE, M.E. (1990). Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti (Keyfiyet-i Teşekkülü ve Şimdiki Vaziyeti),(Haz.) Yavuz Akpınar. İrfan Murat Yıldırım, Sabahattin Çağrı, İstanbul: Azerbaycan Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği Yayınları. [Rasulzade, M.E. (1990). Azerbaijan Republic (Quality of Formation and Current Situation), (Ed.) Yavuz Akpinar. Irfan Murat Yıldırım, Sabahattin Çağrı, Istanbul: Azerbaijan Turks Culture and Solidarity Association Publications.]
Soysüren, A.H. (2018) Azerbaycanın’ın Bolşevikleştirilmesi süreci ve Türkiye’nin rolü bağlamında Azerbaycanlı milliyetçilerin yaklaşımı, 27-66. [Soysüren, A.H. The approach of Azerbaijani nationalists in the context of the Bolshevization of Azerbaijan and the role of Turkey]
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Şamıyeva, H. (2018). Milli Mücadele dönemi Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve Kâzım Karabekir Paşa’nın Azerbaycan ve bolşeviklik hakkındaki düşünceleri, 17-30. [Şamıyeva, H. Thoughts of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Kâzım Karabekir Pasha about Azerbaijan and Bolshevism during the period of the War of Independence]
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Şimşir, B. N. (2006). Cumhuriyetin İlk Çeyrek Yüzyılında Türk Diplomatik Temsilcilikleri ve Temsilcileri (1920-1950). Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, 22(64-65-66), 15-90. [Şimşir, B.N. Turkish Diplomatic Representations and Representatives in the First Quarter Century of the Republic (1920-1950). Journal of Atatürk Research Center]
https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/680774
Tekerek, M. (2019). Azerbaycan Türkiye İlişkilerinde Azerbaycan Yardımları ve Azerbaycan’ın Sovyetleşmesi Meselesi (1918-1920). Atatürk Üniversitesi Atatürk Dergisi, 8(2), 263-283. [Tekerek, M. Azerbaijani Aid in Azerbaijan-Turkey Relations and the Issue of Sovietization of Azerbaijan (1918-1920). Atatürk University, Journal of Atatürk]
https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/895182
In Russian
Гусейнов И. (1967). Борьба за победу Советской власти в Азербайджане, 1918-1920: документы и материалы. Издательство АН АзССР. [Huseynov I. The Fight for the Victory of Soviet Power in Azerbaijan, 1918-1920: Documents and Materials. Publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR.]
[1] It should be noted that among these groups, the ones with truly Communist ideals were Mustafa Suphi and his supporters from the third group. (Dağıstan, 1996:176-177).
[2] This was the name for the territories that came under the control of the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Batum, Kars, Ardahan).
[3] A total of 4 battalions were formed from Turkish prisoners of war in 1918-1920.