Under the agreement, Russia’s peacekeeping mission was meant to be limited to 1,960 motor rifle troops with light weapons and armored personnel carriers, though both the number of troops in this contingent and its military equipment soon exceeded the limits (Interfax, November 12, 2020; TASS, December 2, 2020, see EDM, January 22, 2021). Russia’s peacekeeper withdrawal marks a significant turning point in Russian influence in the South Caucasus, as Russia will not have its involvement in mediating the Karabakh conflict as leverage over Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The three parties never reached an agreement concerning the overall mandate of the peacekeeping force. Statements from the Armenian side point to a document that was proposed by Russia and approved by Armenia to define the legal framework of the peacekeeping. This document consisted of a peacekeepers’ mandate, which Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan claimed was a part of the trilateral statement between the leaders of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which described the five-year peacekeeping term. Mirzoyan pointed out that Azerbaijan, however, did not sign the document and questioned the effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission (Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1, 2021). Baku was never pleased with the presence of Russia’s troops on its territory and often criticized the mission for its failure to ensure the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Karabakh, as envisioned under the trilateral statement (see EDM, September 22, 2021).
According to Azerbaijani media sources, the Russian peacekeeping forces had already transferred control of the Khudavang monastery in the Kalbajar region to Azerbaijani law enforcement several days before publicly announcing their withdrawal on April 16 (Apa.az, April 16). The peacekeeping contingent departed from Azerbaijan through Dagestan, whereas they had entered Karabakh via the Lachin road from Armenia in November 2020. The withdrawal comes 18 months before the mission’s scheduled conclusion in November 2025, despite the trilateral statement allowing for a possible extension of another five years (President.az, November 10, 2020).
Hikmet Hajiyev, foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, told the media that “the early withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers … has been decided by the leaders of both countries” (APA, April 17). Aleksey Zhuravlev, first deputy chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on Defense, stated that the mission of the peacekeeping contingent could be considered “fully accomplished.” He stressed that, since there are currently no warring parties in Karabakh, there is no more need for the peacekeeping mission (RIA Novosti, April 17).
This was followed by an announcement from the Turkish Defense Ministry about the closure of the joint Russian-Turkish monitoring center that had been established in the region by a January 2021 trilateral agreement (APA, April 18). The center was created to monitor the ceasefire regime and prevent violations of law in the Karabakh region. Overall, it had minimal impact and failed to prevent violations of the ceasefire regime, which led to Azerbaijan’s unilateral move to remove the separatist entity in September 2023 (see EDM, September 20, 28, October 4, 2023.
The departure of Russian peacekeepers from Azerbaijan is a significant development for the South Caucasus. It marked the first time Russian armed units left the territory of a post-Soviet state voluntarily and prematurely (Kommersant, April 17). Many analysts in the region contemplate the reasons behind this unexpected and unprecedented event, raising questions about how the two countries (Russia and Azerbaijan) agreed on this (Jam News, April 18). The realities on the ground have changed radically over the past three and a half years since the peacekeeping contingent’s deployment in November 2020. The conditions that would have necessitated the peacekeepers’ mission collapsed following the removal of the Armenian separatist entity in Karabakh and the exodus of the local Armenian population in September 2023 (see EDM, September 20, 2023).
Russian President Vladimir Putin indirectly announced the possibility of withdrawing the peacekeeping units a few weeks after the collapse of the separatist regime in Karabakh. In October 2023, Putin told reporters that it would soon be necessary to determine, in a dialogue with partners, what to do with the Russian peacekeeping unit in Karabakh, as the situation changed following Armenia’s recognition of this region as part of Azerbaijan (Interfax.ru, October 13, 2023).
The timing of the withdrawal raises questions. Less than two weeks before the announcement, the head of the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action announced at a briefing on April 4 that negotiations have been ongoing with Moscow regarding the involvement of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in demining operations. “They are already undergoing accreditation. Technicians, dogs, and manpower will soon start the demining process in Khojaly,” he said (Modern.az, April 4). Whether this plan is in force or was canceled following the latest events remains unclear.
Russia’s withdrawal of its peacekeeping mission signifies a considerable strategic development that underscores the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and the cessation of the “Karabakh card” as leverage for Moscow’s dealings with Baku. The removal of foreign forces from its soil has significantly strengthened Azerbaijan’s geopolitical standing. Baku avoided a diplomatic scandal or military stand-off in reasserting its sovereignty and territorial integrity, opening the door for regional peace and for Azerbaijan to become a more influential regional player.
Dr. Vasif Huseynov is a senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and Adjunct Lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan.
