Azerbaijan sits in one of the world’s roughest neighborhoods, squeezed between Russia to the north and Iran to the south.
Over the past few years, the small, secular but Muslim-majority nation has faced tensions with both Russia and Iran. Relations with Moscow cooled after Russian air defenses accidentally downed an Azerbaijani airliner last December, killing 38. Meanwhile, repeated Iranian threats—including support for the Husseiniyyun, a radical Shia proxy operating terrorist cells in the country and large-scale military exercises on the border—have kept the nation on edge.
Yet Azerbaijan is more than a country at the mercy of large neighbors. It also offers a rare strategic opening for Washington with immediate payoffs in trade, energy security, and regional deterrence.
Baku controls a key stretch of the Middle Corridor—the only land route from Europe to Asia that bypasses both Russia and Iran. It already supplies natural gas to Europe and has helped ease tensions between Jerusalem and Ankara. It has become a bridge to Central Asia, a region the United States has recently prioritized as it seeks alternatives to Chinese rare earths.
President Donald Trump has recently moved to capitalize on Azerbaijan’s rise. This year, Washington replaced Russia as lead mediator in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks, leading to an August 8 peace summit, one of the largest US foreign policy achievements in the South Caucasus. Referred to as the “Washington Declaration” in political circles, the summit led to concrete pledges to resolve the most sensitive issues preventing normalization. The question now is whether Washington will treat this as a standalone diplomatic win or the foundation of a broader strategy.
One early test will be the speed of the implementation of a transport corridor through Armenia’s Syunik province, recently rebranded by regional leaders as the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” or TRIPP. The argument for speed is more than commercial. The Republic of Georgia—once Washington’s regional darling—has edged closer to Moscow under the Georgian Dream government, leaving the current Middle Corridor route more exposed to pro-Russian influence.
Armenia, by contrast, has taken real steps away from Russia under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, including suspending active participation in the CSTO, strengthening ties with the United States and European Union, and removing Russian border guards from Zvartnots Airport. Regional experts have linked recent cargo delays through Georgia affecting both Armenia and Azerbaijan to Russian pressure. If true, Vladimir Putin already possesses the ability to squeeze Middle Corridor transit. The sooner TRIPP is constructed, the sooner the region can secure a transit route outside of Moscow’s reach.
One obstacle to TRIPP, however, is Armenia’s fraught political landscape. An active measures campaign waged by the Kremlin, combined with low government approval ratings, could slow implementation. Washington can reinforce warming relations with Armenia to help overcome this obstacle—in ways that also promote the peace process.
Targeted investment in growth sectors such as Armenia’s emerging AI industry, which recently secured millions of dollars in investment from NVIDIA, would help show voters ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections that a post-conflict, West-aligned future comes with concrete economic benefits. Peace agreements are more durable when paired with jobs, infrastructure, and a credible path to prosperity.
Iran has been the most vocal opponent of TRIPP. A senior advisor to the Supreme Leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, has labeled the project a national security threat and vowed to turn the region into a “graveyard of the mercenaries of Donald Trump.” Tehran’s fear is easy to parse: a US-supported corridor would place Iran’s border with Armenia under effective Western oversight.
Azerbaijan has responded by strengthening deterrence with significant help from Israel. Baku’s recent unveiling of the Israeli Ice Breaker precision-guided missile at a military parade and the high-profile visit of Dr. Daniel Gold, architect of many of Israel’s most advanced systems, signal what Israeli outlet Maariv describes as “cooperation at the deepest levels.” Military analysts say the Ice Breaker could reshape Caspian naval deterrence.
Iran’s government is struggling, amid the aftereffects of last June’s joint Israeli-US strikes, a looming water crisis, and an economy at a low ebb. This is a moment for Washington to move beyond quiet coordination with Israel and Azerbaijan toward a more explicit strategic dialogue—akin to the working groups that followed the Abraham Accords—that treats the Caspian flank as part of broader planning against Iran across the Persian Gulf and Red Sea theaters. Netanyahu has called for formal trilateral cooperation. For the United States, the logic is straightforward: Deterrence is stronger when it is coordinated and visible.
The upside extends further. Any stable trade route to Central Asia that avoids Russia, China, and Iran must pass through Azerbaijan, making Baku the central access point to Central Asia’s mineral wealth and a hedge against China’s rare-earth dominance. The United States still depends on China for nearly 70 percent of its rare earth supply—a strategic vulnerability Beijing has already exploited twice this year—underscoring the urgency of diversification. That reality should make Baku less a peripheral partner than a central access point for a US-aligned connectivity strategy.
Azerbaijan has embraced this role as a bridge nation. Its leadership in the Organization of Turkic States and its inclusion in Central Asia’s consultative format—expanding the traditional C5 of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to the C6—reflect an emerging vision of a unified region. Building on that framework, Washington could explore a C6+2 concept that formally includes Israel alongside Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states. This would create a practical platform for coordination on infrastructure, cybersecurity, water management, and corridor security. It could also amplify US influence in a region long dominated by Russia and China.
Finally, Congress should repeal Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. The 1992 restriction on US assistance to Azerbaijan was crafted during the first Karabakh war over Azerbaijan’s blockade and use of force against Armenia. In the wake of the current peace momentum, it has outlived its usefulness. Repealing it would remove an outdated barrier to a relationship that is becoming central to US strategy in the region.
Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine and Iran’s mounting internal crises have created a narrow window. A secure east-west corridor, a sustainable Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement, and credible deterrence against Tehran are all within reach—but only if Washington treats Azerbaijan as the pivotal state it has become rather than another peripheral partner. Windows of this kind rarely stay open long.
Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center, a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University.
