Former Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov, in an interview with Minval.az, stated that Russia will continue its anti-Azerbaijani campaign following President Ilham Aliyev’s cancellation of his visit to Moscow on May 9 for the Victory Parade.
“I don’t have verified information, but I get the impression that, apart from the obvious reason related to the crash of our aircraft, I personally do not rule out the existence of other factors that have not yet been disclosed. These are primarily connected to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. We must understand that the conflict itself was essentially created to be manipulated—used to influence and control the politics of both Armenia and Azerbaijan,” he said.
According to Zulfugarov, the upcoming elections in Armenia bring renewed focus on who will lead the country and what direction it will take.
“It’s evident that Pashinyan has image problems. It’s also known that there was a previous attempt to promote Ruben Vardanyan. After his time in the peacekeeping-controlled zone, there were open discussions in Armenia suggesting he would transition into Armenian politics as a rival to Pashinyan. These assumptions came from Armenian analysts themselves,” Zulfugarov noted.
The former minister believes the Kremlin may now want Vardanyan to be released in order to reenter Armenia’s political arena—this time as a pro-Russian figure with strong ties to the West who could effectively replace Pashinyan.
At the same time, he added, old political players like Sargsyan and Kocharyan are no longer viable competitors. “This isn’t insider knowledge, but my opinion as an analyst.”
“Attempts to pressure Azerbaijan have not ceased. Looking at Russian media platforms, it seems that certain controlled actors have been activated and unleashed with specific narratives. Pressuring campaigns targeting both Azerbaijan and its president are being orchestrated by some power structures. When I refer to ‘power structures,’ we recognize the nature of Russia’s decentralized governance. Different Kremlin factions appear to be playing their own games and undergoing internal transformations. These are closed processes, and one can only draw conclusions based on indirect evidence,” he explained.
Zulfugarov believes the pressure on Azerbaijan will continue.
“Given the significant efforts following Pashinyan’s failed attempts to gain Western support—and with the return of Trump potentially making that even less feasible—his participation in the parade signals Armenia’s desire to return under Russia’s protection. I see this as a mutual intention. Certain pro-Armenian circles in Russia also want to ensure this shift,” he said.
The campaign against Azerbaijan, in his view, is tied to the post-conflict period of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war.
When asked about the continued operation of the “Russian House” and Sputnik in Baku—platforms through which Moscow seeks to assert its interests—Zulfugarov said: “Moscow typically engages in demonstrative actions to express its displeasure. Subtle hints are not characteristic of the Kremlin’s style—they prefer, let’s say, undiplomatic moves. From this perspective, any available tool, including the ‘Russian House’ and others, will be used.”
He added that Baku must always seek to understand the underlying motives behind such actions.
“There will be ongoing provocations under various pretexts. Furthermore, a new element is emerging: Azerbaijan’s ally, Turkey, is becoming the venue for Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. Therefore, I believe this slow-burn pressure campaign will continue. While those negotiations are ongoing, we might not see overtly anti-Azerbaijani actions—although it’s hard to predict what games the Kremlin leadership might play,” Zulfugarov concluded.
